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 Abstract 
 
Essays in Corporate Finance  
 
Rachel E. Gordon 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation consists of one chapter studying the information possessed by outside 
directors before mergers and two chapters related to firms and their advisor relationships.   
The three essays in my dissertation explore various areas of corporate finance. My first 
paper titled “Are they in the know? Assessing outside director private information in M&A” 
examines trades by acquirer outside directors to test whether these directors are informed about 
upcoming mergers and whether they trade on this information for personal gain. Empirical 
evidence provides strong support of these hypotheses. Opportunistic trading in pre-merger 
months by outside directors is associated with the likelihood of a merger announcement and these 
trades appear correlated with deal quality. Outside directors sell shares before less valuable deals 
and purchase shares before more value-enhancing ones, suggesting that outside directors use their 
private information in self-serving ways. This relationship appears to be concentrated in harder to 
value firms and intensifies when a greater number of outside directors on the board trade in the 
same direction. Furthermore, there is evidence that this behavior occurs in firms with high levels 
of CEO power signifying that underlying agency problems may exist for some of these firms. 
   The second essay titled “Why hire your rival? The case of bank debt underwriting,” with 
David Becher and Jennifer Juergens, explores the previously undocumented debt underwriting 
relationship for financial firms.  These firms are unique in that they are the only firms both able 
and capable of underwriting their own securities issuances.  We find, however, that publicly 
traded investment and commercial banks (“banks”)  hire a rival in nearly 30% of all their debt 
issuances from 1979-2014.  Further, the use of rivals is not limited to small, low ranked, or 
commercial banks as large, high quality, or investment banks also tend to engage rivals. 
x 
 Traditional (bank expertise and information sharing) as well as bank-specific (capacity 
constraints and limited distribution networks) motivations help explain why banks hire a 
rival.  Evidence also suggests that the decision to use a rival to underwrite debt offerings affects 
fees. Collectively, these results expand our understanding of banks’ underwriter choice and show 
that despite the potential costs, banks pervasively hire their rivals. 
  The last essay titled “Are firm-advisor relationships valuable? A long-term perspective,” 
with David Becher and Jennifer Juergens, examines long-term firm-advisor relations using an 
extended history of debt, equity, and merger transactions. Hard-to-value firms are more likely to 
maintain dedicated advisor relations (underwriters or merger advisors). Firms that retain 
predominantly one advisor over their entire transaction history pay higher underwriting/advisory 
fees, have inferior deal terms, and have lower analyst coverage relative to those that employ 
many advisors. When we condition on a firm’s information environment as a catalyst for long-
term advisor retention, riskier firms obtain better terms when they utilize a variety of advisors, 
but informationally-opaque firms do not. Our results suggest that only some firms benefit from 
long-term advisor retention. 
 
 
Keywords: Insider trading; corporate governance; mergers, capital markets, debt issuance,  
 
                  underwriting, advisory relationship  
 
JEL Codes: G14; G21; G24; G32; G34; G38 
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CHAPTER 1: ARE THEY IN THE KNOW?  
           ASSESSING OUTSIDE DIRECTOR PRIVATE INFORMATION IN M&A1 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines trades by acquirer outside directors to test whether these directors are 
informed about upcoming mergers and whether they trade on this information for personal gain. 
Empirical evidence provides strong support of these hypotheses. Opportunistic trading in pre-
merger months by outside directors is associated with the likelihood of a merger announcement 
and these trades appear correlated with deal quality. Outside directors sell shares before less 
valuable deals and purchase shares before more value-enhancing ones, suggesting that outside 
directors use their private information in self-serving ways. Overall, mergers with outside director 
selling beforehand are associated with 29% lower announcement returns and those with buying 
have 14% higher announcement returns. This relationship appears to be concentrated in harder to 
value firms and intensifies when a greater number of outside directors on the board trade. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that this behavior occurs in firms with high levels of CEO power 
signifying that underlying agency problems may exist for some of these firms.   
 
Keywords: Insider trading; corporate governance; mergers 
 
JEL Classifications: G14; G34 
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1. Introduction 
Outside directors are tasked with representing shareholders’ interests through monitoring 
management, providing advice, and promoting value-enhancing decisions.  The significance of 
their role is especially important around events with major wealth implications for shareholders. 
Acquisitions, for example, are highly uncertain transactions where the deal quality and the impact 
on shareholder value are difficult to determine ex-ante.  In order to make informed decisions 
about the quality of an upcoming deal as well as carry out their duties effectively, outside 
directors should have private information about the merger.  While private knowledge may enable 
outside directors to be effective monitors, it also gives them the opportunity to use this 
information for private benefit.  This paper examines acquirer outside director trades in the 
months before a merger to test the joint hypothesis that acquirer directors are informed about 
upcoming mergers and that they use this information for personal gain.2 
Prior studies suggest that trades by outside directors (hereafter referred to as OD) before 
specific firm events, such as earnings restatements, may be driven by private information (Ravina 
and Sapienza, 2010). Mergers provide an opportunity for ODs to trade on their informational 
advantage as mergers are unique, non-routine events that can considerably alter firm value.  
Unlike routine events such as earnings announcements, mergers are less likely to have trading 
restrictions (Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon, 2000) and tend to have lengthy negotiation windows 
(Boone and Mulherin, 2007).  Active purchasing or selling in the company’s stock by outside 
directors in the months leading up to a deal provides potentially valuable signals about their 
private information concerning the quality or wealth implications of the merger.   
Studies that have previously examined insider trading in acquirers, however, focus 
primarily on managers or treat insiders as a homogenous group (Seyhun, 1990; Boehmer and 
                                                            
2 While it is difficult to test whether outside directors are effective monitors or the quality of their 
information directly, personal trades are used as a proxy for their private information (Seyhun, 1990; 
Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Ravina and Sapienza, 2010).  
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Netter, 1997; Billet and Qian, 2008).3  The objective in this paper is to assess whether ODs have 
private information about upcoming mergers to be effective in their roles.  While CEOs are 
definitely informed about an impending deal (Akbulut, 2013), the extent ODs are informed is less 
clear.  By analyzing OD trades, it is possible to identify if they have private information and 
whether they use that information.  If ODs have information that allows them to evaluate merger 
quality and they trade on this information, then the direction of their trades before a merger 
should be related to merger returns.4   
 I obtain data on public, private, and subsidiary mergers as well as data on insider trades 
from 1992 to 2013 to identify the incidence of outside director trading before mergers.5  My 
primary proxy of private information is opportunistic sales or purchases by acquirer ODs in the 
six months before a deal announcement.6  I examine the correlation between OD trades and the 
likelihood of a merger occurring within the next month to identify whether trades are predictive 
of future mergers.  In the sample, 60% of firms with trades by the board engage in a merger 
during the twenty-one year period. I find that opportunistic trading by ODs in a given six-month 
period is positively correlated with the likelihood of a deal occurring in the following month.   
While the positive correlation suggests that outside directors trade on private information 
about a merger, it is not clear whether their information is sufficient to assess the quality of that 
deal.  To determine if ODs have merger-specific information, I examine the association between 
the direction of OD trades and deal quality, where quality is measured as three-day merger 
announcement returns and one or two year long-run returns.  Merger announcement returns 
measure information about potential deal benefits to an acquiring firm and its shareholders 
                                                            
3 Insiders are defined by the SEC as corporate officers, all board members (including outside directors), and 
beneficial owners with more than 10% equity ownership.   
4 For smaller or more informationally opaque firms, ODs face fewer restrictions and less scrutiny, (Jeng, 
Metrick, and Zeckhauser, 2003; Fidrmuc, Goergen, and Renneboog, 2006).  In addition, ODs may be more 
likely to trade opportunistically given that they do not depend on the firm for employment.  
5 I follow previous literature that includes private, public, and subsidiary targets (Fuller, Netter and 
Stegemoller, 2002; Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004; 2005).   
6 I define opportunistic trades following the algorithm defined by Cohen. Malloy, and Pomorski (2012), 
which classifies and removes routine trades by insiders. 
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(Moeller et al., 2004).  Long-run returns link whether a firm’s long-run performance is consistent 
with market reactions at the deal announcement and are less likely to be impacted by information 
asymmetry that may exist at announcement (Chen, Harford, and Li, 2007). 
Focusing on mergers with OD trades, ODs engage in both buying and selling in 16% of 
deals, but in 55% and 29% of the deals respectively only selling or only buying.  Merger 
announcement returns are 32 bps lower when ODs only sell compared to deals without any trades 
by ODs. This implies a 29% lower return based on average deal announcement returns (1.10%).  
Comparatively, when ODs engage in pre-merger purchases, the announcement returns are 15 bps 
higher, resulting in 14% higher returns.  The findings from long-run returns further support this 
link between OD trades and merger quality.  The direction of OD trades and returns indicates that 
ODs appear to have private information regarding the quality of upcoming deals. 
As monitors of the firm, one expectation of shareholders is that ODs will have access to 
private information about important firm events; given our findings on OD trading prior to 
mergers, this appears to be the case.  ODs, however, appear to strategically use this information to 
sell before low quality mergers and buy before high quality mergers, suggesting that there are 
agency conflicts that arise from their foreknowledge of upcoming mergers.  I thus anticipate that 
these conflicts are likely to be exacerbated when ODs have access to more valuable information 
and when external monitoring is likely to be weaker. 
The information in an insider’s trade could be impacted by a firm’s information 
asymmetry (Aboody and Lev, 2000).  If external investors have a greater difficulty valuing an 
acquirer and/or target firm, then outside directors’ access to private information should give them 
a greater advantage in attaining profits through pre-merger trading. To proxy for information 
asymmetry, I implement several measures including research and development (R&D) expenses, 
analyst coverage, deal size, and private status. Returns associated with OD trades appear 
concentrated in acquirers with high information asymmetry.  For example, selling by ODs in high 
R&D acquirers is associated with a 33 bps reduction in announcement returns.  
4
 
 
 
 
Further, the presence of external monitors (e.g. institutions and blockholders) may alter 
an outside directors’ opportunity or willingness to trade on private information. Stronger external 
governance mechanisms should reduce the extent to which ODs act in self-serving ways and 
make them less likely to take advantage of their private knowledge (Hermalin and Weisbach, 
2003; Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010). If ODs trade in firms with high external monitoring, then 
the benefits to trading must outweigh potential costs. While higher levels of external monitoring 
reduce the likelihood of ODs trading before a merger, I find that when ODs trade in these firms, 
their trades are associated with larger returns than trades in firms with low levels of monitoring. 
The results suggest that ODs trade when private information is most profitable for them to do so. 
Next, I identify if the number and intensity of ODs trading impacts the relationship 
between their trades and merger announcement returns.  In some instances, only one OD trades 
on his private information.  If the majority of ODs trade, however, this suggests a potentially 
deeper conflict of interest. I find an increase in the association between OD trades and deal 
quality when the number of ODs trading increases.  A change from one or two ODs selling to 
three or four ODs selling corresponds to an additional 26% lower announcement return whereas 
the same change in purchase intensity corresponds to an additional 80% higher announcement 
return. This analysis suggests that trades by multiple ODs send a greater signal to the market 
about the quality of an upcoming merger.  However, when a majority of ODs on the board sell 
before poorer quality deals, this indicates an underlying agency problem.7   
One explanation for these findings may be related to a CEO’s influence; ODs may not be 
able to control board decisions with an overtly powerful CEO. I use several proxies for CEO 
power: tenure, CEO-Chairman duality, ownership, and CEO Entrenchment Index.  In general, I 
find that firms with high CEO power are more likely to have the majority of the outside directors 
                                                            
7 Although the potential for harm to shareholders is reduced when ODs purchase before good mergers, they 
are still extracting rents at the shareholders’ expense by trading in advance of merger announcements based 
on their private information. 
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selling before a deal.   These results suggest that outside directors may vote with their shares in 
firms where they are unable to prevent a merger from occurring.  
 Given that outside directors appear to use their private information to trade before deals, 
it raises the question of whether shareholders can follow ODs trading schemes to earn abnormal 
returns.  One requirement is that investors are aware of both the merger announcement as well as 
the OD trade.8  I construct long-short portfolios, segmented on size and book-to-market, buying 
stocks with OD purchases and shorting those with OD sales.9  Four of the nine long-short 
portfolios (concentrated in high book-to-market firms) have significant monthly alphas ranging 
from 38 to 65 bps per month (4.5% to 7.8% annually).  These results imply that investors could 
use OD trades around mergers to create profitable trading strategies.   
Governance theory suggests outside directors should represent shareholders’ interests by 
both advising and monitoring a firm’s management.  This requires access to private, often 
valuable, information by ODs.  My results show that OD trading before a merger is pervasive, 
confirming both that ODs have access to private information and that they benefit from trading in 
the direction of their information.  Further, this conflict is intensified when there is less external 
monitoring and when directors may have less control over board decisions. 
 
2. Literature Overview 
2.A. Outside Directors and Mergers  
Outside directors have an important responsibility to represent shareholders’ interests 
(Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner, 1997; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003).  Their external position 
brings new perspectives regarding firm strategies that may differ from inside directors (Kaplan 
                                                            
8 Since SEC regulations require directors to report their trades shortly thereafter, investors know at the deal 
announcement whether OD trades preceded a deal.  Prior to 2002, the SEC required insiders to file a Form 
4 within 10 days following the month of their traded. After August 2002, the SEC required insiders to file 
by the second business day after their trade.  
9 Differences between portfolio returns may stem from merger announcement returns differing between 
small and large acquirers (Moeller et al., 2004). Further, poor long-term performance after mergers tends to 
be concentrated in low book-to-market firms (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998).  
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and Reishus, 1990; Celikyurt, Sevilir, and Shivdasani, 2014), and their advisory role should help 
management make value-enhancing decisions.  Past studies document that outsider dominated 
boards engage in different decisions compared to those of predominantly insider boards (Bhagat 
and Black, 1999; see Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) for a summary).   
The decision making abilities and influence of outside directors are extremely important, 
particularly with regards to mergers.  Mergers and acquisitions tend to be large, non-routine 
events, with massive wealth implications, which entail significant negotiations by all parties.  For 
shareholders, it matters whether ODs have private knowledge about the merger and are brought 
into negotiations early to exercise their advisory roles (Byrd and Hickman, 1992).  ODs should 
have knowledge about the deal to assess its value and the impact on the firm (Cotter et al., 1997).  
The question of how outside directors use this private information in merger decision-
making remains unclear. While the purpose of providing ODs with private knowledge is to ensure 
that these directors make good decisions about prospective mergers, ODs may use this private 
information to trade for personal gain (Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010). If a director’s information 
suggests a merger will harm firm value, he may be more inclined to sell shares prior to a deal to 
avoid an anticipated drop in price.  This may particularly be the case in firms where the CEO has 
large amounts of power over the board and can control the decision-making (Shivdasani and 
Yermack, 1999). Conversely, if the outside director’s information indicates a value-enhancing 
merger, he may purchase shares to capitalize on the expected post-merger benefits.  In general, if 
OD trades are associated with abnormal returns and merger quality, this would indicate that 
outside directors have information required to make a decision regarding an upcoming deal and 
they trade based on this private information.   
2.B. Insider Trading and Mergers 
 Trades by insiders are a common proxy to assess private information. Collectively, prior 
studies suggest that insider trades contain private information and provide predictive signals of 
future firm activity. Seyhun (1986) finds that insiders earn abnormal returns as they purchase 
7
 
 
 
 
(sell) stock before abnormal stock price increases (decreases). Lakonishok and Lee (2001) find 
that insider purchases earn abnormal returns of 6% per year, while Cohen, Malloy, and Pomorski 
(2012) find that both sales and purchases predict subsequent returns. Several papers explore 
insider trading prior to various firm events: equity issuances (Lee, 1997; Kahle, 2000); news 
announcements (Fidrmuc et al., 2006; Korczak, Korczak, and Lasfer, 2010); bankruptcy (Seyhun 
and Bradley, 1997); SEC filings (Huddart, Ke, and Shi, 2007); and mergers (Seyhun, 1990).  
  Even though the SEC prohibits insider trading based on private information, mergers 
provide a unique event where insiders may trade on nonpublic, material knowledge with less fear 
of incrimination. First, mergers typically have an extended negotiation window where 
information is relayed to directors, but not dispersed to the public (Boone and Mulherin, 2007).  
Second, unlike common events such as earnings announcements, mergers are less likely to have 
trading restrictions (Bettis et al., 2000).  In the event that a firm does have restrictions or blackout 
windows in place concerning a merger, Jagolinzer, Larcker, and Taylor (2011) find that insider 
trades still occur and are profitable within restricted windows. Third, outside directors may have 
less scrutiny than CEOs or inside directors providing them with greater freedom to engage in 
trading actions (Fidrmuc et al., 2006).    
The research on insider trading and mergers presents mixed results. Seyhun (1990) 
examines the 18-month window surrounding 339 merger announcements and finds that, on 
average, insiders tend to purchase more shares in acquirer firms compared to non-acquirer firms; 
but finds no differences in sales. Conversely, Boehmer and Netter (1997) do not find any 
differences in trades by insiders in the year around a merger announcement, possibly due to 
increased trading regulations during their sample time frame. Korczak et al. (2010) group merger 
announcements with other news and find that insiders increase (decrease) purchases (sales) before 
good events (bad news).  It is difficult to identify the specific effect of a merger, however, since 
all news events are grouped together.  In addition, numerous studies focus on target firms and 
insiders (Keown and Pinkerton, 1981; Agrawal and Nasser, 2012). The motivation behind 
8
 
 
 
 
personal trading decisions for insiders in targets, however, may differ from acquirers as a target 
OD’s employment may change in the newly merged firm (Harford, 2003). 
2.C. Insiders as a Non-Homogenous Group 
Many studies regarding insider trading treat insiders as a single homogenous group or 
focus only on top executives, particularly when examining returns (Jaffe, 1974; Seyhun and 
Bradley, 1997; Marin and Olivier, 2008).  When analyzing the information content of insider 
trades before mergers, aggregating all insiders together can impose severe limitations and 
interpretation issues.  For example, lower level executives or large shareholders may be unaware 
of the upcoming merger (Akbulut, 2013).  Additionally, large shareholders tend to trade the 
largest dollar volume of stock with both purchases and sales than any other insider type and 
usually trade for non-informative reasons (Seyhun, 1986; Ravina and Sapienza, 2010).  By 
grouping all insiders together, it is unclear which group possesses private information and which 
group may act on that private information.  
Moreover, distinct groups of insiders possess varying amounts of private information 
(Seyhun, 1986; Seyhun and Bradley, 1997; Jeng et al., 2003). The information across insider 
groups may drive their actions (Gordon and Pound, 1993; Edmans, 2009), particularly with 
regards to trading. For example, inside directors may have a better advantage when it comes to 
assessing firm strategies (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990).  Thereby, allowing these directors to 
act more quickly on their private information.  Inside directors or CEOs, however, may face 
increased scrutiny by the market, shareholders, and regulators making them less inclined to trade 
on private information (Jeng et al., 2003; Fidrmuc et al., 2006) than outside directors who are less 
likely to face such scrutiny. 
When segregating types of insiders, early research presents mixed results on which 
insiders are more likely to have private information.  Prior research finds that executives tend to 
have the highest returns to their trades, implying they are the most informed (Seyhun, 1986).  
Seyhun (1986) shows that officer trades contain the most private information, followed by the 
9
 
 
 
 
chairman, directors, large shareholders, and then lower employees of the firm.  More recent 
literature, however, suggests that the highest executives (i.e., CEO, Chairman, or President) in a 
firm actually earn lower abnormal returns than other insiders (Jeng et al., 2003; Fidrmuc et al., 
2006), perhaps due to higher levels of scrutiny and firm trading restrictions. With regards to ODs, 
Ravina and Sapienza (2010) find that purchases of both independent directors and executives earn 
abnormal returns and the information content of the two groups appears to be quite similar.  
Further, Cao, Dhaliwal, Li, and Yang (2014) find that ODs socially connected to firm executives 
tend to earn higher returns and sell more stock prior to bad news than unconnected outside 
directors. 
 Most research involving insider trading and acquirers tends to exclude outside directors.  
Seyhun (1990) and Boehmer and Netter (1997) only examine insider trades by “top managers,” 
defined as “chairpersons of the board of directors, persons who are officers and directors, 
controlling persons, and general partners.” They specifically exclude ODs and other firm 
employees.  Billet and Qian (2008) focus solely on CEOs, while Akbulut (2013) removes outside 
directors and non-executive blockholders/employees from his sample. Studies on acquirers, in 
general, do not separate ODs from other insiders prior to a merger; thus, it is unclear if these 
directors possess private information around deals.10  I contribute to this literature by separating 
acquirer OD trades before mergers from those of insider directors and CEOs to identify whether 
outside directors are informed, the type of information they possess, and whether they use this 
information for personal benefit. 
 
 
 
                                                            
10 Agrawal and Nasser (2012) document that target directors engage in passive insider trading by 
decreasing sales more than purchases prior to the takeover announcement, increasing overall net purchases.  
Passive insider trading is not as profitable as active insider trading, but is legal. Acquirer outside directors 
may also engage in passive trading behavior before mergers rather than active trading behavior.   
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3. Data and Methodology 
3.A. Dataset Creation 
I construct two different datasets: Trading and Merger datasets.  The Trading dataset 
consists of all director trades and examines whether opportunistic trades by outside directors are 
related to the likelihood of a merger occurring in the subsequent month.  The Merger dataset 
contains all mergers and identifies whether mergers with outside director trading beforehand 
differ from mergers with no trading.   
To construct the Trading dataset, I collect insider trading data from Thomson Reuters, 
Form 4, Table 1 from 1992 to 2013. I include all open market sales and purchases. There are 
2,864,233 sales transactions (15,961 firms) and 949,919 purchases (16,887 firms).11  I further 
remove all records with insufficient data (coded by Reuters as an “A” or “S”).  I also apply the 
following filters outlined by Jeng et al. (2003) and Frankel and Li (2004): remove all trades 
where the number of shares traded exceeds trading volume for a given day; remove all records 
where prices reported for the shares traded falls outside the daily trading range on CRSP; remove 
all trades less than 100 shares; and remove trades with a stock price below $2 (see Appendix A). 
Prior studies document that some insider trades may be routine and occur for liquidity or 
diversification purposes, particularly for sales (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Jeng, et al., 2003).  
Cohen et al. (2012) find that only opportunistic insider trades are informative about future firm 
events, such as earnings forecast revisions. To identify whether ODs trade on private information 
about an upcoming merger, it is necessary to isolate opportunistic trades.  I follow the algorithm 
defined by Cohen et al. (2012) and remove all trades identified as routine.  If an insider trades in 
the same month of the year for at least three years, all subsequent trades by the insider in that 
month are deemed routine trades. All remaining trades are classified as opportunistic.  Removing 
                                                            
11 Consistent with prior research, the total number of sales exceeds the number of purchases. Open market 
sales include all sales by the insider, regardless of how the shares are obtained (e.g., by grants, options, 
etc.).  Open market purchases, however, do not include any shares awarded to insiders via grants, bonuses, 
or options.   
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routine trades reduces the number of sales (purchases) to 2,251,598 (512,898) transactions, 
eliminating approximately 2,000 firms across both categories where only routine trades existed.  
I next consolidate the remaining transactions on a firm-insider-daily basis, keeping only 
director trades. This data is then matched to Compustat to obtain firm financial information.  This 
creates a final Trading dataset of 330,507 observations (6,973 firms) of which 81% are sales and 
19% are purchases. I then use Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions 
Database to identify which firms in the Trading dataset have a merger in a given month. 
Approximately 60% of all firms announce a merger at some point in the sample period.  
To construct the Merger dataset, I begin with all mergers for U.S. public acquirers with 
public, private, or subsidiary targets that have a reported deal value.  The initial dataset is 67,402 
mergers.  Matching the mergers to CRSP and Compustat reduces the sample to 56,701 mergers 
for 10,341 firms.  Following Fuller et al. (2002) and Moeller et al. (2004), all deal values below 
$1 million are removed from the sample, removing approximately 23,000 mergers.12  In addition, 
all firms with multiple mergers within a five day window are removed to prevent confounding 
issues with the abnormal announcement return analysis. The final Merger dataset consists of 
31,468 mergers for 6,927 firms. I then identify the amount of trading, if any, before a given 
merger from the Trading dataset.  
3.B. Trading Measures 
My proxy for OD private information is pre-merger acquirer outside director net sales.  
Net sales is total dollar volume sold less the total dollar volume bought scaled by the total dollar 
volume traded by an outside director, aggregated for the six months prior to a merger 
announcement date.  This variable ranges from -1 when ODs engage in only buying to +1 when 
ODs only selling pre- merger.  For ease of exposition, I define “purely sell” as instances where 
ODs only engage in sell trades and “purely buy” when ODs only engage in buy trades.  In 
                                                            
12 For robustness, I also remove all mergers with deal values less than $5 million and those where the deal 
size is less than 5% of the acquirer’s market value. Results are unchanged. 
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addition, I use indicator variables to reflect whether outside directors buy, sell, or trade in the 
given six month window.  The six-month window corresponds to both the six-month average 
merger negotiation period (Boone and Mulherin, 2007) as well as short-swing regulations.13  Each 
OD trade is aggregated to the firm level to obtain the total amount of trades by all ODs on the 
board for each firm-merger.  Alternative definitions of OD trades are described in Section V. 
3.C. Control Variables 
Additional controls include variables related to the incidence of a merger or 
announcement returns.  Prior studies show that industry and firm characteristics impact deal 
likelihood as well as deal characteristics (Asquith, 1983; Fuller, et al., 2002; Moeller et al., 2004; 
Billet and Qian, 2008). Mergers may also cluster in different industries or time periods (Rhodes–
Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan, 2005).  Therefore, I calculate whether an acquirer’s industry 
experiences a merger wave outlined by Harford (2005) and Netter, Stegemoller, and Wintoki 
(2011). I also include industry fixed effects based on Fama-French industry 48 codes.  
In Appendix B, I provide detailed definitions of all variables. For firm characteristics, I 
compute firm size (log assets), leverage (debt scaled by equity), market-to-book, cash to assets, 
and profitability (return on assets). All financial variables are for the fiscal year prior to the 
merger, winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels, and GDP adjusted where appropriate.  Firm age at 
the time of the deal is calculated using CRSP beginning dates. I calculate the number of prior year 
mergers for a firm and identify whether a firm is engaged in a merger program as defined by 
Fuller et al. (2002).  These firms are more likely to undertake a merger in a given month relative 
to firms not involved in merger programs. To control for stock price increases due to potential 
market anticipation or over-valuation, run-up is calculated as the percentage change in price from 
day (-42) to day (-6) before the merger announcement date (Schwert, 1996).  In addition, I 
include the prior six-month stock return for longer periods of stock price changes that may 
                                                            
13 The SEC requires that any insider who earns a profit from purchases and sales in company stock that 
occur within a six-month period must return the profits of those transactions. 
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influence insider trading. Institutional ownership variables are obtained from Thomson Reuters 
13-F Institutional ownership database. For a reduced sample of firms from 1996-2013, I obtain 
governance variables from RiskMetrics: board size, whether the CEO is also chair of the board, 
CEO tenure, CEO ownership, and CEO age.   
The following deal characteristics are obtained from SDC: target size, target 
characteristics (indicators for same industry, foreign, public, or subsidiary targets), and indicator 
variables for tender offers, multiple bidders, and 100% stock financing. Relative size is calculated 
as the target value (proxied by deal value) divided by acquirer market value.  
 
4. Opportunistic Outside Director Trading and Mergers 
4A. Summary Statistics  
Table 1 provides trading summary statistics separated into trades that occur in a six 
month period before a merger versus trades not before a merger. Among the deals with OD 
trades, the median and mean dollar amount sold and purchased by ODs before a deal is 
significantly higher than in non-merger periods. Outside directors’ sales (purchases) are 
substantially greater: $249,902 ($38,450) during a pre-merger period compared to $159,067 
($27,740) in non-merger periods.  The differences across periods for both sales and purchases are 
significant at the 1% level.  For robustness, I remove firms without any mergers and only 
compare firms with at least one merger. The differences in sales and purchases remain consistent, 
providing support that non-acquirers are not biasing the findings.  In sum, ODs engage in active 
trading in the six months before a merger and both the values of sales and purchases are 
economically meaningful.   
4.B. Opportunistic Trading and Merger Likelihood  
 Cohen et al. (2012) show that opportunistic trades are significant predictors of firm 
events; however, opportunistic OD trades may not actually be related to an upcoming merger.  
Other firm or director specific events occurring during the same period may influence trading 
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decisions. To test this, I examine the relation between OD trades and the likelihood of a deal 
announcement taking place to determine whether an actual association exists.   
Table 2 examines whether opportunistic OD trades in a given six-month period are 
related to the probability of an upcoming merger announcement. Using a logistic regression, the 
dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to one if a merger occurs in the current month, zero 
otherwise.  The main variable of interest is an indicator for whether an opportunistic OD sale 
(Column A), purchase (Column B), or trade in general (Column C) occurs in the six month period 
prior to a deal (t-6 to t-1).  Following Billet and Qian (2008) and Akbulut (2013), I control for 
firm and industry characteristics that may influence the likelihood of a firm undertaking a merger: 
log(firm assets), market-to-book, leverage, cash scaled by assets, the number of mergers in the 
past year, and the past six-month stock return.  I also include whether the CEO traded during the 
same window and the total CEO dollar value traded.  In Columns (D)-(F), I include board size, 
CEO age, and an indicator for CEO/chair duality as firm governance controls. Each specification 
includes year and industry fixed effects based on Fama-French 48 factors.   
For ease of interpretation, Table II reports the marginal effects from the logit regressions.  
The regression in column (A) focuses only on sales and shows that opportunistic OD sales have a 
significant, positive correlation with the likelihood of a merger occurring following these trades 
compared to sales by other insiders.  Conversely, Column (B) focuses solely on purchases. OD 
purchases have a significant, negative association with merger likelihood.  In general, particularly 
for public deals, mergers typically have negative returns; therefore, ODs may be less likely to buy 
before mergers in general.  When examining both types of trades together, however, the presence 
of an OD opportunistically trading is associated with 1.6% increase in the likelihood of a merger 
(p-value of 0.00) compared to trades by the CEO and inside directors.  While this association is 
smaller in magnitude relative to other control variables such as firm size, the results provide some 
evidence that acquirer ODs trade opportunistically before mergers and the timing of the trades 
appears to be predictive of upcoming merger activity. Even after controlling for governance 
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(Columns D-F), opportunistic OD trading, overall, still has a positive association with the 
probability of a merger occurring.  
4.C. Merger Summary Statistics   
Given that outside directors appear to increase the size of their trades in acquirers before 
mergers, I next examine the association between these trades and merger characteristics. I begin 
by comparing deals with OD trades to those without using the Merger dataset.  Table 3, Panel A, 
presents summary statistics on merger, firm, governance, and ownership characteristics split 
between these two groups.  Panel B reports return characteristics. As OD trades are defined on a 
per-deal basis, all summary statistics are reported at the deal level.14  Of the 31,468 mergers, OD 
trades occur prior to 11,709 deals, or in 37.2% of the merger sample.   
In Panel A, mergers with OD trades are larger in value ($390M versus to $275M), but 
smaller in relative size.  Target firms represent 15% of an acquirer’s market value for OD trades 
compared to 28% for firms with non-OD trades, on average (p-value=0.00). Outside directors are 
more likely to trade in relatively smaller deals, where less scrutiny may exist.  Further, acquirers 
with OD trades have higher profitability, potentially providing these directors with additional 
reasons to take advantage of private information. Firms’ governance and institutional ownership 
characteristics are significantly different between firms with OD trading pre-merge and those 
without. Firms with OD trading have slightly larger boards and higher institutional, blockholder 
ownership, while CEO ownership is lower. These findings may be driven by larger firms in the 
OD trading sample. I explore ownership and governance characteristics in Section 5. 
Panel B reports average return characteristics, separated into mergers with no OD trades, 
mergers with OD sales beforehand, and mergers with OD purchases beforehand.15  On average, 
merger announcement returns are higher when ODs buy shares (96 bps) compared to when ODs 
                                                            
14 I also recalculate the summary statistics for firm, governance, and ownership characteristics at the firm 
level. The differences between firms with OD trades compared to non-OD trades still hold at the same 
significance levels. 
15 These statistics exclude mergers with both prior purchases and sales by outside directors. 
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sell (32 bps) and this relation holds across deal type (public, private, or subsidiary; unreported).16  
The lower returns for mergers with trades by ODs could be driven by firm size.  Firms with these 
trades are, on average, 1.3x larger than firms without OD trades. Similar to Moeller et al. (2004), 
I find that larger acquirers have lower returns compared to smaller acquirers (significant at the 
1% level).  The one-year and two-year post-completion returns are statistically higher when ODs 
purchase shares compared to when they sell or no OD trading occurs.  These higher returns 
suggest that OD purchases in particular may be indicative of long-run merger synergies. 
Table 4 details information regarding the intensity and direction of trading before 
mergers. Outside directors trade before 37% of mergers in the sample, compared to 19% for 
CEOs and 14% for inside directors.  In the 11,709 deals with OD trades, outside directors purely 
sell before 55%, purely buy before 29%, and engage in mixed buying and selling before 16% 
(Panel A).17  Together, these statistics indicate that opportunistic OD trading before a merger 
occurs frequently before a deal.   
 I also examine the relationship between OD trades before a merger compared to trading 
behavior by other board members.  In 6,159 of the 11,709 mergers with OD trades (53%), the 
CEO and other inside directors do not trade; thus ODs are the only board members trading in 
19.6% of all mergers (Panel B).  Comparatively, in 14% of mergers with OD trades, outside 
directors trade in the opposite direction from other insiders and, in 33% of deals, ODs and other 
insiders trade in the same direction.  Conditional on having data in RiskMetrics, ODs that purely 
sell (buy) before a deal represent 27% (21%) of the entire board.  Given that mergers with OD 
trades have an average board size of ten, this implies that typically two to three outside directors 
trade in the same direction during the pre-merger period.  
 
                                                            
16 Similar to Fuller et al. (2002) and Moeller et al. (2004), returns to subsidiary targets are highest for all 
firms, followed by private targets, then public targets. 
17 All results are robust to excluding mixed trades by outside directors. See Section VI. 
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4.D. Likelihood of Pre-Merger Outside Director Trading  
Given that ODs trade in nearly 40% of mergers, it is important to identify what influences 
the likelihood of OD opportunistic trading.  To test this, I run a logistic regression to estimate the 
influence of various factors on the likelihood of an OD selling (Table 5, Panel A) or OD buying 
(Table 5, Panel B) before a deal.  Marginal effects are presented. 
The base specification in Column A (Panels A and B) includes key merger and firm 
characteristics that are likely to be known to an informed outside director in the months leading 
up to a specific deal.  The remaining specifications (Columns B-E) capture the influence of 
information asymmetries and external monitoring on the likelihood that ODs trade before 
mergers.  Each model includes variables that proxy for firm information asymmetry: high R&D 
expenses and low analyst coverage.  Columns B-E individually explore the effect of various 
external monitoring measures, including the percentage of institutional ownership, percentage of 
ownership by the Top 5 institutions, the percentage of blockholder ownership, and an indicator 
for whether the firm has multiple blockholders.18 
I use R&D expenses and the amount of analyst coverage as measures of acquirer 
information asymmetry (Aboody and Lev, 2000; Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1995).  
Shareholders may have more difficulty valuing a high R&D firm’s current projects.  Further, for 
firms with low analyst coverage, less information may be disseminated to the public through 
widely-available channels.  In both instances, having access to private information by outside 
directors is likely to be valuable, particularly around mergers. 
I capture information asymmetry with two indicator variables high R&D, equal to one for 
firms with R&D expenses greater than 3.6% (the sample average), and low analyst coverage, 
                                                            
18 Firms with OD trades before a merger are larger firms in general. As such, most of these firms have at 
least one blockholder. I use 2 or more blockholders, representing the upper quartile of blockholder 
ownership in my sample.   
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equal to one if firms have less than 6 analysts providing coverage.19  Approximately 29.7% 
(26.5%) of mergers with (without) OD trades are classified has high R&D (p-value for difference 
= 0.00).  Roughly 71% of mergers with no OD trades have low analyst coverage compared to 
55% when ODs trade (p-value = 0.00).  Given that ODs are more likely to trade in larger firms, 
and analyst coverage is highly correlated with firm size, this result is not unexpected. 
With respect to external monitoring, high levels of institutional ownership should 
alleviate potential agency problems with the board (Kohers and Kohers, 2000; Masulis, Wang, 
and Xie, 2007; Hoechle, Schmid, Walter, and Yermack, 2012).  Alternative measures focus on 
blockholders (owns at least 5% of shares outstanding), which may engage in more monitoring of 
the board because of the size of their stake (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986).  
Firms with pre-merger OD trades have approximately 11.6% greater institutional 
ownership and 0.7% larger blockholder positions than firms with no OD trades prior to the 
merger (both statistically significantly different at p-value = 0.00).  While this may be driven by 
the larger size of firms with OD trades, this relation holds even when I segment the data by firm 
size quintiles (unreported).  
As shown in Column A (Panels A and B), ODs are less likely to either buy or sell before 
relatively larger deals, which may be driven by increased scrutiny in these cases.  OD selling is 
greater in pure stock deals (which are likely to lead to dilution of ownership), when targets are 
private, and across horizontal mergers, both of which are likely to reflect a greater degree of 
private information by ODs.  Further, ODs reduce pre-merger buying when firms have already 
undertaken a merger in the previous year. 
In all OD sale specifications, the probability of outside directors engaging in pre-merger 
selling is increasing by approximately 3% for firms with high R&D. In contrast, we do not find 
                                                            
19 Consistent with prior studies, R&D expense is scaled by assets for firms is set to zero if missing in 
Compustat. For robustness, I classify “high R&D” firms as any firm with a positive R&D expense ratio, 
covering 47% of mergers in the sample. In addition, I use industry adjusted R&D to measure high R&D 
firms. I also classify firms below the median number of analysts (3) in the sample as having low coverage. 
Results qualitatively hold.  
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similar results when OD purchases are examined; private information about R&D does not 
impact OD purchases.  In contrast to our expectations, in all specifications for both OD sales and 
OD purchases, low analyst coverage is negatively related to trading.  As noted above, since size 
and analyst coverage are highly correlated,  and I showed in Section 4.B that trading is 
concentrated in larger firms, analyst coverage may simply be capturing a size effect.  
Across OD sales and purchases, I find that in general, my proxies for external monitoring 
decrease the likelihood that outside directors trade in advance of mergers.  This confirms Cohen 
et al. (2012), which shows that firms with greater levels of external monitoring by institutional 
shareholders (or blockholders) should have lower levels of opportunistic trading by insiders. 
 
5. Returns and Factors Affecting Outside Director Trading 
Results indicate that OD opportunistic trades appear to be linked to an impending merger 
and that specific deal characteristics influence the likelihood that an OD trades. I explore whether 
OD trades appear to contain specific information regarding the upcoming quality of the merger by 
assessing their association with merger returns. I then examine the extent to which the firm’s 
information or external monitoring environment influences OD trading behavior.   
5.A. Merger Short-Run and Long-Run Returns    
I analyze the association between OD trades and deal quality using cumulative abnormal 
announcement and long-run returns after deal completion. Merger announcement returns measure 
the market’s perception of the deal value to the acquiring firm and anticipated benefits from the 
deal (Fuller et al., 2002; Moeller et al., 2003; Chen et al., 2007).  The short-term price reaction, 
however, may be noisy due to market uncertainty over the deal or information asymmetry 
between insiders and outside investors (Bhagat, Dong, Hirshleifer, and Noah, 2005; Chen et al., 
2007).  I, therefore, examine long-run returns to provide further evidence as to the market 
perceptions about the synergistic benefits of the merger.  
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Two main scenarios exist regarding OD trading and merger quality.  First, even after 
removing routine transactions, OD trades may still occur for non-information related reasons 
(e.g., liquidity, diversification, etc.).  In this case, trades by ODs could be unrelated to merger 
returns.  Alternatively, if outside directors use their private information for personal gain, ODs 
may actively trade on private information about a merger.  In this instance, ODs would increase 
sales before poor quality mergers and purchases before good quality ones.   
Table 6 presents ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions where the dependent variable is 
merger returns. For columns (A)-(C), the dependent variable is the merger announcement 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs).  CARs are computed over the three-day window (-1 to 1) 
around the deal announcement using the Fama-French (1993) three factor model.20  Columns (D) 
and (E) use one- and two-year abnormal buy-and-hold returns (BHARs) from the merger 
completion date as the dependent variables based on daily data and the Fama-French (1993) three 
factor model as well.  
The main independent variable is an indicator variable for whether ODs sell or purchase 
shares in the six month period prior to a merger announcement.  Column (A) compares mergers 
with OD sales to all others, Column (B) compares mergers with OD purchases to all other 
mergers, and Column (C) controls for both OD sales and purchases in the same regression. 
Following previous studies that examine short-run and long-run merger returns (Fuller et al., 
2002; Moeller et al., 2004), firm and merger controls are included: indicator variables for private, 
subsidiary, and foreign targets; 100% stock transactions; relative deal size; same industry 
mergers; multiple bidders; number of mergers in the past year; firm size; firm profitability; 
leverage; and run-up.  In addition, I construct similar trade measures for the CEO and inside 
directors which controls for the total dollar amount traded by ODs, inside directors, and the CEO 
in the six month pre-merger period. All regressions include year fixed effects to account for 
                                                            
20 Results are robust to using including a momentum factor or to using a market-adjusted model. 
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variations in regulations and shifts in insider trading as well as industry fixed effects based on 
Fama-French industry 48 codes.   
OD sales are associated with significantly lower three-day CARs compared to all other 
mergers (p-value=0.00), whereas when ODs only buy shares pre-merger, announcement returns 
are significantly higher (p-value=0.08).21 Focusing on Column (C), the associated announcement 
returns are 32 bps lower (p-value of 0.00) when ODs sell pre-merger and 15 bps higher (p-value 
of 0.04) when they buy, compared to deals with no OD trading.  As the average announcement 
return is 1.1%, this reflects a 29% decrease in the acquirer’s announcement return when ODs sell 
and a 14% increase when they buy.  For robustness, when I include governance controls (CEO 
duality, board size, percent of busy directors, and CEO tenure) the impact of OD trades on returns 
does not change.  These results support the joint hypothesis that ODs have private information 
regarding upcoming mergers and appear to use this information for private benefit. Outside 
directors sell in advance of poor quality deals and buy in advance of good ones.   
Next, I test if there are long-run implications based on the direction of OD trades.  If ODs 
have private knowledge that allows them to better assess long-run benefits, then the direction of 
their trades should correspond with long-run post-merger returns.  For exposition purposes, I only 
report regressions where both OD sales and purchases are analyzed jointly.  Results are similar 
when each is examined separately.  As reported in Columns (D) and (E), deals where ODs sell 
have one- (two-) year returns that are 2.6% (3.7%) significantly lower compared to deals without 
OD trades (p-value=0.00).  Deals where ODs buy have one-(two-) year returns that are 2.3% 
(2.02%) significantly higher (p-value=0.01, 0.09 respectively).  These findings indicate that ODs 
may have private knowledge about long-run synergies or value of an upcoming merger. 
                                                            
21The remaining variables are consistent with prior research. For example, CARs are significantly lower in 
100% stock deals while they are significantly positive for private and subsidiary targets (Fuller et al., 2002) 
as well as for horizontal deals. I also control for run-up to account for market anticipation (Schwert, 1996).  
Run-up controls for trades that may occur due to a stock price increase. 
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Overall, the merger announcement and long-run return analyses confirm the hypotheses. 
It appears that OD trades contain private information not merely captured by specific merger 
characteristics, firm financials, or run-up prior to the deal.  There remains a significant 
association between the direction of OD trades and the quality of a merger, implying that ODs 
have specific private knowledge about the impending deal and seem to trade for personal gain.  
5.B. Factors Affecting OD Trades and Merger Returns  
This section explores the extent to which the relation between OD opportunistic trading 
and mergers is driven by a firm’s environment.  In some instances, ODs may have a better ability 
to assess private information than external investors due to the firm’s information environment or 
ODs may have a greater opportunity to take advantage of private information due to a lack of 
outside monitors. Previous studies find that insider trades are more valuable when they contain a 
greater amount of private information (Aboody and Lev, 2007) or occur in weaker governed 
firms (Ravina and Sapienza, 2010).  I examine the impact of a firm’s information environment 
and the presence of external monitoring on opportunistic OD trading before mergers.  
5.B.1. Firm Information Environment  
In this subsection, I isolate the effect on returns of firms’ information asymmetry when 
ODs in these firms trade before a merger.  I hypothesize that trades should be more valuable in 
firms with high information asymmetry.  In these firms, ODs may have a better comprehension 
about the effects of pending deals on the acquirer compared to the public, thereby motivating 
these directors to trade on their private information.  I use the same information asymmetry 
measures discussed in Section 4.D, namely high R&D and low analyst coverage indicators.  I 
augment these measures with two related to target information asymmetry: a private target 
indicator and the size of the deal. 
Similarly, the amount of information available on target firms may also impact OD 
trades.  As there are data limitations for nonpublic firms, I measure a target’s information 
environment using deal size and whether it is private.  It is more common for larger firms to 
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disseminate greater amounts of information to the public creating less information asymmetry 
about these firms (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Harris, 1993).  Private targets naturally have a 
higher information asymmetry regarding their value (Chang, 1998; Officer, Poulsen, and 
Stegemoller, 2009).  As such, the private information ODs learn about smaller or private targets 
during merger negotiations may provide them with a significant advantage allowing them to trade 
more extensively for greater personal gain.  
I measure small deal size by an indicator variable equal to one if the deal value is below 
the average deal size of $318 million.  Approximately 40.8% of mergers without OD trades are 
small compared to 56.1% of mergers with OD trades (p-value=0.00).  I code an indicator variable 
equal to one if the target is private.  Private targets represent 42% of mergers without OD trades 
and 44% with OD trades (p-value of difference is 1%).22 
 To test the impact of the information environment on OD trades, I re-run the OLS 
regressions from Table 6 with these four indicator variables and interaction terms with OD net 
selling (Table 7).  The return effect of OD trades is concentrated in acquirers with high R&D 
expense. The interaction coefficient for high R&D acquirers with OD trades is negative, 
significant, and subsumes the impact of the OD trade variable by itself.  Pure selling OD trades in 
high R&D firms are associated with 0.33% lower announcement returns (a 30% decrease 
compared to the average announcement return).  Neither low analyst coverage nor the target’s 
information environment, however, is significantly related. It may be the case that for ODs, their 
trading behavior is not driven by specific information regarding the target itself, but from the 
combined value or synergies that may result from the upcoming deal.  In general, in cases where 
external investors may find it harder to decipher the value of the firm, OD trades are more likely 
to occur and seem to have greater value.  
 
                                                            
22 For robustness, I use alternative measures of small deal size. I separate based on median deal size and 
also examine the smallest quartile. Results qualitatively hold.  
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5.B.2. External Monitoring   
 Existing theory suggests that strong internal governance measures will ensure that ODs 
monitor management and, as such, non-OD trades will be less informative. There is no evidence, 
however, that internal governance mechanisms monitor directors themselves. Prior studies find 
that external monitoring can discipline ODs.  For example, shareholder voting is one mechanism 
(Cai, Garner, and Walkling, 2009), where institutional owners are more likely to vote against the 
board if they disagree with the board’s actions (Gillan and Starks, 2000; Chen et al., 2007). This 
type of external monitoring by institutional owners may reduce conflicts of interest and help ODs 
to be incentive aligned with shareholders’ (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Bebchuk et al., 2009).  
The presence of high external monitoring in a firm, therefore, may alter an outside director’s 
willingness or ability to trade on private information before a merger.  
Specifically, firms with greater levels of external monitoring by institutional shareholders 
should have reduced opportunistic trading by insiders (Cohen et. al, 2011).23  Results in Section 
4.D confirm that higher levels of external monitoring are associated with a lower likelihood of 
OD opportunistic trading. These findings suggest that there may be significant costs to trading on 
private information in firms with higher external monitoring. Opportunistic trading, however, still 
occurs, indicating an underlying conflict of interest may exist. I hypothesize that when ODs trade 
on private information in the presence of high external monitoring, benefits to trading must 
outweigh potential costs. In these cases, ODs trades will contain more information and their 
trades will be more negatively (positively) related to announcement returns for sales (purchases).   
 I employ the same proxies for external monitoring as outlined in Section 4.D. and follow 
the same methodology used to test a firm’s information asymmetry.  I interact each of the four 
proxies for external monitoring with OD net selling and run OLS estimations on merger 
                                                            
23 Ravina and Sapienza (2010) find that ODs in better governed firms trade more frequently than directors 
in poorer governed firms; they are unable to decipher whether ODs actually have information at these 
times.  
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announcement returns (Table 8). Columns (A) and (B) use the two institutional ownership 
variables and Columns (C) and (D) focus on the impact of blockholders. The proxies for external 
monitoring are negative and significant for the blockholder variables, but not for general 
institutional ownership. For this sample of firms, high levels of blockholder ownership are 
associated with poorer mergers implying a lack of monitoring by these blockholders.24  
 The interaction term between OD net selling and the external monitoring proxies is 
negative and significant for three of the four specifications. When an OD sells before a merger in 
firms with high blockholder ownership, announcement returns are an additional 1.11% lower than 
in deals with lower blockholder ownership.  This result is consistent with the idea that ODs must 
obtain greater benefits when trading in the presence of external monitors. Similarly, when a firm 
has multiple blockholders, the merger return is an additional 32 bps lower when an OD sells 
before a merger.  In both cases, the coefficient on OD net selling is negative, but insignificant. 
The larger returns indicate that trades in a high external monitoring environment are more 
informative; further, the opportunistic trading by ODs in these firms appears consistent with a 
conflict of interest. 
 With regards to external monitoring, there may be an endogenous relationship driving the 
findings between firms with high external monitoring and merger announcement returns.  It may 
be the case that these acquirers, in particular, have higher levels of continuous trading by outside 
directors without any knowledge concerning the merger or that these specific firms are more 
likely related to higher or lower deal returns.  To mitigate this potential endogenous relationship 
                                                            
24 Past research shows a mixed relationship between external monitoring by institutions and merger 
announcement returns. Hoechle et al. (2012) find a positive relationship between high levels of external 
monitoring and merger announcement returns or long-run performance suggesting that monitoring 
facilitates better merger selection or negotiation. Other studies show a negative, but insignificant, relation 
between total institutional ownership and acquirer merger announcement returns as well as with 
blockholders (Chen et al., 2007; Masulis et. al, 2007).  Qui (2006) finds that the presence of investment 
company ownership is associated with significant, negative merger announcement and long-run returns. 
My findings differ from prior studies due to the larger merger sample size as well as the combination of 
public, private, and subsidiary targets. If I estimate the regressions solely on public targets, the coefficient 
on the external monitoring proxies remains negative, but becomes insignificant.  
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or omitted variable bias, I control for specific firm and deal characteristics (e.g. deal size) that 
have a known association with merger announcement returns. In addition, all of the analyses in 
the paper, including the focus on external monitoring, exclusively uses opportunistic trading by 
outside directors. These results do confirm an explicit causal relation between high levels of 
external monitoring and merger announcement returns in the event of OD trading; however, even 
with implementing these controls and methodology, an association still exists between outside 
director trades in firms with high external monitoring being associated with greater benefits.    
5.C. Intensity  
In this section, I examine whether opportunistic trading is driven by the actions of one 
director or many. It is possible that the opportunistic trading is a function of a few directors taking 
advantage of private information or it may indicate a more systemic problem.  To identify the 
implications of many ODs trading, I examine the association between the number of ODs trading 
on the board and merger returns.  
I estimate OLS regressions on merger announcement returns using specifications from 
Table 6 and employ several different variables to capture OD trading intensity (presented in Table 
9).  The first set of measures is based on the number or percentage of ODs on the board who trade 
in a given period (Columns A and B, respectively). As shown in Column A, for each additional 
OD who buys (sells) pre-merger, the associated return is 12 bps higher (10bps lower) (p-values of 
0.01 and 0.03).  These changes represent approximately a 9-11% difference in the merger 
announcement returns for each additional OD that trades. The results are consistent when using 
the percentage of ODs trading as reported in Column B.  
 The second set of measures examines when the majority (greater than 50%) of ODs on a 
board trade in the same direction, which occurs in 10.1% of mergers with trading. When the 
majority of ODs sell shares (Column C), announcement returns are 0.49% lower than when only 
one or two ODs sell (p-value = 0.07).  This result is five times stronger than when only one 
outside director sells pre-merger. When the majority of ODs on the board buy, announcement 
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returns are 0.82% higher than when only one or two ODs buy (p-value = 0.04), and nearly seven 
times higher than when one OD buys before a merger. Further, when three or four ODs sell (buy), 
announcement returns are 26% lower (80% higher) than when only one or two trade (Column 
D).25 Together, these changes imply that trades by multiple ODs contain more information and 
signify a consensus regarding the overall quality of the upcoming merger.  
5.D. CEO Power 
For outside directors to be effective monitors, there is some expectation that they have 
access to private information, and this is confirmed in Section 5.A.  However, as shown in the 
previous section, directors may misuse this information by executing sales in advance of poor 
quality mergers.  This problem is not isolated to few directors; instead, when a majority of 
directors sell prior to bad mergers this suggests that a deeper agency problem may exist.  
Shareholders would expect that ODs in the case of low quality mergers would take actions to 
prevent the deal from occurring rather than simply selling their own shares in advance of the 
merger announcement based on their private information. 
 One explanation why ODs do not block the merger may be driven by their level of 
power. When CEOs dominate decision making, outside directors may be unable to adequately 
voice their concerns about the potential merger. Past studies find that powerful CEOs control the 
level of information given to a board and may potentially discourage board members in general 
from voicing their opinions (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999; Bebchuk et al. 2002; Grinstein and 
Hribar, 2004).  When firms have powerful CEOs, ODs may not be able to oppose a merger 
directly and, instead, may only be able to express concern about the quality of the merger by 
selling their shares.   
 I hypothesize that when the CEO holds significant power, this influences the likelihood 
that the majority of ODs or that ODs in general will sell shares pre-merger. If the majority of ODs 
                                                            
25 The differences in returns between the different groups of ODs trading presented in Column (D) are 
statistically, significantly different from each other.  
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believe in the quality of an upcoming deal, then they may purchase shares regardless of whether 
they are able to exert power.  I, therefore, expect OD purchases to not be influenced by the level 
of CEO power.  
I implement five different proxies for CEO power based on prior literature. The first is 
CEO tenure. As CEO tenure increases, he gains more managerial power and becomes more 
entrenched (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Masulis and Mobbs, 2011).  The second proxy is 
whether the CEO is also chair.  CEOs with dual positions may have more power to dictate which 
deals occur (Grinstein and Hribar, 2004; Masulis et al., 2007). The third proxy is the percentage 
of CEO ownership. Higher CEO ownership may provide them with greater decision making 
power (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The fourth variable is a composite CEO Entrenchment 
Index. Following Masulis and Mobbs (2011), I use principal components analysis on CEO tenure, 
CEO ownership, and CEO-chair duality.  The higher the CEO Index, the greater the CEO power.  
The last proxy is whether a CEO has a high index based on the median CEO index value.  
In unreported tests, firms where the majority of ODs sell have significantly longer CEO 
tenure, are more likely to have a CEO/COB duality, have slightly higher CEO ownership, and a 
higher CEO Entrenchment Index. Using the same base logit as Table 5, Column A, I examine the 
implications of CEO power on the likelihood that at least one OD sells (buys) versus the 
probability half of the ODs sell (buy). Table 10 (11) reports the marginal effects for selling 
(buying) and panel C of each table reports whether the marginal effects for the CEO power 
proxies differ between whether only one or a majority of ODs are selling (buying).  
 For CEO/Chair duality, CEO ownership, and high levels of the CEO Entrenchment 
Index, the effect is significant and positive for when one OD sells versus when the majority of 
ODs sell.  This indicates a general increase in the likelihood of OD selling before a merger in 
firms where the CEO has high power.  For example, the probability that one OD sells his shares 
before a merger increases by 4.3% when CEOs are also Chairman of the Board. The impact of 
this duality doubles the likelihood of the majority of the board selling to 8.9% (the difference is 
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statistically significant at the 5% level, Panel C). The same increased likelihood holds true when 
examining CEO ownership or firms with high CEO Entrenchment.  The probability that the 
majority of outside directors engage in opportunistic selling before a merger increases when 
CEOs possess primary control over the board. 
For OD purchases, CEO power does not appear to have the same impact on when the 
majority of outside director trading behavior. While CEO power shows some significant 
influence in the likelihood of at least one OD purchasing shares, the effect is weaker.  In addition, 
there are inconsistent differences between when one OD purchases shares compared to when the 
majority of the ODs are buying shares.  The inconsistent results support the notion that CEO 
power over decision making is less likely to increase the probability that ODs purchase shares 
before a merger.   
 High CEO power provides some explanation for why many ODs sell before a poor 
quality merger as they may be unable to prevent the deal from occurring. Thus, agency conflicts 
apparent in OD trades may stem from undue influence of the CEO, leaving outside directors with 
few alternatives to stopping the merger or voicing their disapproval, except through trading.   
 
6. Additional Tests   
6.A. Investing in the Firm   
I next examine whether investors can use opportunistic trades by outside directors to 
create profitable trading strategies.  Previous studies indicate that investors can earn significant 
abnormal returns by creating trading strategies that follow outside director trades before certain 
events (e.g., Fidrmuc et al., 2006).  To identify tradable strategies, investors must wait until a 
merger is publicly disclosed. To test this, I explore returns to the investor after the merger 
announcement by creating long-short portfolio returns based on the direction of OD trades.  
Following Mitchell and Stafford (2000), I construct long-short calendar-time portfolios, 
based on the direction of pre-merger OD trades.  One benefit of the calendar-time portfolio 
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approach is that it accounts for cross-sectional correlations in returns for the different firms 
undertaking mergers in overlapping periods. Three value-weighted portfolios are constructed: 
purchases and sales (both based on previously defined OD measures), as well as a long-short 
portfolio, which are presented in Panels A – C of Table 12, respectively.  Each sample firm is 
added to the portfolio at the end of the merger announcement month, and is held for 36 months. 26 
I obtain monthly alphas, which capture the average monthly abnormal return for each portfolio, 
by regressing the portfolio excess returns on the Fama-French (1993) market (MKT – RF), size 
(SMB), and value (HML) factors. 
 I create the Long-Short portfolio by going long firms in the Purchases portfolio and 
shorting firms in the Sales portfolio.  Merger returns tend to differ greatly based on firm size 
(Moeller et al., 2004) and low book-to-market firms tend to have poorer long-term performance 
after mergers (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998).  Rau and Vermalean (1998) hypothesize that ODs in 
value firms are more prudent in their analysis of an upcoming merger, suggesting these directors 
have greater private information about the deal quality.  ODs in growth firms, however, tend to 
give management greater freedom to select deals, implying these directors may be given less 
private information.  To capture these effects, I separate my portfolios into terciles based on size 
and book-to-market using Fama-French NYSE breakpoints, consolidating the smallest/lowest 
30%, the middle 40%, and the largest/highest 30%.  Results are robust to using quintiles instead 
(unreported). 
Panel A (Panel B) of Table 12 reports the value-weighted Purchase (Sales) portfolios.  
Overall, portfolio returns are significant for all nine of the Purchase portfolios and for eight of the 
nine Sale portfolios. These significant returns reinforce that the outside director trades contain 
private information.  In Panel C, the long-short portfolios are significant and positive for four out 
                                                            
26 Results are qualitatively similar using equal-weighted portfolios and for holding the firms for 24 months 
instead of 36 months.  In addition, I require a minimum of ten monthly observations in each portfolio 
(Mitchell and Stafford, 2000) 
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of the nine portfolios, primarily concentrated in largest book-to-market firms.27  These results are 
in line with Rau and Vermalean (1998), where long-run returns are largest for value acquirers. 
The portfolios have average monthly abnormal returns ranging from 38 to 65 basis points, 
indicating annual abnormal returns from 4.5% to 7.8%.  Overall, the significant and positive 
Long-Short portfolios further suggest that OD trades contain private information and, on average, 
present potential tradable strategies following merger announcements.   
6.B. Robustness Tests 
  I perform a number of robustness tests.  Given that the inferences largely rely on the 
validity of the opportunistic trading measure, I replace OD net sales or trade indicator variable 
measures with several alternative specifications and rerun each regression: net sales in shares, net 
sales without scaling, net sales as a percentage of shares outstanding, sales and purchases 
analyzed separately, and net purchases. I further calculate an alternative measure of opportunistic 
trading using a benchmark of normal, non-merger trading.  For each firm, I compute abnormal 
trading by ODs in the pre-merger period based on average volume traded in a six-month non-
merger period in that firm.  This controls for firm-specific effects.  Results qualitatively hold for 
each different measure.  I also control for the amount of trading in the six to twelve month period 
before a merger and the coefficient is never significant.   
While the main focus of this paper is outside directors, I also run additional regressions 
that include trades by other employees and external blockholders.  I find the coefficients for both 
these groups to be insignificant, reinforcing that the trades for these groups are not due to private 
information about an upcoming merger. 
Numerous additional robustness tests are performed.  The regressions control for run-up 
during the pre-merger period; however, OD trading in the month closest to the merger may be 
strongly influenced by the stock price due to market anticipation.  Regressions are re-run 
                                                            
27 Using quintile breakdowns, the long-short portfolios have significant and positive alphas in 40% of the 
portfolios, concentrated in the medium size and medium to large book-to-market firms (unreported). 
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calculating trade measures using aggregate three-month and one-month windows as well as 
removing the one-month pre-merger trading amounts from the windows.  Results indicate that 
OD trading still has a positive (negative) association for net purchases (sales) on the merger 
announcement return as well as for the one- and two-year returns. I also split the regression into 
two separate periods coinciding with both different SEC filing requirements and Sarbanes-Oxley 
(pre and post 2002).  The coefficients on OD net sales remain significant and negative.  
 I also run all regressions with panel fixed effects based on the firm and calendar month 
instead of using year and industry fixed effects to account for potential within-firm variation.  
Further, all analyses are repeated using 5-day cumulative abnormal returns.  Returns are also 
standardized by the yearly cross-sectional standard deviation of the returns following Kolari and 
Pynnönen (2010) to account for potential cross-correlation of announcement returns.  Moreover, 
all returns are calculated using a market and Fama-French three-factor with momentum model. 
 I implement alternative specifications for the logistic regressions that include director- 
specific characteristics. The sample of firms is reduced to those that overlap with RiskMetrics.  I 
include outside director age, outside director tenure, the percentage of independent outside 
directors, and board size.  In all of the above specifications, the main results qualitatively hold.   
 
7. Conclusion  
 This paper examines acquirer outside director trades around corporate control events to 
test the hypotheses of whether outside directors are informed and whether they use their private 
information for personal gain.  Specifically, I investigate whether OD trades signal both the 
likelihood of a merger and if the directions of OD trades are predictive of quality.  I document 
that outside directors opportunistically trade in the months before a merger.  I find that outside 
director purchases (sales) before a merger are associated with significantly higher (lower) deal 
announcement and post-merger returns.  These results suggest that ODs trade for their own 
private benefit, indicating potential agency problems.  
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 This relation appears concentrated in harder-to-value acquirers.  Outside directors may be 
less willing to trade when the market has more information about a firm’s value or a greater 
ability to interpret a merger’s benefits.  Higher levels of external monitoring appear to reduce the 
likelihood that outside directors act opportunistically.  When ODs do trade in these firms, 
however, their trades are associated with significantly greater returns.  This behavior appears 
consistent with the notion that outside director trading around acquisitions occurs more frequently 
than expected if outside directors represent shareholder interests.   
  As outside directors have responsibilities to advise and monitor the firm on behalf of 
shareholders, it is important that they have private information to base their recommendations and 
decisions. Access to private information also allows ODs to use this information for personal 
gain.  My results suggest ODs are informed about mergers and actively trade on this information. 
While it is reassuring that ODs are informed, the fact that they consistently trade on this inside 
information is disconcerting. The majority of ODs selling indicates a potential agency conflict 
within the board. At a minimum, one would hope that ODs would prevent bad mergers from 
being completed rather than allowing them to go through while selling their shares to avoid 
personal losses.  My findings show that high levels of CEO power may explain why this occurs in 
some firms.  
 Overall, basic corporate governance principles imply that outside directors represent 
shareholders’ interests and help mitigate agency problems in firms.  The findings in this paper 
indicate that outside directors are privately informed about the quality of upcoming mergers, a 
necessary condition for them to fulfill their responsibilities.  Results, however, suggest that ODs 
appear to exploit this private information for their own self-benefit indicating underlying conflicts 
of interest that should be ameliorated.  
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Table 2: Merger Likelihood  
 
This table reports marginal effects for logit regressions using the Trading Dataset. The dependent 
variable is a 0/1 indicator for whether the firm announces a merger in the current month. Columns 
(A) and (D) examine only sales by board of directors, Columns (B) and (E) examine purchases 
and Columns (C) and (F) examine all trades. Outside director (OD) sales (buys) is an indicator 
variable that equals one if an OD opportunistic sells (buys) in the six months prior to the current 
month and OD trades equals one if the OD either buys or sells in the six month prior period. 
Specifications (D) - (F) include governance controls, reducing the sample to 1996-2013.  
Regressions control for year and industry fixed effects with robust standard errors.  p-values are 
reported in parentheses. Variables are defined in Appendix B. ***; **; * represent significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels in two-sided significance tests, respectively. 
 
  All  Sales 
All  
Purchases
All  
Trades 
All  
Sales 
All  
Purchases 
All  
Trades 
  (A) (B) (C)  (D) (E)  (F) 
Outside Director Trades (0/1) 0.014*** -0.026*** 0.016*** 0.010*** -0.029*** 0.015***
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log Assets 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.021***
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Leverage -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.007* -0.007 -0.005 -0.002 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.12) (0.22) (0.67) 
Market to Book 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001***
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Cash/Assets 0.071*** 0.069*** 0.066*** 0.074*** 0.072*** 0.070***
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Stock Return 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
# Mergers in Past Year 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.053***
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CEO Trade (0/1) 0.003 -0.002 0.003* 0.004* -0.008 0.003 
 (0.14) (0.66) (0.08) (0.10) (0.14) (0.20) 
Dollar Value Traded 0.002*** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001* 0.001***
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) 
Log Board Size 0.001** 0.001** 0.001***
    (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) 
CEO Age -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CEO/COB Duality 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.012***
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Observations 241,980 92,604 330,507 181,576 54,577 233,343 
Pseudo R-squared 0.085 0.101 0.090 0.089 0.116 0.096 
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Table 3: Merger Dataset Characteristics  
 
This table details summary statistics for merger and return variables based on the Merger Dataset. For 
Panel A, the statistics  on merger, firm and governance characteristics are divided between mergers with 
no outside director trades in the six months prior (Column A) and mergers with OD trades in the six 
months pre-merger (Column B). There are 19,759 mergers with no OD trades and 11,709 mergers with 
OD trades. Governance characteristics are based on matching the sample to RiskMetrics (10,095 mergers).  
Panel B provides statistics on return variables separated into mergers with no OD trades, mergers with OD 
sales (Column B), and mergers with OD purchases (Column C). Variables defined in Appendix B.  
 
Panel A: Mean Variable Characteristics      
 No Trades (A) 
OD Trades 
(B) 
Diff.        
(B - A) 
p-value     
(B - A) 
Merger Characteristics (%)     
Deal Size ($M)  274.74   389.75 115.01 (0.00) 
Relative Size 28.15 15.46 -12.70 (0.00)  
100% Stock  18.09 15.88  -2.21 (0.00)  
Same Industry 38.75 38.57     -0.18 (0.02)  
Private Target 42.42 44.02      1.60  (0.00)  
Public Target 27.70 28.73      1.03  (0.03)  
Subsidiary Target 29.88 27.25     -2.63 (0.19) 
Multiple Bidders   1.84   1.47     -0.37 (0.30) 
Completed 93.95 95.33      1.38  (0.01)  
Firm Characteristics  
Market Value of Equity       2,690     6,170     3,480  (0.00)  
Return on Assets (%)   8.16 11.80 3.64  (0.00)  
Leverage   0.24   0.22  -0.03 (0.00)  
Cash Scaled by Assets (%) 13.25 12.60   -0.65 (0.00)  
R&D Expense Scaled by Assets (%)   3.34   3.53 0.19 (0.08)  
Number of Analysts (%)   5.05   8.40 3.35 (0.00)  
Governance and Ownership Characteristics     
Board-size   9.16 9.81 0.66 (0.00)  
CEO/COB Duality (%) 47.20 46.50 -0.70 (0.00)  
CEO Tenure   7.00 7.19 0.19 (0.43) 
CEO Ownership (%) 4.84 3.78 -1.06 (0.00)  
CEO Entrenchment Index  -0.06 0.07 0.14 (0.00) 
High CEO Entrenchment Index 47.97 52.26 4.28 (0.00) 
Institutional Ownership (%) 45.35 56.91 11.56 (0.00)  
Top 5 Institutional Ownership (%) 21.03 22.96 1.92 (0.00)  
Blockholder Ownership (%) 12.68 13.41 0.72 (0.00)  
Multiple Blockholders (%) 42.95 47.86 4.91 (0.01)  
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Table 3: Merger Dataset Characteristics (continued) 
 
Panel B: Mean Return Characteristics      
  No Trades 
OD 
Sales 
OD 
Buys 
 
p-values 
 
  (A) (B) (C)  (B-A) (C-A) (C-B) 
Return Variables (%)             
CAR (-1,1) 1.42 0.32 0.96 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Run-up (-42,-6) -0.34 -2.63 0.13 (0.00) (0.18) (0.00)  
6 month Prior Stock 
Performance -1.12 -3.29 -4.55 (0.00) (0.00) (0.14) 
1 year Post BHAR -2.04 -3.27 1.00 (0.12) (0.00) (0.00)  
2 year Post BHAR -6.60 -5.07 -1.17 (0.18) (0.00) (0.01)  
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Table 4: Merger Trading Characteristics 
This table details mean summary statistics about the insider trading during the six month period pre-
merger using the Merger Dataset. Panel A provides statistics on the total number of deals with pre-
merger trades by various insider groups. Panel B presents more specific statistics on outside director 
trading alone. There are 31,468 mergers in the dataset of which 11,709 have outside director trades. 
Variables are defined in Appendix B.  
  Sales Only 
Buys 
Only 
Both Sales 
& Buys # Mergers 
% of All 
Mergers 
  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
Panel A: Number of Mergers with Trading Beforehand 
Any Director or CEO  8,291 3,514 2,882 14,687 46.68 %
Outside Director 6,445 3,428 1,836 11,709 37.21 %
CEO 4,542 1,382 93 6,017 19.12 %
Inside Directors 3,600 696 137 4,433 14.09 %
External Blockholders 1,911 777 215 2,903 9.23 %
Panel B: Outside Director Mergers 
Outside Directors Only 3,022 2,203 934 6,159 19.57 %
Outside Directors Trading Opposite     
       of Inside Directors 481 1,060 63 1,894 5.10 %
Outside Directors Trading Similarly     
       to Inside Directors 
2,942 165 839 3,946 12.54 %
Multiple Outside Directors Trading 
on the Same Board 
1,580 569 24 2,173 6.90 %
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Table 5: Probability of Outside Director Trading Pre-Merger 
 
This table details marginal effects of logistic regressions where the dependent variable is a 0/1 
indicator of an outside director selling (buying) in Panel A (B) before a merger. Column (A) 
reports the logit regression for variables most likely known ahead of the merger by an informed 
outside director. Columns (B-E) include additional institutional ownership variables. All 
regressions include year and industry fixed effects.  p-values listed in parentheses. Variables are 
defined in Appendix B. ***; **; * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels in two-
sided significance tests, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Likelihood of Outside Director Selling Before a Merger     
  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
Percent of Institutional Ownership -0.011 
(0.44) 
Percent Ownership by Top 5  -0.015***
(0.00) 
Percent Blockholder Ownership -0.129*** 
(0.00) 
Multiple Blockholders -0.040** 
(0.02) 
High R&D firm 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Low Analyst Coverage -0.053*** -0.067*** -0.069*** -0.067***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Private Target 0.019*** 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Pure Stock Merger 0.037*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.035*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Relative Size -0.016*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Same Industry 0.012*** 0.006 0.008* 0.008* 0.007* 
(0.01) (0.18) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) 
Past 6 month Return -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.23) (0.39) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
ROA 0.271*** 0.215*** 0.257*** 0.258*** 0.254*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Leverage -0.106*** -0.089*** -0.092*** -0.092*** -0.093***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log Assets 0.020*** 0.008*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Merger in past year 0.010 0.012** 0.013** 0.012** 0.013** 
  (0.11) (0.04) -0.03 (0.04) (0.03) 
Observations 26,204 26,204 26,204 26,204 26,204 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.176 0.191 0.185 0.185 0.185 
40
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Continued 
 
Panel B: Likelihood of Outside Director Buying Before a Merger     
  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
Percent of Institutional Ownership -0.081*** 
(0.00) 
Percent Ownership by Top 5  -0.016*** 
(0.00) 
Percent Blockholder Ownership -0.050***
(0.01) 
2 or More Blockholders -0.080***
(0.00) 
High R&D firm -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
(0.87) (0.82) (0.82) (0.80) 
Low Analyst Coverage -0.022*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.018***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Private Target -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.98) (0.94) (0.86) (0.91) (0.89) 
Pure Stock Merger 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 
(0.40) (0.50) (0.54) (0.55) (0.51) 
Relative Size -0.011*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.008***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Same Industry 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.72) (0.84) (0.87) (0.88) (0.88) 
Past 6 month Return -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ROA 0.114*** 0.109*** 0.114*** 0.112*** 0.112*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Leverage -0.030*** -0.031*** -0.028*** -0.026*** -0.028***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Log Assets 0.015*** 0.0134*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Merger in past year -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.016***
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Observations 23,187 23,187 23,187 23,187 23,187 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.153 0.155 0.154 0.155 0.154 
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Table 6: Merger Returns 
 
This table details OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the acquirer's cumulative 
abnormal return (-1,1) around the merger announcement date, and the one-year/two-year buy and 
hold abnormal return from the merger completion date using the Merger Dataset. Outside director 
(OD) sales (buys) is an indicator variable that equals one if an OD opportunistically sells (buys) 
in the six months pre-merger. All regressions include firm controls: the number of mergers the 
firm has engaged in the past year, log of assets, ROA, and leverage. Year and industry fixed 
effects are also included. p-values listed in parentheses. Variables are defined in Appendix B. 
***; **; * represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels in two-sided tests, respectively. 
 
CAR (-1,1) 1-year BHAR 2-year BHAR 
  (A) (B) (C)  (D) (E)  
OD Sales -0.398*** -0.316*** -2.614*** -3.665*** 
 (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
OD Purchases 0.179* 0.150** 2.312*** 2.021* 
  (0.08) (0.04) (0.01) (0.09) 
Private Target 1.308*** 1.308*** 1.298*** -3.245*** -7.922*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Subsidiary Target 1.431*** 1.437*** 1.424*** -0.803 -2.415** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.34) (0.05) 
Foreign Target -0.152 -0.156 -0.144 -2.103** -3.921*** 
 (0.16) (0.15) (0.19) (0.02) (0.00) 
100% Stock -0.954*** -0.964*** -0.942*** -5.827*** -8.748*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Relative Size 0.377*** 0.387*** 0.373*** -0.239 -0.918*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.22) (0.00) 
Same Industry 0.559*** 0.557*** 0.557*** 2.890*** 4.482*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Run-up -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 0.031*** 0.038*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Multiple Bidders -0.293 -0.302 -0.294 -0.704 -6.399* 
 (0.40) (0.38) (0.40) (0.80) (0.09) 
OD $ Value Traded 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** 
 (0.00) (0.52) (0.77) (0.83) (0.00) 
ID $ Value Traded -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 
 (0.52) (0.21) (0.21) (0.00) (0.16) 
CEO $ Value Traded 0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000* 
 (0.61) (0.67) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) 
Constant 2.323*** 2.362*** 2.320*** 5.943*** 4.410** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.07) 
Observations 31,468 31,468 31,468 28,716 27,934 
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.068 0.068 0.069 0.085 0.130 
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Table 7: Information Asymmetry 
 
This table details OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal 
return around the merger announcement from -1 to 1 days using the Merger Dataset. Outside 
director (OD) net sales is calculated as total dollar volume sold less total dollar volume bought by 
outside directors scaled by the total dollar volume traded in the six months preceding a merger.  
Regressions include interaction terms for various factors that may affect OD trades: research and 
development expense (columns A), analyst coverage (B), deal size (columns C), and private 
targets (columns D). All regressions include controls for the CEO and inside directors at the firm 
trading in the same period, merger characteristics as detailed in Table 5, firm controls (number of 
mergers in the past year, ROA, leverage, run-up, and log of assets), and year/industry fixed 
effects.   p-values listed in parentheses. Variables are defined in Appendix B. ***; **; * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels in two-sided significance tests, respectively. 
 
  
R&D Analyst Coverage Deal Size 
Private 
Target 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) 
OD Net Sales -0.108 -0.130** -0.578*** -0.240***
(0.14) (0.04) (0.01) (0.00) 
High R&D -0.045   
(0.79)    
High R&D * OD Net Sales -0.332**   
(0.04)    
Low Analyst Coverage 0.645***   
 (0.00)   
Low Analyst Coverage * OD Net 
Sales -0.108   
 (0.47)   
Deal Size 0.381***  
  (0.00)  
Small Deal Size * OD Net Sales 0.459**  
  (0.04)  
Private Target  0.536***
   (0.00) 
Private Target * OD Net Sales  0.076 
   (0.56) 
Insider Trading Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm and Merger Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 31,468 31,468 31,468 31,468 
Adjusted R-squared 0.069 0.072 0.069 0.064 
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Table 8: External Monitoring 
 
This table details OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal 
return around the merger announcement from -1 to 1 days using the Merger Dataset. Outside 
director (OD) net sales is calculated as total dollar volume sold less total dollar volume bought by 
outside directors scaled by the total dollar volume traded in the six months preceding a merger.  
Regressions include interaction terms for various external monitoring mechanisms that may affect 
OD trades: percent of institutional ownership as a percentage of shares outstanding (column A), 
percent of ownership by the top 5 institutional investors (column B), percent of blockholder 
ownership as a percentage of shares outstanding (column C), and an indicator variable for 
whether a firm has multiple blockholders (top quartile of firms) (column D). All regressions 
include controls for the CEO and inside directors at the firm trading in the same period, merger 
characteristics as detailed in Table 5, firm controls (number of mergers in the past year, ROA, 
leverage, run-up, and log of assets), and year/industry fixed effects. p-values listed in parentheses. 
Variables are defined in Appendix B. ***; **; * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels in two-sided significance tests, respectively. 
 
  Institutional Holders Blockholders 
  (A) (B) (C) (D) 
OD Net Sales  -0.203*** -0.191 -0.027 -0.023 
(0.00) (0.34) (0.77) (0.80) 
Percent of Institutional Ownership -0.212 
(0.43) 
% Inst. Ownership * OD Net Sales 3.112 
(0.26) 
Percent Ownership by Top 5  -0.153 
(0.84) 
% Top 5 Ownership * OD Net Sales -1.813*** 
(0.00) 
Percent Blockholder Ownership  -1.130*** 
(0.00)  
% BH Ownership * OD Net Sales  -1.111** 
(0.03)  
Multiple Blockholders  -0.158* 
 (0.09) 
Multiple Blockholders * OD Net Sales  -0.318***
     (0.01) 
Insider Trading Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm and Merger Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year/Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 31,468 31,468 31,468 31,468 
Adjusted R-squared 0.071 0.069 0.072 0.071 
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Table 9: Intensity of Outside Director Trading 
 
This table details OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the acquirer's cumulative 
abnormal return around the merger announcement date -1 to 1 days using the Merger Dataset 
using different measures of OD trading intensity. Specifications (B) and (C) are limited to the 
sample from RiskMetrics in order to obtain board size data. All regressions include controls for 
the CEO and inside directors trading in the same period, the dollar amount of trading occurring. 
Firm controls (number of mergers in the past year, ROA, log of assets, leverage, and run-up), the 
merger characteristics reported in Table 5, and year/industry fixed effects. p-values listed in 
parentheses. Variables are defined in Appendix B. ***; **; * represent significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels in two-sided significance tests, respectively. 
 CAR (-1,1) 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) 
# of ODs Selling -0.097**    
(0.03)    
# of ODs Buying 0.122***    
(0.01)    
     
% of ODs Selling on Board  -0.010***   
 (0.03)   
% of ODs Buying on Board  0.013**   
 (0.02)   
     
Majority of ODs Selling on Board   -0.491*  
  (0.07)  
Majority of ODs Buying on Board   0.815**  
  (0.04)  
     
One-Two ODs Selling    -0.377***
   (0.00) 
Three-Four ODs Selling    -0.477***
   (0.01) 
Greater than Four OD Selling    -0.560* 
   (0.10) 
One-Two ODs Buying    0.478** 
   (0.03) 
Three-Four ODs Buying    0.858***
   (0.00) 
Greater than Four OD Buying    1.038** 
    (0.02) 
Insider Trading Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm and Merger Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 31,468 10,095 10,095 31,468 
Adjusted R-squared  0.069 0.068 0.064 0.069 
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Table 10: CEO Power – Sales  
 
This table reports marginal effects from logistic regressions where the dependent variable is the 
probability of one OD selling before a merger (Panel A) or greater than half of ODs selling (Panel 
B). Panel (C) tests difference in coefficients between the two panels and reports F-tests. 
Regressions include various CEO power measures that may affect OD trades: log of CEO tenure 
(column A), indicator variable for a CEO duality (column B), percent of CEO ownership (column 
C), CEO Entrenchment Index defined by Masulis and Mobbs (2011) (column D), and an indicator 
for whether a firm has a high CEO Entrenchment index (column E). All regressions include 
controls for CEO and inside directors trading in same period, merger characteristics as detailed in 
Table 5, firm controls (number of mergers in past year, ROA, leverage, run-up, and log assets), 
and year/industry fixed effects. p-values listed in parentheses. Variables defined in Appendix B. 
***; **; * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels in two-sided tests, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Probability of at Least One OD Selling        
  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
Log (CEO Tenure) 0.006 
 (0.19)     
CEO/COB Duality 0.043***
  (0.00)    
Percent CEO Ownership 0.066* 
   (0.09)   
CEO Entrenchment Index 0.000 
    (0.39)  
High CEO Entrenchment Index 0.006***
     (0.04) 
Observations 14,817 22,966 13,467 16,258 12,928 
Adjusted R-squared  0.204 0.138 0.165 0.214 0.158 
Panel B: Probability of Half of ODs on the Board Selling      
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
Log (CEO Tenure) -0.001 
 (0.83)     
CEO/COB Duality 0.089** 
  (0.03)    
Percent CEO Ownership 0.298*** 
   (0.00)   
CEO Entrenchment Index 0.000 
    (0.27)  
High CEO Entrenchment Index 0.023** 
     (0.02) 
Observations 5,007 6,666 5,362 5,361 5,341 
Adjusted R-squared  0.104 0.085 0.099 0.103 0.099 
Panel C: Ho: Panel A = Panel B 0.65 4.73** 17.91*** 1.42 6.11* 
  (0.42) (0.03) (0.00) (0.28) (0.09) 
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Table 11: CEO Power – Purchases  
 
This table reports marginal effects from logistic regressions where the dependent variable is the 
probability of one OD buying before a merger (Panel A) or half of the ODs buying (Panel B).  
Panel (C) tests difference in coefficients between the two panels and reports F-tests. Regressions 
include various CEO power measures that may affect OD trades: log of CEO tenure (column A), 
indicator variable for CEO duality (column B), percent of CEO ownership (column C), CEO 
Entrenchment Index defined by Masulis and Mobbs (2011) (column D), and an indicator for 
whether a firm has a high CEO Entrenchment index (column E). All regressions include controls 
for CEO and inside directors trading in same period, merger characteristics as detailed in Table 5, 
firm controls (number of mergers in past year, ROA, leverage, run-up, and log of assets), and 
year/industry fixed effects. p-values listed in parentheses. Variables defined in Appendix B. ***; 
**; * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels in two-sided tests, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Probability of at Least One OD Buying          
  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
Log (CEO Tenure) 0.007 
 (0.21)     
CEO/COB Duality 0.032***
  (0.00)    
Percent CEO Ownership 0.584*** 
   (0.00)   
CEO Entrenchment Index 0.000 
    (0.17)  
High CEO Entrenchment Index 0.008* 
     (0.07) 
Observations 14,562 23,000 13,271 16,056 12,765 
Adjusted R-squared  0.146 0.0978 0.128 0.145 0.119 
Panel B: Probability of Half of ODs on the Board Buying       
  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
Log (CEO Tenure) -0.002 
 (0.64) 
CEO/COB Duality 0.065***
  (0.00)    
Percent CEO Ownership 0.052 
   (0.26)   
CEO Entrenchment Index 0.003 
    (0.56)  
High CEO Entrenchment Index 0.001* 
     (0.08) 
Observations 2,691 3,779 2,925 2,889 2,902 
Adjusted R-squared  0.199 0.164 0.194 0.190 0.192 
Panel C: Ho: Panel A = Panel B 1.87 8.82* 12.53*** 0.96 2.39 
  (0.35) (0.07) (0.01) (0.25) (0.13) 
47
 
 
 
 
Table 12: Calendar Time Portfolios 
This table details the alphas for value-weighted calendar-time portfolios using Fama-French (1993) three 
factor regressions for mergers with only outside director purchases or sales for 36 months. The long-short 
portfolio is calculated by going long firms with outside director pre-merger purchases and shorting firms 
with outside director pre-merger sales. The portfolios are broken out based on Fama-French size and 
book-to-market breakpoints.  All portfolios require at least 10 observations per month to be included. p-
values are reported below in parentheses. ***; **; * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
in two-sided significance tests, respectively. 
Low BTM Med. BTM High BTM 
Purchases 
Small Size -2.34** 0.95** -1.72*** 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.00) 
Med. Size 2.44*** 1.32*** -0.83*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Large Size 1.58*** 0.68*** -0.73*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
       
Sales 
Small Size -4.23*** -0.10 -2.33*** 
 (0.00) (0.88) (0.00) 
Med. Size 2.01*** 0.56 -1.49*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Large Size 1.69*** 0.50 -1.10*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
       
Long-Short  
Portfolio 
Small Size 1.89 1.04 0.61** 
 (0.11) (0.13) (0.05) 
Med. Size 0.43 0.76*** 0.65*** 
 (0.41) (0.00) (0.00) 
Large Size -0.11 0.18 0.38* 
 (0.69) (0.17) (0.09) 
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CHAPTER 2: WHY HIRE YOUR RIVAL? 
            THE CASE OF BANK DEBT UNDERWRITING 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper explores the previously undocumented debt underwriting relationship for financial 
firms.  These firms are unique in that they are the only firms both able and capable of 
underwriting their own securities issuances.  We find, however, that publicly traded investment 
and commercial banks (“banks”)  hire a rival in nearly 30% of all their debt issuances from 1979-
2014.  Further, the use of rivals is not limited to small, low ranked, or commercial banks as large, 
high quality, or investment banks also tend to engage rivals. Traditional (bank expertise and 
information sharing) as well as bank-specific (capacity constraints and limited distribution 
networks) motivations help explain why banks hire a rival.  Evidence also suggests that the 
decision to use a rival to underwrite debt offerings affects fees.  Collectively, these results expand 
our understanding of banks’ underwriter choice and show that despite the potential costs, banks 
pervasively hire their rivals. 
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1. Introduction 
The debt capital markets play a substantial role in the funding of U.S. public companies.  
From 1979 to 2014, U.S. firms raised $33 trillion in aggregate debt and $2.1 trillion in 2014 
alone.28   In nearly all of these debt issuances, public companies engaged a financial intermediary 
to underwrite and place their securities.  These intermediaries perform a crucial role in debt 
issuances, bringing together borrowers and investors as well as credibly reducing the transaction 
and information costs by putting their own reputations at stake (Fang, 2005).  Little is known, 
however, about financial intermediaries’ own debt issuances.  From 1979 to 2014, financial firms 
comprise over 30% of all debt issued by U.S. public firms, yet nearly every academic study 
excludes financial firms when examining securities issuance and the role of the underwriters.29   
Focusing on debt issued by financial intermediaries is important because these firms, 
uniquely, are the only ones that have the ability to self-underwrite securities.  If, however, a 
financial intermediary decides to employ a bank other than itself to underwrite its own debt, it 
would be hiring a direct rival.  Many investment and commercial banks (hereafter jointly referred 
to as “banks”) actually choose to hire a rival to either lead or co-lead their debt offerings.  This 
decision to use a rival is not concentrated in small or low-reputation banks.  For instance, J.P. 
Morgan Chase (JPM) acted as its own lead or co-lead underwriter in 74% of its 419 debt deals.  
In the remaining deals, JPM’s debt is underwritten by competitors of its investment banking 
business, including Merrill Lynch, UBS, Edward Jones, and others.  
In this paper, we examine why U.S. publicly-traded investment and commercial banks 
that have both the ability and capability to underwrite their own debt issuances choose to hire a 
rival instead.  Historically, there has been variation through time regarding which financial firms 
are able and capable of underwriting debt.  We define “ability” as a bank having the legal or 
regulatory approval to underwrite debt.  All investment banks, by design, have the ability to do 
                                                            
28 Aggregate U.S. debt proceeds are obtained from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) League Tables. 
29 See for example Fang (2005) and Yasuda (2005). 
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so; while, for nearly 60 years after the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 (“Glass-
Steagall”), U.S. commercial banks were prohibited from securities underwriting.  Following 
changes to the regulatory environment in 1989, some commercial banks were allowed to re-enter 
the securities market and compete with investment banks.  Now, all U.S. commercial banks are 
legally able to underwrite debt since the repeal of Glass-Steagall in 1999.  This variation in 
banks’ ability across time provides an opportunity to examine bank behavior in different 
regulatory environments.  We, therefore, track all commercial banks in our sample to identify 
when they are legally able to underwrite debt, for themselves or others, and consolidate these 
banks with investment banks.   
Just because a bank is legally able to underwrite debt does not mean it is capable of doing 
so.  For example, small, regional, or highly specialized banks are unlikely to have the expertise or 
network to self-underwrite. We define “capability” as banks that have underwritten at least one 
debt offering for any other firm.  In all, we focus on 60 U.S. publicly traded banks that have both 
the ability and capability to underwrite debt.  While these banks are capable of self-underwriting, 
nearly all hire a rival to underwrite at least some of their own debt offerings.  Rivals act as the 
lead or co-lead underwriter in nearly 30% of all debt deals and in 92% of those deals, the issuing 
bank takes no role (even syndicate participation) in its own debt issuance.    
This paper has two main objectives.  First, we provide a base understanding of debt 
underwriting by banking firms and their choice of advisor(s).  Non-bank firms are required to hire 
underwriters to facilitate capital market transactions and the motivations behind the choice of 
advisor for non-bank firms has been extensively examined in the literature.  With the exception of 
the work by Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989), which examines the role of investment banks in 
underwriting of their equity IPOs, there is no evidence of what motivates commercial or 
investment banks to hire another bank as an underwriter. Broadening our understanding of this 
market is important, particularly since banks are inherently different from other firms in their 
ability to underwrite their own debt and comprise a large fraction of U.S. total debt.  Thus, we 
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seek to fill a gap in the literature that examines banks, their debt offerings, and their advisor 
choice.   
The second objective is to identify reasons why banks hire a rival when they have the 
capability to underwrite their own debt.  We focus on a number of extant reasons for advisor 
choice, including bank expertise, relative quality of the bank, and costs and benefits associated 
with the disclosure of information.30  Under the “bank expertise” hypothesis, we combine a 
number of previously identified and related advisor choice determinants, including bank 
reputation and quality (Krigman, Shaw, and Womack, 2001; Yasuda, 2005) as well as expertise 
and specialization (Fang, 2005).  Similar to non-bank firms, all banks to some extent will select 
advisors based upon the benefits that can be obtained from that choice. We predict, however, that 
expertise will be more valuable to lower-quality banks that may have neither the reputation nor 
the extensive expertise and specialization to handle their own underwriting.  
Under the “information” hypothesis, both bank and non-bank firms may use advisors to 
provide certification of an issue, while reducing the level of information asymmetry between the 
firm and investors.  As relations between issuers and advisors strengthen, the cost of obtaining 
information about the issuer becomes more valuable (Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan, 
2007; Yasuda, 2005), but it can also lead to potential hold-up problems (Rajan, 1992).  Our 
sample banks are unique in that they are capable of underwriting their own debt, thereby reducing 
potential hold-up problems.  While the benefits of information sharing are likely to be pervasive 
among banks, lower-quality ones are more likely to rely on third-party certification to both reduce 
information asymmetries as well as facilitate placements of the offerings. 
Under the “bank-specific” hypothesis, we examine reasons unique to banks which may 
help explain advisor choice.  Banks themselves may be capacity-constrained, either by the issue 
                                                            
30 There is an extensive literature that examines reasons for advisor choice for non-financials (see Rau, 
2000; Krigman, Shaw and Womack, 2001; Burch, Nanda, and Warther, 2005; Bharath et al., 2007). In 
Section I, we present an overview of this literature and consolidate reputation, certification, expertise, and 
quality into the “bank expertise” hypothesis.  The “information” hypothesis focuses on costs and benefits of 
information revelation associated with advisor choice. 
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size or the number of deals currently on their books.  Some banks may also not have a sufficient 
distributional ability to place an issue.  Moreover, each self-underwritten deal not only affects a 
bank’s capacity to work with clients, but also potentially leads to conflicts of interest if a bank 
puts its own needs ahead of its clients.  Lastly, banks may be able to manipulate their League 
Table standings, and thus, their reputation. These rankings are important to banks and are based 
on the value or number of offerings underwritten by a given bank (Rau, 2000).  By underwriting 
more of its own debt prior to publication of these rankings, a bank may be able to increase its 
reputation. 
The explanations for advisor choice are unlikely to be mutually exclusive and often cross 
between our broadly segmented categories of expertise, information, and bank-specific reasons.  
For instance, a bank may choose a highly reputable underwriter to capture their expertise and 
certification ability, but also because that advisor may have a better ability to reduce information 
asymmetries as well as greater capacity and better distributional networks. Thus, the main 
objective of this paper is to determine what motivates banks to hire rivals as underwriters. 
Overall, we find support for each of our three testable hypotheses and the decision to hire 
a rival.  Issuing banks hire a rival bank in 29% of all debt issuances. In general, issuing banks are 
more likely to use rivals for international and longer-maturity deals, but are less likely to use 
rivals when issues are privately-placed, have a larger relative deal size, or when the issuer has a 
large market share in the debt underwriting market.  Our results show that as an issuer’s expertise 
declines, whether measured by its overall market share, or its market share in specific categories 
of debt (international, private placements, or long-maturity issues), the issuing bank is more likely 
to hire a rival to underwrite its debt offering. 
In addition, we find some evidence that banks are more likely to use a rival on a given 
deal as the percentage of past rival usage increases (particularly for lower-quality banks); thus, 
past relations may matter.  However, if an issuing bank has frequently used one rival in the past, 
they are less likely to use that rival in the current deal, regardless of issuer quality.  This suggests 
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that banks may try to alleviate potential hold-up problems (Rajan, 1992).  We use two additional 
proxies for proprietary information (indicators for whether the issuing bank has either a 
proprietary trading or derivatives division).  We find that when issuers have either of these 
divisions, they are less likely to use rival banks, suggesting that they may be attempting to protect 
private information on their strategies from their rivals. 
We next examine the decision to use a rival based on the quality of the bank.  Lower-
quality banks are significantly more likely to use rivals (67%) than high-quality ones (19%).  
These findings suggest that, similar to non-banks, lower-quality banks may use rivals for their 
reputation, expertise, or to help certify an offering. Regardless of bank quality, when banks have 
limited expertise in certain types of deals (e.g. international offerings), they are more likely to 
hire a rival.  In addition, rivals may help to reduce information asymmetries or provide 
certification of an issuer. Top 10 banks are more likely to use a rival when they have high prior-
year stock return volatility or low debt ratings. The opposite is true for Non-Top 10 banks.  These 
results could signify that rivals either may not want to work with lower-quality banks or it may be 
too costly to get certification from rivals, so lower-quality issuers choose to self-underwrite.  
As discussed under the “bank-specific” hypothesis, we also examine bank specific 
motivations: the capacity to underwrite their own debt and their distributional network.  An 
increase in the percentage of financial deals of the issuer’s total underwritten debt for lower-
quality banks has no effect on their decision to use a rival.  Conversely, Top 10 banks are more 
likely to hire a rival when they have capacity constraints.  This may be due to these banks 
trading-off their own underwriting for that of their clients.  To proxy for distributional resources, 
we use the presence of an asset management arm and observe that banks with this division are 
less likely to hire a rival.  We test these three hypotheses jointly to determine if one explanation 
appears to emerge as the predominant motivation for issuing banks to hire a rival, but observe 
that the basic inferences obtained from the individual tests continue to hold when tested jointly.  
As commercial banks were subject to a substantial regulatory shock, we also restrict our sample 
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to the time period from 2000-2014, and obtain qualitatively similar results. 
Lastly, we investigate whether the use of a rival affects an issuing firm’s deal terms.  In 
general, we find that when issuing banks hire a rival, gross spreads (direct costs borne by the 
issuing bank at the time of the issue) increase by 18 bps for all banks and 34 bps for Top 10 
banks.  Given the unconditional average gross spread of 63 bps, these higher fees represent an 
increase of 29% and 54%, respectively. We find limited evidence that the use of a rival increases 
coupon rates, but find no effect on offer yields to maturity.  The decision to hire a rival appears to 
increase issue costs, particularly for Top 10 issuing banks. Since Top 10 banks appear to hire 
rivals when they are capacity-constrained, this additional increase in spreads could be 
compensation to the rival for bearing the issuing-bank’s excess capacity. 
 
2.  Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.A. Financial Firms and Regulatory Changes to the Industry 
Financial firms comprise a large fraction of total debt issued in the U.S., yet these firms 
are generally excluded from studies of capital market transactions.  Based on SDC League 
Tables, since 1979 financials (including investment and commercial banks) represent 32%, on 
average, of all new debt funding raised annually (see Figure 1).  One explanation why prior 
studies on debt underwriting exclude financial firms centers on a banks’ ability to underwrite its 
own debt; however, we have no previous knowledge on how many banks underwrite their own 
debt or the frequency with which they use another bank as the lead underwriter.   
From 1979-2014, about 11.5% of public U.S. banks that issue debt have both the ability 
and capability to underwrite their own debt, although there is variation across time due to both 
consolidation as well as regulatory changes (see Figure 2).31  While prior literature on debt 
offerings excludes banks on the basis that they can self-underwrite, in approximately 29% of all 
                                                            
31 Prior to widespread regulatory changes in the late 1980s, commercial banks were unable to underwrite 
their own debt, while investment banks always have had the ability to do so.   
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debt issues, able and capable banks choose to use a rival as the lead underwriter (see Figure 3).  
This finding is not restricted to commercial banks; investment banks hire rivals nearly 30% of the 
time as well.   
Before examining motivations for why banks might hire rivals, we first examine the 
regulatory landscape for commercial banks that, culminating in 1999, allowed their unrestricted 
entry back into the investment banking business. After the collapse of the financial system in the 
1920s, commercial banks were prohibited from participating in any investment banking 
(underwriting) business as part of the U.S. Banking Act of 1933 (more commonly known as the 
Glass-Steagall Act).  In the 1960s through 1980s, a few commercial banks were allowed to 
underwrite a limited array of securities.32  In the late 1980s, banks were given the ability to 
establish separate subsidiaries to underwrite securities, Section 20 subs, but were still restricted in 
the scope of activity (e.g., debt underwriting allowed in 1989) and the percentage of revenue 
these subs could generate.  Over the next decade, additional revocations of the ban between 
investment and commercial banking activities were introduced, until the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act of 1999 permanently removed restrictions for U.S. commercial banks to be fully involved in 
investment banking business.  A timeline of the regulatory revisions is provided in Figure 4. 
The effect of increased competition driven by the entry of commercial banks into the 
investment bank arena has been widely examined for non-bank debt issuers.  Commercial banks 
potentially have an informational advantage over investment banks given their long-term lending 
relations with firms (Boot and Thakor, 2000). Numerous studies find that commercial banks 
charged lower fees upon their entry into debt underwriting, perhaps to capture market share from 
investment banks (Gande, Puri, and Saunders, 1999; Kim, Palia, and Saunders, 2008; Song, 
2004). Further, this entry affected the development of syndicates, which has also been shown to 
reduce issuing costs (Narayanan, Rangan, and Rangan, 2004).  Although the ability of 
                                                            
32 Bank underwriting activities were limited to commercial paper, municipal debt, and mortgage-backed 
securities. 
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commercial banks to underwrite debt affected the landscape for non-banks in their advisor choice, 
how this change affects banks’ own advisor choice has been unexplored.  We use shifts in the 
regulatory environment as natural experiments to determine how exogenous shocks to the number 
and quality of advisors affects banks’ likelihood of using a rival to underwrite its’ own debt 
offerings. 
2.B. Determinants of Advisor Choice: Expertise, Information, and Bank-Specific Reasons 
A broad literature explores determinants of advisor choice for non-banks. We categorize 
these motivations into “bank expertise” and “information” based explanations.  Expertise 
comprises a number of different, but highly related, facets, including reputation, specialization, 
and underwriting experience.  As shown in Krigman et al. (2001), non-banks often select highly 
reputable underwriters as they may provide better or more extensive services.  There is some 
evidence that reputable banks obtain better prices and yield terms than lower quality ones (Datta, 
Iskandar-Datta, and Patel, 1997; Fang, 2005).  Some banks, instead, specialize in certain deal 
types (Berger, Espinosa-Vega, Frame, and Miller, 2005).33  With debt underwriting, more 
reputable banks are more likely to underwrite larger, long-term, investment-grade debt (Fang, 
2005). 
This leads us to our first hypothesis, the “bank expertise” hypothesis. Similar to non-
banks, banks may need to use more reputable or specialized competitors on their debt offerings.  
Whether expertise motivates only lower-quality or all banks to hire a rival is an empirical 
question.  For example, since the merger between JP Morgan and Chase Manhattan in 2001, JP 
Morgan Chase (JPM) has been ranked in the Top 10 of the SDC League Tables.  JPM is a large, 
global, diversified bank, yet in 26% of its debt issues, it uses rival banks as lead underwriters.  
Moreover, in only a quarter of these deals does JPM use another Top 10 bank.  Banks, therefore, 
                                                            
33 Although Berger et al. (2005) does not specifically look at debt deals, they find that bank size is a 
predictor of specialization.  Small, regional banks are more likely to capitalize on “soft” information, while 
larger banks are likely to take on clients based solely on accounting or audit (“hard”) information. 
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may choose to use a rival due to particular specialization or expertise.  For instance, in several of 
JPM’s international offerings, it uses UniCredit (an Italian universal bank) as the lead 
underwriter; thus, domestic banks may choose to hire rivals to facilitate international debt 
placements. While high-quality banks may still require expertise from rivals, we posit that, 
similar to non-bank firms, lower-quality banks will be more likely to use a rival to underwrite 
debt deals than larger, more reputable banks.   
Although reputation clearly can affect the choice of underwriter, another important 
determinant is whether the use of an underwriter can affect a firm’s information environment 
around the debt issue.  Information is multi-dimensional.  The choice of advisor may be due to 
the need for deal or issuer certification, to potentially reduce information asymmetry between the 
issuer and investors, or to create incentives associated with relationship building. Each of these 
has been shown to be important for non-bank firms.  Many non-bank issuers do not access capital 
markets at sufficient frequency for them to be well known to the market.  One role of the advisor, 
therefore, is to provide certification regarding the quality of the offering or of the issuer (Booth 
and Smith, 1986; Ross, 2010).34  A number of studies show that the use of an underwriter can 
reduce the information asymmetries between firms and their investors, particularly when firms 
are more opaque (Bharath et al., 2007; Duarte-Silva, 2010; Ross, 2010).   
Information acquisition by advisors, however, can be costly.  Advisors would prefer to 
foster long-term relations with issuers to capitalize on the time and effort required to provide 
certification and reduce information asymmetry.  As shown by Bharath et al. (2007) and Yasuda 
(2005), this relationship builds across time (duration), number of transactions, and product lines 
(e.g., lending and underwriting).  There are added benefits to firms that have stronger relations 
with their banks, including lower underwriting fees (Song, 2004; Yasuda, 2005), although Anand 
                                                            
34 Puri (1996) examines commercial and investment bank underwriting activities prior to the 
implementation of Glass-Steagall and finds that commercial banks appear to provide a certification role in 
underwriting securities. 
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and Galetovic (2006) show that increased competition due to the entry of commercial banks after 
deregulation, decreases incentives by banks to invest in firm-specific relations with their issuers.   
There are additional costs borne by an issuer related to information provided to advisors.  
Rajan (1992) posits that firms that repeatedly use the same advisor are prone to a hold-up 
problem, where an underwriting bank attains monopoly power over both financing and 
investment decisions within a firm.  This suggests that issuers are more likely to use a number of 
advisors to reduce the potential hold-up problem.  In contrast, as shown in Asker and Ljungqvist 
(2010), the use of an investment bank opens an issuing firm to possible information leakage to 
rivals within the industry.  Therefore, Asker and Ljungqvist (2010) predict that firms, particularly 
those in informationally-sensitive industries, are more likely to form long-term relationships with 
a single advisor to reduce information transfer to competing firms. Banks, however, by self-
underwriting their own debt, are in the rare position to reduce both hold-up problems and possible 
information leakage to rivals. 
These dynamics of information within an issuer-advisor relationship lead to our second 
hypothesis, the “information” hypothesis. Similar to our expectations for the bank expertise 
hypothesis, we predict that although all issuing banks could benefit from using rivals to certify 
offerings or reduce information asymmetries, the value of these relations are likely more 
important for lower-quality banks. Further, long-term relationships could help minimize the 
possibility of information revelation to competitors; however, as any underwriter is a direct 
competitor to the issuing bank, the possibility of information leakage to a rival is a near certainty. 
By exploring both the number of rivals hired across time, as well as the types of deals where 
rivals are used, we can identify whether the use of rivals is driven by the desire to reduce 
potential hold-up problems or when issuers require specialization for specific deals. 
There are a host of explanations, however, that are unique to banks when it comes to 
underwriter selection, which creates our third “bank-specific” hypothesis.  First, each sample 
bank has the capability to act as its own underwriter, thus, the choice is between hiring a rival and 
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hiring in-house. Banks do not have unlimited capacity to take on deals (Asker and Ljungqvist, 
2010); each time a bank underwrites its own debt, the loss of a potential client deal emerges as an 
opportunity cost. Choosing to self-underwrite, therefore, may strain a bank’s capacity, but also 
potentially lead to conflicts of interest if a bank prioritizes its own deals ahead of its clients’.  
Second, banks with larger distributional networks are more likely to be able to attract investors to 
new offerings (Huang, Shangguan, and Zhang, 2008).  If an issuing bank does not have sufficient 
distributional ability, it may require a rival to act as a lead underwriter to facilitate deal 
placement.   
Lastly, banks may be able to influence their reputation by underwriting more of their own 
debt in advance of League Table publications, thereby manipulating market share and rankings 
(Rau, 2000).  Every time an issuing bank hires a rival, it directly affects its own market share, 
especially since the trade-off between self-underwriting a deal instead of a client’s deal could be 
costly (for instance, a client deal is subject to more information asymmetry and there is 
potentially more reputation at stake than with a self-underwritten offer).   
Capacity constraints, distributional ability, and reputation enhancement are unique 
reasons applicable solely to banks, but may provide some explanation for the advisor choice. All 
banks, regardless of quality, are likely to be affected by bank specific motivations.  Lower quality 
banks are more likely to be capacity-constrained and have smaller distributional networks, 
thereby requiring the use of a rival.  However, if lower-quality banks want to move up the League 
Tables to improve their reputational standings, they should be less likely to use a rival.  
Alternatively, high-quality banks may also face capacity constraints, as these banks are likely to 
have clients that require larger capital transactions.  This could additionally strain a top-tier 
bank’s distribution network.  In these instances, Top 10 banks may be more likely to hire a rival.  
Rankings also are likely to be more important for top tier banks; therefore, these banks could be 
less likely to use a rival in order to build market share and thus reputational status. 
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3. Data and Methodology 
3.A. Data and Sample Selection 
  To construct our sample of financial firms we use the Thomson-Reuters Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC) Global New Issues database. We obtain all debt offerings issued by U.S. 
domiciled publicly traded commercial and investment banks from 1979 to 2014.  This initial 
dataset consists of 17,311 deals by 1,117 banks. Matching and identifying the banks to Center for 
Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) permnos reduces the dataset to 15,983 deals for 782 firms.  
From previous literature, we know that SDC sometimes records debt transactions in 
multiple steps, which may overstate a firm’s relation with a given advisor (Burch, Nanda, and 
Warther, 2005). As such, we follow the methodology detailed in Burch et al. (2005) to 
consolidate similar transactions. Within a seven-day period, all debt issuances of the same type, 
coupon, maturity, and advisor are combined into a single, aggregate offering. This consolidation 
removes 799 debt deals. We then remove deals with missing transactions values and no advisors 
(35 deals) and match firms with Compustat, eliminating 428 deals (133 firms), yielding a sample 
of 14,721 deals for 643 firms.  Appendix A details sample construction. 
In order to obtain the sample of banks that has a choice between underwriting its own 
debt and using a rival, we identify banks that have both the ability and capability to underwrite 
debt offerings. As noted in the introduction, commercial banks are “able” to underwrite debt once 
legal restrictions on debt underwriting were removed in the 1980s and 1990s (see Figure 4 for the 
regulatory time line) whereas investment banks have had no restrictions on their ability.  
“Capable” banks are those that are both “able” (a necessary condition) and have acted as the lead 
underwriter for another firm’s debt offering.  The date of the bank’s first external offering is used 
to define when the issuer is deemed capable of underwriting debt issuances.   For example, prior 
to August 2, 1995, when First Union first underwrote debt for another firm (Post Properties, Inc.), 
First Union is incapable of underwriting its own debt issues.  After this date, First Union is 
considered capable of acting as its own underwriter for any of its own debt issuances.   
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Our final sample of both able and capable banks leads to a sample of 9,760 debt 
issuances for 60 banks, consisting of both investment and commercial banks.  The sample of 
banks, including their investment bank or commercial bank classification, the first capable date, 
and the date of merger completion (if applicable) are presented in Table 1.   
3.B. Identification of Using a Rival 
 There have been substantial consolidation in the banking industry, driven by competitive 
and regulatory forces.  We track our sample banks’ corporate identities through time to account 
for any name changes and mergers, when the bank is the surviving firm.  For instance, JP Morgan 
& Co. is a separate firm from JP Morgan Chase.35  To determine whether a bank hires a rival as 
its underwriter on a given deal, we classify all advisors used on a specific debt offering by their 
primary, mutually-exclusive roles into two main categories following Corwin and Stegemoller 
(2014). A Lead advisor is listed as the lead or joint-lead bookrunner, lead or joint-lead manager, 
lead or joint-lead placement agent, or co-lead agent. An Other advisor is listed by SDC as an 
agent, a co-manager, a co-placement manager, or a member of the syndicate.   
 We classify a bank as using a rival on a debt offering when the issuing bank hires another 
bank as for the Lead advisor role. If the issuing bank is not listed as their own advisor (solo or 
joint), then this bank is identified as hiring a rival on that deal.  Banks are classified as Other on a 
given deal if the bank only participates in a non-lead capacity (i.e. syndicate member).  In 
general, non-managing (“other”) advisors tend to play a significantly reduced role in the 
underwriting process (Corwin and Schultz, 2005).  If the firm does not have any role in the 
underwriting or placement of the deal, then the firm is classified as No Role for that specific deal.  
 Table 1 shows the propensity of our sample banks to self-underwrite (“lead”) compared 
to using a rival (“other” or “no role”).  For example, JP Morgan Chase (JPM) issues debt on 419 
                                                            
35 Tracing the history of JP Morgan Chase begins with the initial merger of Chase Manhattan Bank and 
Chemical Bank in 1996, which led to the creation of the new Chase Manhattan Bank.  In 2000, JP Morgan 
& Co. acquired Chase Manhattan Bank, and the new bank JP Morgan Chase was formed. In 2004, JP 
Morgan Chase acquired Banc One, but remained JP Morgan Chase following that acquisition. 
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occasions in the sample.  In 74% of its debt deals, JPM is listed as Lead advisor, and never serves 
in the “other” capacity. In the remaining 26% of its deals, JPM does not participate in any 
capacity (“no role”) and relies solely on rival bank(s) to facilitate the transaction. In our sample, 
banks use a rival as the lead underwriter in 28.7% of their debt offerings, while in 26.4% of deals, 
the issuer plays no role in the offering, even though these issuing banks are both able and capable 
to do so.  
3.C. Data and Variable Construction 
In this section, we describe the data sources for the variables used in our analyses.  A 
comprehensive list of the variables is provided in Appendix B.  From SDC, we obtain all deal-
related variables, including the name and number of all advisors for each deal, advisory role (e.g., 
lead, manager, and syndicate), gross spreads as a percentage of principal, coupon rate, and yield 
to maturity. We collect offer maturity (denoted in years), principal value, and indicator variables 
for whether a deal is an international or private debt issuance.36  We also create indicator 
variables for whether a deal is rated high (AA rating or higher), mid (A rating), or low (BAA 
rating or lower) based on Moody’s ratings in SDC.  
Market value of equity, prior returns, and stock return volatility are constructed from 
CRSP data.  A measure of relative deal size is computed as the principal value (SDC) scaled by a 
firm’s market value of equity (CRSP).  Returns and volatility are measured for twelve months 
prior to the debt issuance using daily returns. Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated using 
the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model based on daily returns for [-253,-1] trading days prior 
to the issue date of the debt offering. Volatility is the standard deviation of the past twelve months 
of daily returns. Leverage, return on assets, and the market-to-book ratio are constructed from 
Compustat data.  Firm financial characteristics are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels and 
collected for the year preceding each debt issuance.  
                                                            
36 International deals are coded by SDC as an offering for Australia/New Zealand, Asia Pacific, Europe, or 
general international.  Private debt placements are classified as private non-convertible debt by SDC. 
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We use Thomson Reuters SDC League Tables to obtain market share information related 
to each issuer and advisor for the year prior to the debt issuance.  We collect U.S. public debt 
market share for each issuer and advisor. In addition to market share, for each year we obtain the 
total proceeds and total number of deals underwritten by each bank, as well as the bank’s League 
Table ranking. From these rankings, we create indicator variables classifying whether a bank 
(either issuer or advisor) is ranked as a Top 10 bank in the prior year. 
To obtain variables related to bank expertise, we construct deal characteristic-specific 
market shares for each bank’s fraction of the entire U.S. public debt issuances collected from 
SDC. The three market share variables are based on a bank’s aggregate deal values for 
international, privately-placed, and long-term (>10 years maturity) debt over the prior five years, 
and compute a bank’s rolling five-year market share in each of these categories.  In addition, we 
construct rolling six-month windows to identify the total and financial debt issues underwritten 
by each bank. Our capacity measure is the total amount of financial debt underwritten by a bank 
scaled by the total debt underwritten by the same bank in the previous six-month period.  
As advisor relationships may play a role in the propensity for a bank to hire a rival, we 
compute a number of relationship metrics for each bank.  Using SDC data, we identify the 
percentage of a bank’s self-underwritten offerings in the prior twelve months relative to the 
percentage of offerings underwritten by a rival bank. We also calculate the frequency that an 
issuer hires the same rival as the lead advisor over the same horizon noted above.  
From the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority’s website (FINRA.org), we identify 
whether each of our banks has an asset management arm (proxies for the distribution network), a 
proprietary trading or derivatives trading division (proxies for proprietary information) and create 
three indicator variables.37  We also create an indicator variable for whether the debt offer 
                                                            
37 Unlike non-banks, where proxies of proprietary information (i.e. R&D) are available, similar proxies to 
capture the degree of information spillage between the issuer and the underwriter are more difficult to 
construct for banks. 
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occurred after the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, which occurred in 1999. 
3.D. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 provides basic deal (Panel A) and firm characteristics (Panel B) for the 9,760 
debt offerings from our sample of 60 U.S. investment and commercial banks.  We also split the 
sample around the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act (pre- and post-1999) to determine if there are 
significant changes to deal or firm characteristics driven by the regulatory shock.38  As shown in 
Panel A, on average, banks raise $286 million per debt issuance, although the average size has 
increased post-1999 ($467 million versus $101 million).  The relative deal size (proceeds scaled 
by market value of equity), however, has declined over time (2.2% pre-2000 compared to 1.1% 
post-1999).  The average maturity is slightly less than 6 years, although maturities have increased 
from 4.9 years to 6.5 years in the post-1999 period.   
Banks have significantly ramped up their percentage of international deals from 8.8% to 
21.9%; however, the number of privately placed transactions has significantly declined from 
11.6% to 0.8% in the post-1999 period. After the regulatory shift, which led to consolidation 
among investment and commercial banks, the overall percentage of highly rated issues increased 
from 24.5% to 45.8%, while the percentage of mid- and low-rated debt issues declined.  Further, 
the percentage of deals executed by rival banks declined from 37.3% to 20.4%, while the number 
of deals in the sample underwritten by Top 10 banks increased from 53.4% to 73.5%.  Although 
statistically significantly different, the proportion of deals done by investment banks has been 
relatively unchanged across time (56% pre-2000 compared to 58% post-1999). 
Panel B highlights the bank characteristics based on a firm-year level.  Driven by the 
entry of large commercial banks, the average firm size (measured by the market value of equity) 
significantly increases from approximately $8 billion to $50 billion following the regulatory 
change.  Banks have lower leverage post-1999 (although this may be driven by new rules 
                                                            
38 All changes in deal characteristics between the pre-2000 and post-1999 periods are statistically 
significantly different, as shown in Panel A of Table 2. 
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following the 2008 financial crisis which changed the amount of regulatory capital required by 
banks) and higher valuations (measured by market to book); profitability is relatively unchanged.  
On average, banks issue about 16 debt offerings per year; while there is an increase from 15 to 17 
deals post-1999, the difference is not statistically significant. 
In Table 3, we segment the sample into Top 10 and non-Top 10 banks and compare the 
underwriting characteristics on a firm-year basis (each difference reported is statistically 
significantly different at the 1% level).  Top 10 banks have a larger percentage of the overall and 
financial debt market share (4.82% and 4.60%, respectively) than non-Top 10 banks (0.17% and 
0.21%, respectively).  Of all debt issued by a particular bank, Top 10 banks self-underwrite 
nearly 81% of their debt, while non-Top 10 banks only self-underwrite 33% of their total issues.  
Further, approximately 38% of the total financial debt underwritten by a Top 10 issuing bank is 
its own debt, compared to 22% for non-Top 10 banks.  When we condition on a rival being used, 
Top 10 banks are much less likely to use another Top 10 bank compared to non-Top 10 banks 
(32% versus 64%), and the overall advisor League Table rank is of significantly lower quality (23 
versus 7, where a rank of 1 is the top-ranked bank). 
In Table 4, Panel A, we compare characteristics of issuers to those of the banks they hire 
to underwrite their deals.  Rivals tend to underwrite more debt than self-issuers, both in terms of 
proceeds and number of deals, and have greater financial market share (1.9% versus 0.9%, 
respectively).  Rivals also tend to have higher League Table rankings (10 versus 27 for self-
issuers), and are more likely to be Top 10 banks (60% versus 15%).  Consistent with the 
hypothesis that issuers might hire rivals to gain their expertise, self-underwriters have 
significantly less experience in international, private, and long-maturity debt offerings than the 
rivals they hire. In Panel B, approximately 78% of rivals are ranked higher than the issuing bank, 
although this varies greatly when we segment into Top 10 and non-Top 10 banks (19% and 89%, 
respectively).  Interestingly, Top 10 banks are 81% more likely to hire lower-quality advisors, 
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compared to 11% for non-Top 10, indicating that reputation alone does not appear to drive the 
advisor choice. 
 
4. Results 
In this section, we explore the three hypotheses (bank expertise, information, and bank-
specific) to determine why capable banks choose to hire a rival to underwrite their debt.  We 
begin by focusing strictly on deal- and bank-characteristics in our base model, and then construct 
a series of variables to capture our proposed explanations for advisor choice.  Further, since the 
majority of the hypotheses are likely to vary based on the quality of the issuing bank, we partition 
by whether the issuing bank was ranked in the Top 10 of the SDC League Tables at the time of 
the issue.  Due to regulatory changes, culminating in the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999, 
we include a post-1999 indicator variable to capture shifts driven by the exogenous shock to the 
competitive environment in all of our regressions.   
As our primary objective is to determine why capable banks hire rivals, our dependent 
variable is an indicator equal to one if a rival bank is used on the current deal, zero if it self-
underwrites.  Typically logit or probit models are used for estimation when the dependent 
variable is dichotomous. To reduce any omitted variable bias between firm- or year-specific 
characteristics and the error term, it is necessary to control for year and issuer fixed effects in our 
estimations of why a bank hires a rival. A logit or probit model with fixed effects cannot be used 
as it introduces biases in the coefficients and standard errors. Using a linear probability model 
(LPM) with fixed effects to estimate the marginal effects helps correct these biases. LPMs, 
however, do not impose the restriction that the estimated probability of the dependent variable is 
bounded between zero and one (results are qualitatively similar if probit models are used instead).  
Additionally, LPM regressions tend to be inherently heteroskedastic, which we correct for by 
estimating all of our models with robust standard errors. 
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In Table 5, we explore why capable banks hire a rival to underwrite a debt offering, 
controlling only for bank and deal characteristics (in the remainder of Section III, we explore the 
individual hypotheses separately followed by a joint analysis of the three broad explanations for 
advisor choice).  Columns 1 and 2 focus on the combined sample of all banks, while Columns 3 
and 4 (Columns 5 and 6) examine non-Top 10 (Top 10) banks.  The explanatory variables include 
indicators for international and private deals, the relative deal size, the maturity of the issue (in 
years), and in specifications 2, 4, and 6, the issuer’s prior-year debt market share and an indicator 
for whether the offer occurred after January 1, 2000.  
Table 5 provides some evidence of expertise, reputation, and specialization, as well as 
certification and the protection of proprietary information as reasons for hiring a rival.  In each 
column, banks are more likely to hire a rival when issuing international debt, suggesting that not 
all issuing banks have particular expertise in these deals.39  Longer maturity deals are likely to be 
riskier than short-term deals, so the positive coefficient suggests that issuers may use rivals to 
certify long-term offerings.  We find that more reputable issuers are less likely to use rivals, 
indicating issuers are less likely to seek reputation from advisors when issuers themselves are 
highly reputable.  Issuers are more likely to self-underwrite when deals are relatively larger or 
privately placed.  Although these are imperfect proxies for proprietary information, both suggest 
that when information may be costly to reveal (Asker and Ljungqvist, 2010), an issuer is less 
likely to hire a rival. For instance, privately placed deals provide less information to prospective 
investors in their filings relative to public offerings.  Consistent with Table 2, issuing banks are 
less likely to use rivals after the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999.  In the remaining analyses 
(Tables 6 – 12), the controls are of similar sign and magnitude of those in Table 5. 
 
                                                            
39 One concern is that issuers may be required to hire a “local” bank when issuing in other countries due to 
foreign regulations.  To alleviate concerns that hiring a rival is driven strictly by international deals, we 
remove these deals (which constitute approximately 15.4% of total deals) and find consistent results across 
all specifications. 
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4.A. Expertise 
We next focus on the effect of bank expertise and how that affects the issuer’s decision to 
hire a rival.  Recall, that bank expertise broadly encompasses reputation, specialization, and 
experience.  In Table 5, we provided two measures designed to capture a bank’s expertise: an 
issuer’s prior-year debt market share and whether an issuer is a Top 10 underwriter.  In Table 6, 
we expand our definition of expertise by including market-share based measures for specific 
types of debt deals.  These measures are computed as the five-year rolling average of an issuer’s 
aggregate market share in international, private, or long-maturity debt offerings.  We argue that 
the smaller the issuing bank’s market share in a particular debt category, they are less likely to 
have expertise or specialization in that area, and thus are more likely to hire a rival. The base 
specifications are the same as those reported in Table 5, augmented with the additional market 
share measures of expertise.  As in Table 5, we examine all banks in Columns 1 – 3, non-Top 10 
in Columns 4 – 6, and Top 10 in Columns 7 – 9. 
In Columns 1, 4, and 7 of Table 6, as prior experience or specialization in international 
offerings (Issuer: % International) declines, banks are more likely to hire a rival to underwrite 
their deal.  Expertise carries through to private placement experience as well as specialization in 
long-term offerings.  Regardless of the expertise measure examined, as issuers develop an ability 
within specific areas, their likelihood of using a rival declines.  Top 10 banks reduce their reliance 
on rivals when their expertise increases (in any of the three measures), while international 
expertise alone affects the use of rivals for lower-quality banks.  
4.B. Information 
Expertise, however, is only one component that can affect the decision to use a rival for a 
given debt offering.  Banks may also seek the use of rivals to help certify specific issues (or 
themselves) or to reduce the information asymmetry between the issuer and investors.  Instead, if 
banks are concerned about information leakage to rivals, it is more likely that these issuers will 
self-underwrite. In this section, we broadly test the information hypothesis in Table 7 
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(certification), Table 8 (relationships), and Table 9 (proprietary information).  As noted above, 
our base specifications are the same as those in Table 5, which already has two noisy proxies for 
information, namely the indicator for private placements and the relative deal size. 
In Table 7, we test the certification component of the information hypothesis. We 
continue to segment issuers by Top 10 ranking, which to some degree could capture an issuer’s 
need for certification and reduce possible information asymmetries.  We also include two 
additional proxies for certification:  the prior-year stock return volatility (Columns 1, 3, and 5) 
and indicators for whether the issue is rated by Moody’s AA and above (High Debt Rating) or 
BAA and below (Low Debt Rating).  Firms with high stock market volatility or low-rated debt 
are more likely to be riskier firms, and therefore, may require a third-party certification to 
facilitate placement of the deal.  Further, stocks with high volatility and poor ratings are more 
likely to suffer from greater informational asymmetries with its investors; the use of an outside 
underwriter could reduce this information gap, again facilitating the issue. 
In Column 1, issuers with greater stock market volatility are significantly more likely to 
hire a rival to underwrite a debt offering, consistent with the hypothesis that riskier firms are 
more likely to need certification from other banks.  Similarly, when we control for high and low 
debt ratings, we find that low–rated issues are significantly more likely to be underwritten by a 
rival than high-rated issues (Column 2), again suggesting that rivals reduce information 
asymmetries between investors and the issuing bank.  Unlike our findings for expertise, we find 
significant differences between Top 10 and non-Top 10 banks with regards to certification.  Top 
10 issuing banks look very similar to the whole sample (Columns 5 and 6).  Lower-quality banks, 
however, are less likely to use a rival as their debt ratings fall (Columns 3 and 4). As the overall 
riskiness of a bank increases, it is possible that it becomes too costly to seek outside certification 
or that rival banks are unwilling to work with these risky issuers, as this could potentially put 
their own reputation at risk. Non-Top 10 banks with highly rated debt, instead, may be attractive 
to rival in that their debt are easy to place, given their quality.  
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Table 8 examines the importance of prior relationships on the decision to use a rival on a 
given deal.  The first measure of prior relationships is the percentage each bank used a rival in the 
past 12 months for its own issues. Our prediction is that a greater past usage of rivals will lead to 
greater future rival usage. The second measure captures the strength of the relation with a 
particular advisor and is computed as the percentage of deals where the advisor on the current 
deal was also used by the issuer as an underwriter in the past 12 months.  If relationships are 
important, then the greater the use of one particular underwriter in the past, the more likely the 
issuer will use that advisor again on the current offering (thereby increasing the likelihood that 
the firm uses a rival).  However, if issuing banks are instead concerned about hold-up problems, 
then they will be less likely to use this rival on the current deal if they have used the rival 
repeatedly in the past. 
Table 8 shows that for all banks and the non-Top 10, as past rival usage increases 
(Columns 1, 3, and 5), a bank is more likely to use a rival on the current deal, consistent with our 
predictions. The same does not hold for Top 10 banks: the coefficient is insignificantly negative, 
suggesting that for Top 10 banks the percentage of past rival usage does not impact the decision 
to use a rival.  For all banks, as the percentage of deals in the past year underwritten by the 
current advisor increases, the likelihood of using a rival on the current deal declines.  This 
suggests that long-term relations with rivals are more likely to lead to hold-up problems for the 
issuing bank rather than further reductions of information asymmetries.  Further, as shown in 
Table 3, most banks use between 10 and 13 advisors on average, suggesting that exclusive, long-
term bilateral arrangements are not prevalent within banking. 
Lastly, in Table 9, we use two additional proxies for an issuing bank’s proprietary 
information environment: indicators for whether the firm has a proprietary trading desk or a 
derivatives trading division.  Both of these proxies could indicate that the issuing bank has 
strategies that it would prefer to keep in-house rather than reveal to competitor banks if hired.  In 
Columns 1, 3, and 5 of Table 9, we find that issuers that have proprietary trading desks are less 
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likely to use rivals than banks that do not.  We find similar results in Columns 2, 4, and 6, when 
the derivatives trading division indicator is used instead.  Although each is a noisy proxy, the 
results from Table 9 provide some evidence that when banks are likely to have proprietary trading 
strategies, they are less likely to hire a rival. 
4.C. Bank-Specific Explanations 
As shown in Sections 4.A and 4.B, both expertise and information help explain the 
decision to hire a rival. These motivations, however, are also relevant for non-bank issuers.  In 
this section, we explore rationale pertinent only to potential bank issuers, focusing on a bank’s 
underwriting capacity and its distributional network to aid in the placement of issues. Our 
capacity measure is computed as the percentage of financial deals underwritten by the issuing 
bank relative to its total underwritten deals. We proxy for the distributional network with an 
indicator for whether the issuing bank has an asset management division.  Our prediction is that 
as either capacity or distributional abilities increase, issuing banks are less likely to use a rival.  
However, Top 10 banks are likely to obtain a significant number of external deals, particularly 
from larger firms; thus, high-reputation banks could face capacity constraints to underwrite their 
own deals, and therefore are more likely to seek a rival for its own issues. 
We test these predictions in Table 10.  In Columns 1, 3, and 5, the sign on capacity 
changes based upon the issuing bank’s quality. For all banks (Column 1), the larger the issuing 
bank’s capacity to underwrite financial debt, the less likely the bank is to use a rival.  Non-Top 10 
banks are less likely to use a rival (although the coefficient is insignificant), while Top 10 banks 
are more likely.  This relationship between capacity and using a rival suggests that Top 10 banks 
may trade-off their own deals for those of their clients as they reach the limits of their 
underwriting capacity.  In Columns 2, 4, and 6, we observe that banks with their own asset 
management division are less likely to use a rival for a given deal than issuing banks that do not, 
indicating that an increase in distributional abilities may play a role in the decision to hire a rival 
for a firm.   
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5. Alternative Specifications 
In the previous section, we find support for the three hypotheses presented.  In general, 
issuing banks are more likely to hire a rival when they seek either higher reputation or expertise, 
when they require certification of their issue or a reduction in information asymmetry, and when 
they require additional capacity or better distributional networks.  In this section, we look at a 
number of alternative specifications of our base models.  We first explore whether one of our 
hypotheses emerges as the predominant explanatory factor for why banks hire a rival by jointly 
modeling expertise, information, and bank-specific motivations (Table 11). As deregulation in the 
commercial banking sector provides an exogenous shock to the competitive environment 
regarding debt underwriting, we examine our results focusing on the post-1999 period (Table 12).  
Lastly, in Table 13, we explore whether the use of a rival affects the possible costs to issuing 
banks, including gross spreads, coupon rates, and the offer yields to maturity. 
In Table 11, we investigate our hypotheses jointly by combining variables that capture 
various components of expertise (issuer’s aggregate international market share), information 
(certification: high- and low-ratings or prior-year volatility; strength of relationship: prior-year 
rival use; proprietary trading indicator), and bank-specific (capacity: percentage of financial deals 
advised).  Columns 1, 4, and 7 exclude prior-year volatility, while Columns 2, 5, and 8 exclude 
debt-rating indicators since both capture an issuing bank’s need for certification or reduction in 
information asymmetry.  Columns 3, 6, and 9 include all of these variables. Our results are 
generally consistent with those found when we examined each hypothesis separately, suggesting 
that all three motivations for hiring a rival are important for issuing banks.   While the 
coefficients on deal capacity are consistent with Table 10 for Top 10 banks, the capacity measure 
loses statistical significance for the full sample in the combined test.   
One advantage of the combined hypothesis testing is that we gain some understanding of 
the relative importance of each hypothesis.  For non-Top 10 banks, the biggest impact on hiring a 
rival is whether they have deal-specific expertise to underwrite their own debt; the coefficient on 
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international market share expertise is significantly larger than any other variable.  For Top 10 
banks, high volatility appears to be one of the largest drivers to use a rival.  Capacity, however, is 
almost nearly as important as low debt ratings (Column 7), suggesting that capacity constraints 
are likely to be real motivations for certain banks in their decision to use a rival. 
To control for whether regulatory shifts affect the propensity or motivation to hire a rival, 
in Table 12, we exclude all deals underwritten prior to January 1, 2000, and run the same models 
presented in Tables 5 – 10.  Focusing only on post-deregulation debt issues, we find qualitatively 
similar results for this subsample of observations.  Only the capacity measure (Column 11) does 
not load as significant in the full sample, although when we partition the data into Top 10 and 
non-Top 10 (unreported), we find that capacity remains significantly and positively related to 
rival use for Top 10 banks, consistent with our base results in Table 10.  With respect to the 
control variables, only the private place indicator frequently loses significance (although 5 of the 
7 insignificant p-values range between 0.11 and 0.12).  This loss is driven by the significant 
decline in the number of private placements available in SDC in the last 15 years. 
Lastly, in Table 13, we explore how the use of a rival affects three deal terms: gross 
spreads, coupon rates, and offer yields to maturity. We use OLS models with year and issuer 
fixed effects and robust standard errors.  Due to incomplete data in SDC, the number of 
observations are significantly smaller than for the full debt issuance sample (i.e. there are no 
coupons or offer yields provided in floating-rate debt issuances).  In addition to the controls used 
in previous tables, we augment Table 13 with issuer prior-year stock return volatility, past 
returns, and returns on assets.  Each of these measures captures the financial health or riskiness of 
the issuing bank, which likely affect deal terms.  Our main explanatory variable is an indicator for 
whether the bank uses a rival on a given deal.  As in previous tables, we look at all banks 
(Columns 1 – 3), non-Top 10 banks (Columns 4 – 6), and Top 10 banks (Columns 7 – 9).   
In general, we find that hiring a rival does not have a large impact on deal terms, 
particularly coupons and offer yields, although coupon rates tend to be about 0.25% higher for 
74
 
 
 
 
Top 10 banks when they use a rival (p-value = 0.05).  Gross spreads, which are the actual fees 
paid to the rival bank, however, are significantly higher overall and for Top 10 banks.  In 
aggregate, the use of a rival to underwrite debt increases fees paid by 18 bps while for Top 10 
banks, this amount nearly doubles to 34 bps.  The average fee paid to an underwriter is 63 bps; 
therefore, these increases represent 29% and 54% higher fees, respectively, when using a rival 
bank.  
We also find fees are higher in international and private deals, particularly for Top 10 
banks and in longer maturity deals.  Fees are lower for issuers with high volatility and larger 
market share, particularly if they are high-quality, and in the post-1999 period. Coupons and offer 
yields increase in deal size, maturity, and market share, but decrease for international deals, 
issuing bank profitability, and post-1999.  Volatility is mixed: lower-quality banks have higher 
coupons and yields as volatility increases, while high quality have lower coupons and yields.  In 
general, we find some evidence that hiring a rival affects deal terms, especially fees. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we explore why able and capable U.S. commercial and investment banks 
hire rivals to underwrite their own debt offerings.  Nearly 30% of all our of sample deals involve 
a competitor to facilitate the placement of the deal.  Moreover, this is not limited to commercial 
banks or to lower-quality banks; both investment and commercial banks, as well as Top 10 and 
non-Top 10 ranked banks, use rivals extensively to underwrite their own debt issues.  We test a 
number of existing hypotheses, including bank expertise and information sharing, and provide a 
new hypothesis specifically relating to a bank’s own capacity to underwrite and place a given 
deal.  
Our results provide support for all three hypotheses.  When issuing banks seek reputation, 
experience, or specialization in particular deals, they are more likely to hire a rival.  Banks may 
seek external underwriters to certify a given deal (or perhaps themselves) or to reduce 
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information asymmetries between the issuing bank and its investors.  While long-term 
relationships may amortize the cost of information sharing, using rivals can lead to both potential 
hold-up problems and proprietary information leakage.  We find some evidence that banks will 
seek to minimize both of these costs by strategically making the decision to use a rival. 
Further, bank-specific motivations also impact the rival decision. When banks are likely 
to be capacity constrained, particularly Top 10 ranked banks, they are more likely to hire rivals to 
underwrite their debt (rather than losing potential clients to their competitors).  Banks with less 
distributional resources are also more likely to seek external underwriting.  This choice to hire 
rivals, however, is potentially costly to the issuing bank.  We find that the use of rivals 
significantly increases the total paid by between 29% and 54% over the unconditional average 
fee. 
By examining the previously undocumented debt underwriting relationship for banks, we 
contribute to the literature on advisor choice.  Although banks can underwrite their own debt, 
they pervasively use competitors to underwrite these securities.  Further, the use of rivals appears 
to be systematic as all banks regardless of size, quality, or type engage their rivals.  The 
motivations for doing so stem from bank-specific reasons as well as explanations shown to be 
relevant for non-bank firms.  Collectively, these results expand our understanding of banks’ 
underwriter choice and show that, despite the potential costs, banks extensively hire their rivals.
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Figure 1:  Percentage of Financial to Total Debt 
 
 
 
 
This figure details the percentage of debt (based on aggregate dollar volume of proceeds offered) 
issued by all U.S. public financial firms scaled by total debt issued by all U.S. public firms on a 
yearly basis from 1979 to 2014.  Source of data: SDC League Tables. 
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Figure 2:  Number of Banks Capable of Underwriting Debt 
 
 
 
 
This figure details the number of our 60 banks capable of underwriting debt yearly from 1979 to 
2014.  Appendix A provides details on bank selection criteria and defines capability.  
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Figure 3:  Fraction of Banks that Hire a Rival 
 
 
  
This figure details the fraction of banks that use a rival as a lead underwriter on a yearly basis 
from 1979 to 2014.  The left-hand side axis provides the percentage of issuing banks that use a 
rival bank as a lead underwriter each year.  The right-hand side axis shows the number of debt 
issuances in that given year. 
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Figure 4:  Regulatory Timeline 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This figure details the timeline of regulatory events surrounding commercial banks’ ability to 
underwrite securities.  We track all major regulatory revisions pertaining to commercial banks’ 
ability to participate in the securities business, which were prohibited by the Glass-Steagall Act of 
1933.  The first major expansion into debt underwriting occurred in 1989, and the Glass-Steagall 
Act of 1933 was finally repealed in 1999 following the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. 
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Table 1:  Bank Sample 
 
This table provides our sample of banks and their propensity to self-underwrite their debt issuances. 1st Lead is the first date that a bank acted as a 
lead advisor to another firm, marking the date when it is considered capable of underwriting its own debt issuances.  Other variables include the 
total number of debt issuances by each bank in our sample (# deals), as well as the percent of deals the banks use themselves as lead underwriter 
(Lead), the percent of deals the bank acts in a secondary role, such as a syndicate member (Other), and the percent of deals where the bank has no 
role in its own issuance (No Role).  All banks are identified as commercial banks (CB) or investment banks (IB); the status column details the 
current state of the firm. 
  
Firm Name 1st Lead # Deals Lead Other No Role Type Status 
Alex Brown Inc 10-Dec-70 1 100% 0.0% 0.0% IB 
Merged with Bankers Trust,     9-01-
1997 
Bank of America Merrill 
Lynch 16-Nov-98 472 78.6% 4.2% 17.2% CB Still exists 
Bank of Boston 4-Aug-95 50 6.0% 0.0% 94.0% CB 
Acquired by Fleet Financial,      3-01-
2000 
Bank of New York 1-Sep-83 161 16.1% 0.6% 83.2% CB Still exists 
Bank One Corp 20-Mar-97 136 30.9% 1.5% 67.6% CB 
Acquired by JPM Chase,          7-01-
2004 
BankAmerica Corp 1-Jun-81 157 7.6% 0.0% 92.4% CB 
Merged with Merrill Lynch to form 
BofA Merrill Lynch,        1-01-2009 
Bankers Trust NY 29-Jun-81 173 24.9% 0.0% 75.1% CB 
Acquired by Deutsche Bank,       6-04-
1999 
BB&T Corp 25-May-00 31 77.4% 0.0% 22.6% CB Still exists 
Bear Stearns 2-Jun-70 1039 98.9% 0.1% 1.0% IB 
Acquired by JPM Chase,             6-02-
2008 
Chase Manhattan Corp 15-Nov-82 198 37.9% 0.5% 61.6% CB 
Merged with JPM to form JPM Chase, 
12-31-2000 
Chemical Banking Corp 1-Oct-85 183 57.4% 0.0% 42.6% CB 
Acquired by Chase Manhattan,     3-31-
1996 
Citicorp 1-Jun-83 322 21.4% 0.0% 78.6% CB 
Merged with Travelers to form 
Citigroup, 10-09-1998 
Citigroup Inc 2-Nov-98 316 91.5% 3.2% 5.4% CB Still exists 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 
This table details summary statistics for a sample of 60 financial firms that issued debt from 1979-2014. 
Panel A reports mean, median, and standard deviations for deal characteristics for all debt deals in the 
sample (9,760 deals). Mean summary statistics are further partitioned between deals pre-2000 and deals 
from 2000 onwards.  Coupon, offer yield to maturity, and gross spread are only available for a subset of 
debt deals. Panel B reports firm characteristics based on a firm-year level. All financial data are for the 
fiscal year prior to the deal. Variable definitions are detailed in Appendix B.  p-values report the 
significance of the difference between sample means of the two sub-samples using a difference of means 
test. 
 
 Mean Median Std Dev  Pre-2000 2000-2014 p-value 
Panel A:  Deal Characteristics      
International Deal  15.39% 0% 36.09%  8.76% 21.90% (0.00) 
Private Deal  6.11% 0% 23.95%  11.55% 0.75% (0.00) 
Deal Size ($M) 285.70 93.31 521.83  101.22 467.03 (0.00) 
Relative Deal Size  1.65% 0.56% 3.64%  2.20% 1.11% (0.00) 
Maturity (years) 5.70 4.00 5.74  4.87 6.51 (0.00) 
Coupon 5.71% 5.88% 2.46%  6.80% 4.77% (0.00) 
Offer Yield to Maturity  5.72% 5.75% 2.40%  7.13% 4.81% (0.00) 
Gross Spread, % Principal 0.63% 0.35% 0.75%  0.60% 0.65% (0.00) 
High Debt Rating  35.27% 0% 47.78%  24.51% 45.84% (0.00) 
Mid Debt Rating  47.30% 0% 49.93%  52.77% 41.91% (0.00) 
Low Debt Rating  8.03% 0% 27.18%  10.15% 5.95% (0.00) 
12-mo Prior Stock Vol  3.28% 2.20% 4.81%  2.57% 3.96% (0.00) 
Use Rival  28.74% 0% 45.26%  37.25% 20.38% (0.00) 
% Issued by IBs 56.89% 100% 49.53%  55.73% 58.03% (0.02) 
% Issued by Top 10 Bank 63.51% 100% 48.14%  53.35% 73.51% (0.00) 
Panel B:  Firm Characteristics      
Market Value of Equity ($M) 28,037 9,533 44,772  8,158 50,070 (0.00) 
Leverage 34.67% 25.51% 23.43%  37.59% 31.43% (0.00) 
ROA 3.22% 2.82% 1.94%  3.33% 3.10% (0.15) 
Market-to-Book 1.68 1.47 1.02  1.48 1.90 (0.00) 
Number of Deals Per Year 16.18 6.00 26.66  15.26 17.21 (0.37) 
Proprietary Trading  78.34% 100% 41.23%  73.54% 83.22% (0.00) 
Derivative Trading 84.58% 100% 36.15%  83.51% 85.66% (0.47) 
Asset Management 81.28% 100% 39.04%  75.60% 87.06% (0.00) 
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Table 3:  Market and Deal Statistics by League Table Ranking  
 
This table reports mean and median statistics for all debt deals separated by whether the bank is ranked in 
the Top 10 of the SDC League Tables in a given year. Panel A details statistics by firm-year observations 
(430 non-Top 10 and 177 Top 10), while Panel B details statistics for the subset of issuances where a rival 
bank is hired (2,377 non-Top 10 and 428 Top 10).  Variable definitions are detailed in Appendix B.  p-
values report the significance of the difference between sample means using a difference of means test. 
Wilcoxon rank p-values are reported for medians. 
 
 Mean  Median 
 Non-Top 10 Top 10 p-value  Non-Top 10 Top 10 p-value
Panel A:  Debt Issuance by Firm Year      
PY Debt Market Share 0.17% 4.82% (0.00)  0.00% 3.90% (0.00) 
PY Financial Market Share 0.21% 4.60% (0.00)  0.00% 3.30% (0.00) 
PY Financial Debt Ranking 32.72 5.12 (0.00)  27.00 4.00 (0.00) 
% Self-Underwritten 21.82% 38.27% (0.00)  0.00% 34.74% (0.00) 
% Financial Mkt Share 32.48% 47.66% (0.00)  0.20% 47.32% (0.00) 
Use Rival   71.95% 10.04% (0.00)  100% 0% (0.00) 
Panel B:  Debt Issuance Statistics When Rival is Hired      
Financial Debt Rank (Advisor) 7.25 23.28 (0.00)  4.00 15.00 (0.00) 
Advisor Top 10 Rank 64.49% 32.48% (0.00)  100% 0% (0.00) 
Total Rival Leads 10.00 13.00 (0.38)  9.00 13.00 (0.68) 
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Table 4:  Debt Issuance When Using a Rival     
 
This table reports mean and median statistics for all debt deals where the issuing bank hires a rival 
underwriter (2,805 deals).  Panel A presents comparisons between the issuing bank and which rival the 
bank chooses to hire as its lead advisor for a given deal.  Panel B provides statistics based on whether the 
rival is a non-Top 10 or Top 10 Bank.  Variable definitions are detailed in Appendix B.  p-values report the 
significance of the difference between sample means using a difference of means test. Wilcoxon rank p-
values are reported for medians. 
 
 Mean  Median 
 Issuer Advisor p-value  Issuer Advisor p-value
Panel A:  All Debt Issuances      
PY Financial Proceeds ($M)  3,861    5,868 (0.00)   60   2,728 (0.00) 
PY Financial Market Share  0.91% 1.91% (0.00)  0.00% 1.10% (0.00) 
PY # Financial Issues  14.40 44.02 (0.00)  1.00 29.00 (0.00) 
PY Financial Debt Ranking 27.02 9.68 (0.00)  18.00 5.00 (0.00) 
% International  1.11% 5.79% (0.00)  0.00% 3.37% (0.00) 
% Private 2.33% 5.89% (0.00)  1.22% 5.02% (0.00) 
% Long Maturity 1.52% 7.57% (0.00)  0.18% 7.33% (0.00) 
Prior 6-mo Deals Advised, # 16.04 65.33 (0.00)  7.00 60.00 (0.00) 
Prior 6-mo Deals Advised, $ 4,819 19,623 (0.00)  445  
  
13,399 (0.00) 
Average Deal Size Advised 264.593 273.601 (0.64)  114 218 (0.00) 
Top 10 Rank  15.26% 59.60% (0.00)  0% 100% (0.00) 
Panel B:  Top 10 versus Non-Top 10 Advisors      
  Overall   
Non-  
Top 10 Top 10 p-value 
Advisor Ranked Higher  78.65%   89.31% 19.39% (0.00) 
Advisor Ranked Lower  21.36%   10.60% 80.61% (0.00) 
Advisor > % International  60.00%   66.43% 24.30% (0.00) 
Advisor > % Private  58.72%   65.42% 21.50% (0.00) 
Advisor > % Long Maturity   65.05%   72.82% 22.90% (0.00) 
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Table 5:  Probability of Hiring a Rival 
 
This table presents estimations from a linear probability model (LPM) on whether a firm hires a rival for a 
given debt issuance. Deal characteristics in each regression including: indicators for international and 
private deals, the relative deal size, and the debt maturity.  To provide a control for the reputation of the 
issuer, we also include the issuer’s prior-year aggregate debt market share.  Columns 1 and 2 are calculated 
using all deals in the sample.  Columns 3 and 4 are limited to only those deals issued by non-Top 10 ranked 
banks. Columns 5 and 6 are limited to those debt deals issued by Top 10 ranked banks.  Rankings are 
identified in each year from the SDC League Tables.  All regressions include year and issuer fixed effects.  
Variable definitions are detailed in Appendix B. p-values are listed in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 All Banks  Non-Top 10 Banks  Top 10 Banks 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept 0.409 0.429  0.864 0.979  1.055 1.101 
 (0.00)*** (0.00)***  (0.00) *** (0.00)***  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
International Deal  0.075 0.076  0.072 0.072  0.066 0.065 
 (0.00)*** (0.00)***  (0.00) *** (0.00)***  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
Private Deal  -0.148 -0.146  -0.207 -0.197  -0.039 -0.025 
 (0.00)*** (0.00)***  (0.00) *** (0.00)***  (0.16) (0.37) 
Relative Deal Size -0.470 -0.476  -0.398 -0.405  -0.785 -0.807 
 (0.00)*** (0.00)***  (0.01) *** (0.01)***  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
Maturity  0.004 0.004  0.002 0.003  0.005 0.005 
 (0.00)*** (0.00)***  (0.07) * (0.06)*  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
PY Debt Market  -0.005   -0.088   -0.013 
     Share (Issuer)  (0.05)**   (0.00)***   (0.00)*** 
Post-1999   -0.189   -1.067   -0.997 
  (0.01)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)*** 
Year and Issuer FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 9,760 9,760  3,561 3,561  6,199 6,199 
Adjusted r2 0.574 0.578  0.400 0.401  0.224 0.227 
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Table 7:  Probability of Hiring a Rival – Certification 
 
This table presents estimations from a linear probability model (LPM) on whether a firm hires a rival for a 
given debt issuance while controlling for different types of issuer certification needs (i.e., when firms are 
riskier or have lower debt ratings). Columns 1 and 2 include all deals in the sample. Columns 3 and 4 are 
limited to only those deals issued by non-Top 10 ranked banks while Columns 5 and 6 are limited to Top 
10 bank issued debt deals.  Rankings are identified each year from the SDC League Tables.  The first 
column of each group (Columns 1, 3, and 5) captures issuer riskiness with the standard deviation of issuer 
returns from a three-factor model (Fama and French, 1993) in the twelve months preceding a deal (12-mo 
Prior Stock Vol).  The second set of columns (Columns 2, 4, and 6) provide an alternative measure of risk: 
an issuer’s credit rating.  We construct indicators for whether the credit rating of the deal was ranked high 
(greater than A) or low (lower than BAA) by Moody's (High Debt Rating and Low Debt Rating, 
respectively).   Control variables are the same as those described in Table 5.  All regressions include year 
and issuer fixed effects.  Variable definitions are detailed in Appendix B. p-values are listed in parentheses.  
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 All Banks  Non-Top 10 Banks  Top 10 Banks 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept 0.484 0.434  0.990 0.963  1.091 1.061 
 (0.00) *** (0.00) ***  (0.00) *** (0.00) ***  (0.00) *** (0.00) *** 
12-mo Prior Stock Vol 0.390   -0.240   0.466  
 (0.00) ***   (0.40)   (0.00) ***  
High Debt Rating  -0.048   0.049   -0.094 
  (0.00) ***   (0.02) **   (0.00) *** 
Low Debt Rating  0.070   -0.057   0.089 
  (0.00) ***   (0.08) **   (0.00) *** 
International Deal  0.081 0.072  0.089 0.082  0.070 0.064 
 (0.00) *** (0.00) ***  (0.00) *** (0.00) ***  (0.00) *** (0.00) *** 
Private Deal  -0.126 -0.131  -0.166 -0.210  -0.032 -0.021 
 (0.00) *** (0.00) ***  (0.00) *** (0.00) ***  (0.31) (0.43) 
Relative Deal Size -0.537 -0.496  -0.399 -0.381  -0.783 -0.796 
 (0.00) *** (0.00) ***  (0.03) ** (0.01) ***  (0.00) *** (0.00) *** 
Maturity  0.004 0.004  0.002 0.003  0.005 0.004 
 (0.00) *** (0.00) ***  (0.20) (0.03) **  (0.00) *** (0.00) *** 
PY Debt Market -0.004 -0.006  -0.085 -0.087  -0.012 -0.011 
    Share (Issuer) (0.11) (0.02) **  (0.01) *** (0.00) ***  (0.00) *** (0.00) *** 
Post-1999 -0.262 -0.161  -0.702 -1.041  -1.003 -0.920 
 (0.00) *** (0.03) **  (0.00) *** (0.00) ***  (0.00) *** (0.00) *** 
Year and Issuer FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 9,372 9,760  3,359 3,561  6,013 6,199 
Adjusted r2 0.577 0.576  0.405 0.403  0.233 0.246 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
90
 
 
 
 
Table 8:  Probability of Hiring a Rival – Relationship 
 
This table presents estimations from a linear probability model (LPM) on whether a firm hires a rival for a 
given debt issuance while controlling for issuer past relationships with rivals. Columns 1 and 2 include all 
deals in the sample. Columns 3 and 4 are limited to only those deals issued by non-Top 10 ranked banks 
while Columns 5 and 6 are limited to Top 10 bank issued debt deals.  Rankings are identified each year 
from the SDC League Tables.  The first column of each group (Columns 1, 3, and 5) captures the frequency 
with which the issuer used a rival in the prior 12 months.  The second set of columns (Columns 2, 4, and 6) 
provide an alternative measure of relationship: how frequently the issuing bank used the current advisor in 
the past 12 months.   Control variables are the same as those described in Table 5.  All regressions include 
year and issuer fixed effects.  Variable definitions are detailed in Appendix B. p-values are listed in 
parentheses.  *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 All Banks  Non-Top 10 Banks  Top 10 Banks 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept 0.365 0.990  0.813 1.125  1.103 1.104 
 (0.00)*** (0.00)***  (0.00)*** (0.00)***  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
Prior 12-mo Rival Use 0.263   0.160   -0.006  
 (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.82)  
Prior 12-mo Advisor Use  -0.555   -0.386   -0.609 
       (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)*** 
International Deal  0.070 -0.016  0.075 0.005  0.065 -0.028 
 (0.00)*** (0.05)**  (0.00)*** (0.84)  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
Private Deal  -0.147 -0.159  -0.187 -0.217  -0.024 -0.035 
 (0.00)*** (0.00)***  (0.00)*** (0.00)***  (0.37) (0.11) 
Relative Deal Size -0.442 -0.349  -0.340 -0.418  -0.807 -0.326 
 (0.00)*** (0.00)***  (0.03)** (0.01)***  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
Maturity  0.004 0.002  0.003 0.002  0.005 0.002 
 (0.00)*** (0.00)***  (0.05 ** (0.09)*  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
PY Debt Market -0.004 0.014  -0.066 -0.070  -0.013 0.008 
   Share (Issuer) (0.09)* (0.00)***  (0.02)** (0.01)***  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
Post-1999  -0.223 -0.442  -0.932 -1.267  -0.998 -0.597 
 (0.00)*** (0.00)***  (0.00)*** (0.00)***  (0.00)*** (0.09)* 
Year and Issuer FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 9,760 9,599  3,561 3,403  6,199 6,196 
Adjusted r2 0.587 0.673  0.407 0.445  0.227 0.601 
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Table 9:  Probability of Hiring a Rival – Information 
 
This table presents estimations from a linear probability model (LPM) on whether a firm hires a rival for a 
given debt issuance while controlling for aspects related to the issuing bank’s information environment. 
Columns 1 and 2 include all deals in the sample. Columns 3 and 4 are limited to only those deals issued by 
non-Top 10 ranked banks while Columns 5 and 6 are limited to Top 10 bank issued debt deals.  Rankings 
are identified each year from the SDC League Tables.  The first column of each group (Columns 1, 3, and 
5) uses an indicator for whether the issuing bank has a proprietary trading division (Proprietary Trading).  
The second set of columns (Columns 2, 4, and 6) includes an indicator for whether the issuing bank has a 
derivatives trading desk (Derivatives Trading).  Both of the information variables are obtained from the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (www.finra.org).  Control variables are the same as those 
described in Table 5.  All regressions include year and issuer fixed effects.  Variable definitions are detailed 
in Appendix B. p-values are listed in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 All Banks  Non-Top 10 Banks  Top 10 Banks 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept 0.693 0.653  1.534 1.510  0.922 1.314 
 (0.00)*** (0.00)***  (0.00)*** (0.00)***  (0.01)*** (0.00)*** 
Proprietary Trading -0.225   -0.686   -0.187  
 (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***  
Derivatives Trading  -0.188   -0.644   -0.187 
  (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)*** 
International Deal  0.080 0.079  0.078 0.079  0.068 0.068 
 (0.00)*** (0.00)***  (0.00)*** (0.00)***  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
Private Deal  -0.144 -0.145  -0.209 -0.207  -0.012 -0.012 
 (0.00)*** (0.00)***  (0.00)*** (0.00)***  (0.66) (0.66) 
Relative Deal Size -0.548 -0.544  -0.416 -0.410  -0.815 -0.815 
 (0.00)*** (0.00)***  (0.03)** (0.04)**  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
Maturity  0.004 0.004  0.002 0.001  0.005 0.005 
 (0.00)*** (0.00)***  (0.27) (0.28)  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
PY Debt Market -0.012 -0.011  -0.091 -0.099  -0.023 -0.023 
    Share (Issuer) (0.00)*** (0.00)***  (0.00)*** (0.00)***  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
Post-1999 -0.242 -0.239  -0.743 -0.749  -0.578 -0.969 
 (0.00)*** (0.00)***  (0.00)*** (0.00)***  (0.08)* (0.00)*** 
Year and Issuer FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 9,515 9,515  3,322 3,322  6,193 6,193 
Adjusted r2 0.566 0.565  0.415 0.412  0.228 0.235 
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Table 10:  Probability of Hiring a Rival – Capacity 
 
This table presents estimations from a linear probability model (LPM) on whether a firm hires a rival for a 
given debt issuance while controlling for the underwriting capacity and distributional network of the 
issuing bank. Columns 1 includes all deals in the sample. Columns 3 and 4 are limited to only those deals 
issued by non-Top 10 ranked banks while Columns 5 and 6 are limited to Top 10 bank issued debt deals.  
Rankings are identified each year from the SDC League Tables.  The first column of each group (Columns 
1, 3, and 5) captures the issuer’s capacity to underwrite its own debt by measuring the percentage of 
financial deals it has underwritten in the prior six months relative to total debt underwritten by the same 
bank (Financial Debt Capacity).  The second set of columns (Columns 2, 4, and 6) proxies for the issuing 
bank’s distributional network by including an indicator for whether the bank has an asset management arm 
(Asset Management; source: www.finra.org).  Control variables are the same as those described in Table 5.  
All regressions include year and issuer fixed effects.  Variable definitions are detailed in Appendix B. p-
values are listed in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 All Banks  Non-Top 10 Banks  Top 10 Banks 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept 0.436 0.650  0.976 1.517  1.094 1.314 
 (0.00)*** (0.00)***  (0.00)*** (0.00)***  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
Financial Debt Capacity -0.055   -0.014   0.061  
 (0.00)**   (0.74)   (0.00)***  
Asset Management  -0.189   -0.715   -0.187 
  (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)*** 
International Deal  0.075 0.079  0.072 0.079  0.065 0.068 
 (0.00)*** (0.00)***  (0.00)*** (0.00)***  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
Private Deal  -0.146 -0.145  -0.197 -0.208  -0.024 -0.012 
 (0.00)*** (0.00)***  (0.00)*** (0.00)***  (0.37) (0.66) 
Relative Deal Size -0.489 -0.545  -0.406 -0.422  -0.788 -0.815 
 (0.00)*** (0.00)***  (0.01)*** (0.03)**  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
Maturity 0.004 0.004  0.003 0.001  0.004 0.005 
 (0.00)*** (0.00)***  (0.05)** (0.30)  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
PY Debt Market -0.005 -0.011  -0.087 -0.098  -0.013 -0.023 
    Share (Issuer) (0.06)* (0.00)***  (0.00)*** (0.00)***  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
Post-1999  -0.192 -0.240  -1.064 -0.759  -1.001 -0.969 
 (0.01)*** (0.00)***  (0.00)*** (0.00)***  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
Year and Issuer FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 9,760 9,515  3,561 3,322  6,199 6,193 
Adjusted r2 0.574 0.565  0.401 0.412  0.228 0.235 
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CHAPTER 3: ARE FIRM-ADVISOR RELATIONSHIPS VALUABLE?  
           A LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVE  
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We examine long-term firm-advisor relations using an extended history of debt, equity, and 
merger transactions. Hard-to-value firms are more likely to maintain dedicated advisor relations 
(underwriters or merger advisors). Firms that retain predominantly one advisor over their entire 
transaction history pay higher underwriting/advisory fees, have inferior deal terms, and have 
lower analyst coverage relative to those that employ many advisors.  When we condition on a 
firm’s information environment as a catalyst for long-term advisor retention, riskier firms obtain 
better terms when they utilize a variety of advisors, but informationally-opaque firms do not.  Our 
results suggest that only some firms benefit from long-term advisor retention.    
 
Keywords: Advisory relationship; underwriters; debt and equity issuance; mergers; fees 
 
JEL Codes: G24; G32; G34 
  
                                                            
 This paper is coauthored with David A. Becher, Associate Professor at Drexel University and Jennifer L. 
Juergens, Assistant Professor at Drexel University. We would like to thank Renee Adams, Jie Cai, Dong 
Chen, Jonathan Cohn, Naveen Daniel, Daniel Dorn, Alex Edmans, David Feldman, Ioannis Floros, Kathy 
Fogel, Michelle Lowry, Vassil Mihov, Greg Nini, Chander Shekhar, as well as seminar participants at 
Auburn University, Drexel University, George Washington University, University of Melbourne, 
University of New South Wales, the Eastern Finance Association meetings, the Finance Down Under 
Conference, the Financial Management Association meetings, the Magnolia Finance Conference, and the 
Southern Finance Association meetings for their helpful comments. We would also thank the CFO Alliance 
for their assistance in distributing our survey on advisor usage to their members. 
 
97
  
 
   
1. Introduction 
Are long-term investment banking relationships important to firms?  Firms frequently 
participate in the debt, equity, and merger markets and often use investment banks and M&A 
advisors (hereafter “advisors”) to facilitate these deals.  In 2011, for instance, the value of global 
debt, equity, and merger transactions exceeded $7.5 trillion (greater than 10% of worldwide 
GDP) and generated $63 billion in advisory fees.40 Understanding firm-advisory relations, 
therefore, is economically important.  
While numerous studies have examined the value of firm-advisor relations, the evidence 
to date on whether advisor retention provides benefits to firms has been mixed.41  It is possible 
that the mixed results arise because firm characteristics, advisor choice, and costs associated with 
undertaking a transaction are not exogenously determined.  Using the closure of Lehman Brothers 
in September 2008 as a natural experiment on the loss of an investment banker, Fernando, May, 
and Megginson (2012b) find that firms that had employed Lehman in their past equity 
underwriting deals lost approximately 5% of their value in the days around the announcement of 
Lehman’s failure.  The authors conclude that when long-term advisor relations are severed, it has 
significantly negative wealth effects for their clients. 
Using the entire history of debt, equity, and merger transactions in the SDC database for 
each of our sample firms between 1970 and 2011, we identify that approximately two-thirds of 
firms use different advisors across time, while the remaining third maintain long-term relations.  
Our findings on the propensity to move between advisors appear to be at odds with Fernando et 
al. (2012b).  We seek to identify why so many firms frequently move between advisors and to 
determine if there are measurable costs or benefits that accrue to those that do. 
                                                            
40 Source: http://databank.worldbank.org/databank/download/GDP.pdf for GDP data and SDC Platinum 
Thomson Reuters League Tables for transaction data. 
41 A number of papers have found that switching advisors reduces per-deal transaction costs, provides more 
beneficial deal terms, or increases analyst coverage (see, for instance, Rajan, 1992; Krigman, Shaw, and 
Womack, 2001). Others, however, have found that retained advisors lead to lower fees, shorter transaction 
times, and improved deal terms (e.g., James, 1992; Carter, 1992; Schenone, 2004).  
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We first explore whether firm fundamentals affect the advisor retention choice.  In 
particular, we partition a firm’s information environment into two non-mutually exclusive 
categories: risk and informational opacity. Risk is quantified in three ways, two related to 
financial distress (the Altman’s (1968) Z-score and the CHS measure) as well as a market-based 
measure (idiosyncratic volatility).  We capture informational opacity using an index of 
information asymmetry, a measure of product market competition (Asker and Ljungqvist, 2010), 
and firm complexity as determined by the number of operating segments (Cohen and Lou, 2012). 
Riskier firms may be constrained to using the same advisor because they have limited 
outside options.  Alternatively, riskier firms may use a variety of advisors either to reduce 
potential hold-up costs and/or to circumvent advisors’ reluctance to forming long-term 
relationships with high risk firms.  Thus, it is an empirical exercise to determine whether high-
risk firms are more likely to retain long-term advisors.  Furthermore, informational opacity is 
likely to be related to either how difficult a firm is to value or how valuable information is to the 
firm.  In general, we posit that informationally-opaque firms are more likely to place a higher 
value on a long-term advisor relationship when information revelation is costly (i.e. firms with 
high R&D).  Advisors may also desire long-term commitments by opaque firms since the “start-
up” costs associated with understanding hard-to-value firms are likely to be larger than with 
easier-to-value firms.42   
Our results indicate that firm risk does not appear to drive a firm’s choice of advisor 
retention; riskier firms are not more likely to maintain longstanding advisor relationships.  In 
contrast, we find strong support for the notion that informational opacity affects a firm’s choice of 
whether to use a variety of advisors.  All three measures of informational opacity are significantly 
related to the likelihood that a firm maintains dedicated advisor relations with advisors, even after 
                                                            
42 While we generally expect our measures of informational opacity to be related to the decision to maintain 
a single advisor, firm complexity is the exception. Complex firms may choose a single advisor who 
understands its overall corporate structure or, alternatively, they may use many advisors who become 
specialists in different areas of the firm.  
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controlling for firm financial characteristics and firm risk.   
Next, we compare the transaction cost structure (i.e., gross spreads, M&A advisory fees, 
offer yields, underpricing, and premiums) across the two types of firms.  We observe that firms 
that retain advisors for the long-term (hereafter “static” firms) on average pay more in fees and 
have worse deal terms than firms that consistently use a variety of advisors (hereafter “dynamic” 
firms).43  Further, since many firms find analyst coverage desirable, firms could potentially trade 
higher fees or less preferential deal terms for more analyst coverage from advisors (Krigman et 
al., 2001; Cliff and Denis, 2004).  We find, however, that dynamic firms have greater analyst 
coverage than static firms coupled with lower overall transaction costs.  
These results may be driven by the fact that advisors correctly price deals across static 
and dynamic firms, as they believe they are riskier or engage in inferior deals.  If static firms are 
riskier, then more costly transactions would be justified.  When we examine static firms more 
closely, however, we do not find that they are inherently riskier before their deals or become 
more risky afterwards.  Thus, we next try to identify why static firms are willing to accept worse 
deal terms and lower analyst coverage, again focusing on the information environment.   
  To determine the effects of the information environment on deal-specific outcomes, we 
bifurcate firms on their advisor retention decision and our information environment 
characteristics.  When we condition on firm risk, dynamic firms, regardless of their risk profile, 
obtain better deal terms and more analyst coverage than static firms.  Advisors, thus, appear to be 
able to price this increased level of risk into their deal terms. When we condition on a firm’s 
opacity instead, we find no perceptible difference across most dimensions of fees or deal terms 
between static and dynamic firms. This suggests that there are few benefits to firms that utilize 
many advisors when the potential costs of revealing valuable, proprietary information are large.   
                                                            
43 Previous studies generally focus on one dimension of the firm-advisor relationship, such as fees (Burch, 
Nanda, and Warther, 2005; Sibilkov and McConnell, 2014) or analyst coverage (Krigman, et al., 2001; 
Sibilkov, Straska, and Waller, 2013).  We explore across multiple dimensions since there could potentially 
be trade-offs that occur (i.e., willingness to pay higher fees in exchange for more analyst coverage). 
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Overall, our findings indicate that there are substantial costs associated with long-term 
advisor retention.  The retention decision appears to be valuable only for firms with high 
informational opacity. While a third of our sample firms maintain static advisor relationships, we 
find that 31% of these static firms (23% of all static deals) have low informational opacity.  These 
firms pay the highest fees, have the worst deal terms, and the lowest analyst coverage, relative to 
others. This result implies that these firms may be engaging in costly, suboptimal advisor 
retention.  For instance, we find that upon CEO replacement, more than two-thirds of these easy-
to-value firms terminate their long-term advisor relationships and start to use a variety of 
advisors. 
Although we find that firm risk does not impact firm-advisor relations, other firm 
characteristics, advisor choice, and outcomes may be jointly determined.  If static firms have 
worse deal terms, this could be due to advisors having private information that these firms are 
inherently riskier.  Firm risk rather than advisor choice would impact deal terms and we may not 
be able to empirically capture these ex ante differences in firm risk.  Unlike Fernando et al. 
(2012b), there is not a large scale natural experiment to examine exogenous shocks to the firm-
advisor relation. We propose an alternative approach to reduce endogeneity concerns by focusing 
on ex post realizations of firm outcomes, including deal announcement returns, changes in 
distress, transitions to below-investment grade status, and firm delisting following the deal.  We 
find no difference between static and dynamic firms across any ex post realizations. On average, 
it does not appear that static firms are riskier than dynamics, somewhat mitigating concerns that 
endogeneity drives our results on firm-advisor relations. 
Other factors could still impact the firm-advisor relationship even though we have control 
for firm characteristics and the information environment (and, in robustness tests, governance and 
CEO characteristics).  Professional and social networks have been shown to be important 
determinants in relationship building (e.g., Kuhnen, 2009; Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 2010; 
Huang, Jiang, Lie, and Yang, 2014). However, bank employee identities are unavailable in SDC, 
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thus we cannot examine the impact of these networks on the choice to retain advisors. There are 
also other unobservables that could affect the retention decision. For instance, advisors may 
provide consulting services and access to bankers or research, while firms may face costs (e.g., 
time, effort, and uncertainty) associated with moving to new advisors (Colgate and Lang, 2001).44    
In general, our results provide evidence that there are benefits to firms that establish 
dynamic firm-advisor relationships.  We also suggest reasons why some firms choose to retain 
long-term advisors.  In particular, we find that firms in highly opaque information environments 
are more likely to be static firms and, in this case, can benefit (or at least do no worse) by 
maintaining a unique long-term advisor relationship.  Although this is in contrast to the findings 
of Fernando et al. (2012b), it is consistent with those of Corwin and Stegemoller (2014) and 
Humphery-Jenner, Karpavicius, and Suchard (2014), which show that approximately 50% of 
firms change advisors from one deal to the next (i.e., from the IPO to the first SEO).  Further, our 
findings on deal terms and analyst coverage for dynamic firms are consistent with Krigman et al. 
(2001), who document that there are benefits to changing advisors.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, an overview of the 
long-term relationship literature is presented.  Data, sample selection, and methodology are 
discussed in Section 3.  Section 4 models the propensity for firms to be dynamic and provides 
results on advisory fees and quality, deal terms, and analyst coverage, while Section 5 provides 
explanations for why firms retain advisory associations (risk and information opacity).  A 
discussion of additional analyses is provided in Section 6.  Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Early theoretical studies focus on how the relative bargaining power between financial 
institutions and their customers impacts long-term relations and the costs and benefits of those 
                                                            
44 In a survey of over 400 CFOs (conducted through the CFO Alliance), they confirm that advisor retention 
is likely to occur because the perceived costs to switch exceed anticipated benefits. 
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relations.  Kane and Malkiel (1965) propose that long-standing affiliations between lenders and 
borrowers lead to lower overall borrowing rates, but that benefits depend on the bargaining power 
of each party.  James (1992) argues that the informational setup costs of new relations are large; 
therefore, advisors can induce repeat interactions by setting lower fees at the outset of the initial 
contract.  Empirically, James (1992) and Carter (1992) show that firms that conduct follow-on 
offers pay lower initial fees (see also Sibilkov and McConnell, 2014). Numerous others document 
cost savings associated with long-term advisor relations. Burch et al. (2005) finds that continuing 
connections between firms and advisors lead to lower equity underwriting fees.  Further, cross-
selling across product lines (i.e., lending to underwriting) is related to lower fees (Schenone, 
2004; Yasuda, 2005), and can enhance the certification effect associated with the advising 
relationship (Duarte-Silva, 2010).  Using the closure of Lehman Brothers in 2008 as a natural 
experiment, Fernando et al. (2012b) observe that Lehman’s equity underwriting clients suffered 
significant loss of market value (nearly 5%) in the days surrounding the bank’s demise.  They 
conclude that it is detrimental to firms when long-term advisory relations are severed. 
In contrast, theory and empirical work also suggest that repeatedly using the same lender 
can be costly. As borrowers become more dependent on their relations with a given lender, the 
lender’s information monopoly increases to the point that they control the outcomes of projects; 
this potentially leads to a hold-up problem (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992).  Thus, to limit the power 
of any single lender, firms should foster relations with a variety of others.  Further, Ongena and 
Smith (2000) suggest that hold-up issues may be reduced with multiple lender relationships, but 
firms may face substantial costs (e.g. reduced credit supply) as information acquisition by any 
given bank becomes costlier to procure (Thakor, 1996).  Several empirical studies on advisors 
support this position; Corwin and Stegemoller (2014), and Francis, Hasan and Sun (2014) 
document that both debt market and M&A clients have a preference for maintaining associations 
with multiple advisors.  Further, there is some evidence that long-run advisor retention is 
associated with higher fees and worse deal terms in debt transactions (Burch et al., 2005).   
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Financial terms are not the only reasons why firms might seek more than one advisor. A 
firm may utilize multiple advisors to increase analyst coverage, which has been associated with 
higher levels of private information acquisition, liquidity, investor recognition, and monitoring 
(Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Bhushan, 1989; and Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1995). Although 
analyst optimism does not appear to affect deal flow to particular advisors (Ljungqvist, Marston, 
and Wilhelm, 2006), firms appear to hire new advisors to obtain analyst coverage (Krigman et al., 
2001; Sibilkov et al., 2013). Further, firms appear to pay for coverage through both higher fees 
(Lee, 2012) and increased underpricing (Cliff and Denis, 2004). 
Firms may also switch to obtain more reputable advisors.  Advisor reputation is strongly 
tied to the market share an advisor captures (Rau, 2000; Bao and Edmans, 2011). Several studies 
show that firms change advisors in order to improve advisor quality (Krigman et al., 2001; 
Fernando, Gatchev, May, and Megginson, 2012a), but are mixed on whether firms pay higher 
fees to obtain higher quality advisors (Fang, 2005; Fernando, Gatchev, and Spindt, 2005; 
Fernando et al., 2012b).   
Much of the extant literature proposes direct costs (fees, deal terms) or benefits (analyst 
coverage, reputation) for why firms could maintain long-run connections with advisors.  Few of 
these studies, however, examine firm fundamental characteristics that could impact the firm-
advisor decision.  We propose two distinct, but not mutually exclusive, explanations related to a 
firm’s information environment that could affect the decision about long-term advisor retention: 
firm risk and information opacity.  Both firm risk and opacity are likely to make firms harder to 
value, causing advisors to provide worse deal terms to these firms. 
We implement two measures to capture firm risk: financial distress and idiosyncratic 
volatility.  As firm quality deteriorates, firms may use more advisors to both reduce potential 
hold-up costs and counter advisors’ reluctance to increase exposure to poor performing firms 
(Farinha and Santos, 2002). It is possible, however, these firms may have limited outside options 
and (involuntarily) remain with an advisor (Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein, 1990). An 
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alternative measure of firm risk is idiosyncratic stock price volatility (Moeller, Schlingemann, 
and Stulz, 2007). Firms with the lowest idiosyncratic risk are more attractive to (reputable) 
underwriters and more likely to receive fully underwritten contracts compared to those with high 
risk (Balachandran, Faff, and Theobald, 2008). Thus, high risk firms may have fewer advisors 
competing for their business or may be charged higher costs than low risk firms (regardless of the 
number of advisors they use). 
Firm opacity is an alternative measure of the information environment. Firms that are 
harder to value or place high value on maintaining proprietary information may desire to remain 
informationally opaque.  Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2007) show that borrowers 
that are harder to value (e.g., more R&D, greater analyst dispersion) are more likely to retain 
advisors with which they have prior interactions.  Asker and Ljungqvist (2010) find that firms 
appear unwilling to select underwriters associated with product market rivals due to concerns 
over information leakage. Complex firms are also more difficult to value (Cohen and Lou, 2012), 
and could alter the need for long-term advisor relations.  These firms may be willing to bear the 
cost of having one advisor that is well-informed about its business strategy. Alternatively, 
complex firms could employ many advisors, each acting as specialists within a given segment.   
 
3. Sample Construction and Summary Statistics 
3.A. Data and Sample Selection 
In order to classify a firm’s relation with its advisors, we compile a comprehensive 
history of a firm’s debt, equity, and merger deals.45  Limiting our analysis to publicly-traded 
firms, we collect all public and private corporate debt and equity transactions from the Thomson-
Reuters Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Global New Issues database from 1970 to 2011. We 
add completed and withdrawn mergers of public and private targets by public acquirers from 
                                                            
45 The inclusion of mergers is not unique to our paper.  Several papers have examined the deal-to-deal 
decision between IPOs and mergers (Forte, Iannotta, and Navone, 2010) and SEOs and mergers (Francis et 
al., 2014), while Corwin and Stegemoller (2014) use debt, equity, mergers, and lending to categorize long-
term advisor retention. 
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SDC’s Mergers & Acquisitions database. The initial sample yields 136,846 debt, equity, and 
merger deals. More than 95% of our sample firms retain at least one advisor for debt and equity 
transactions, while acquirers of public (private) targets retain advisors in 64% (22%) of deals 
(similar to Forte et al., 2010).46 
We obtain data on lead advisors or underwriters, gross spreads for debt and equity 
underwriting, total advisory fees paid in M&A deals, yields to maturity, underpricing, and merger 
premiums from SDC.  Other control variables include maturity, transaction value (principal, 
proceeds, or merger value), toehold, as well as indicators for shelf offerings, senior debt, 
callability, NASDAQ listing, tender offers, horizontal deals, and public targets.  Firms are 
matched to CRSP and Compustat, reducing the sample to 126,896 transactions for 16,516 firms.  
Returns, market value of equity, firm age, and volatility are constructed from CRSP data.  
Returns are measured as one-month CARs (-30 to -1) before SEOs and acquirer run-up (CARs -
42 to -6 pre-merger announcement). We compute leverage, return on assets, and the market-to-
book ratio from Compustat and obtain analyst coverage from IBES.  Appendix A provides 
detailed definitions of all of the variables used throughout the study. 
SDC records some debt and equity transactions in multiple steps, which may overstate a 
firm’s relation with a given advisor.  To prevent over-counting, we follow the methodology of 
Burch et al. (2005) to consolidate transactions.  Within a seven-day window, all debt offerings of 
the same type that have the same maturity and same advisor are combined into a single aggregate 
debt offering.  Similarly, SDC occasionally reports a firm having multiple equity offerings with 
the same advisor within a one- or two-day period.  As with debt, these offerings are combined 
into one aggregate equity offer under this advisor.  This consolidation eliminates 4,955 deals. 
We next focus on firms that engage in five or more deals to ensure that we can clearly 
                                                            
46 We consider other types of corporate transactions, such as spinoff and carveouts.  Of the 1,000 
transactions that meet our basic criterion, only 42 have an advisor identity provided by SDC. In addition, of 
the 23,336 public or private mergers for US acquirers in SDC, only 33% have an advisor.  Of those, only 
25% report fees.  Once we apply our basic screening criteria, we capture nearly all of the deals in SDC that 
have merger fee data.  
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categorize the firm-advisor relation (which we discuss more fully in Section II.B).  This 
eliminates 12,868 firms (26,499 transactions) that never use an advisor, use an advisor only one 
time, report fewer than four total deals, or instances where all deals occur on a single day. Finally, 
all financial firms are removed since they potentially can act as their own advisor in 
transactions.47  The resulting sample consists of 2,639 unique, nonfinancial firms that have at 
least five total transactions between 1970 and 2011, yielding 33,167 total transactions.  
3.B. Firm-Advisor Relationship Classification 
To track the firm-advisor relation, we identify the lead advisor in each deal over the 
complete firm history. There are 289 unique advisors in our sample. Although it common for 
large syndicates to be formed for debt and equity offerings or to have multiple M&A advisors, 
following the extant literature we focus on lead advisors for each transaction.48  To ensure that 
advisor changes are not simply driven by mergers or name changes, we track the progression of 
each bank or advisor. By developing a comprehensive record of all bank mergers (i.e., Bank of 
America’s acquisition of Merrill Lynch in 2008), consolidations, and name changes (i.e., Smith 
Barney Shearson to Smith Barney to Citigroup), we capture only true changes in advisors. 
One of the innovations in our study is the methodology of classifying firms into static, 
dynamic, and hybrid firms.  We use the first four transactions (regardless of deal type) to assign 
firms into specific categories.49 We identify static firms as those that consistently use the same 
                                                            
47 We remove 744 financial firms with 62,275 transactions.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac account for 
42,947 of these transactions, the majority of which are debt.  Further, we exclude all IPOs from our 
analysis (less than 2% of our equity deals) since the fee structure for IPOs is different than that of SEOs 
(Chen and Ritter, 2000).   
48 According to SDC, the first advisor for each deal is the lead.  We recognize, however, that particularly 
for M&A deals, there could be multiple lead advisors, thereby overstating our number of static firms. 
Understating the number of advisors for statics potentially biases against finding any difference between 
static and dynamic firms. 
49 Although the use of the first four observations may be arbitrary, it is the minimum number of 
observations needed to identify firm whether firms are static or dynamic. Burch et al. (2005) use a 
minimum five-observation truncation in their study as well. In Section VI, we explore the sensitivity of our 
results to this cutoff.  We also assign classifications based on individual deal types (i.e., debt) and obtain 
similar results. 
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advisor(s) for at least 80% of their total transactions.50  Dynamic firms, on the other hand, are 
those that use multiple advisors across and within transaction types.  Hybrid firms are a mix of 
the two.  Hybrids typically start out static in nature and then over time become dynamic.  Few 
hybrids migrate in the other direction: only 5% start as dynamic and eventually become static.51  
Based on our classification, 32.8% of firms are static, 23.9% dynamic, and 43.3% hybrid.  In 
unreported tests, we find that static firms work with an average of two advisors over their entire 
history, while dynamics, on average, utilize six advisors.  
Examples of static, dynamic, and hybrid firms are presented in Appendix B.  Static firms 
may retain a single advisor over their entire history (Intermedia Communications) or may work 
with one advisor for an extended period and eventually switch to another (Kohl’s Corp.).  
Northeast Utilities depicts the hybrid advisor relation; for the first five deals, Northeast employs 
First Boston (FBC), but thereafter utilizes nine additional advisors in the remaining 16 
transactions, and only returns to Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB) in one of those deals.  
Hercules Inc. provides an example of a dynamic firm; from nearly the first transaction it uses a 
variety of advisors across all deal types. 
We categorize firms as static or dynamic based upon their behavior in time, recognizing 
that hybrids alter their behavior over time.  When hybrid firms remain with one advisor, we 
classify them as static, but when the hybrid firms begin to use a variety of advisors, they then 
become identified as dynamic firms.  We call this approach the split classification.  For 
robustness, we use two alternative classification schemes.  In the ex ante approach, firms are 
classified based solely on the advisor relations in their first four transactions, regardless of 
changes in the firm advisory relation (i.e., hybrids are always static).  Using the ex post method, 
then entire history is used to classify firms.  In this case, hybrids are always dynamic.  In order to 
                                                            
50 We do not hold to a strict 100% cutoff since a firm may be prohibited from using their long-term advisor 
due to conflicts with either the counterparty in a merger or a rival firm.  We also examine 100% and 90% 
static firms. Static firms also include those who form a relation with one advisor and over time move to a 
different advisor, and then maintain a dedicated relation with this new advisor. 
51 Removing these observations from our analyses does not materially affect our findings. 
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maintain consistency across classification schemes, we only utilize transactions from the fifth 
deal on in each sample in our analyses, although results are robust to including the first four 
transactions.52 After removing transactions used to classify the firm-advisor relationship and 
collecting deal variables, the final regression sample consists of 15,005 deals for 2,129 firms.   
Our methodological approach differs from earlier studies on several dimensions. In 
particular, we use a comprehensive history across time, but also explore whether relationships 
persist across different types of transactions (debt, equity, and mergers). Studies that explore the 
shift in the advisor relationship from one transaction to the next (i.e., from the IPO to the first 
SEO) are able to capture short-term and deal specific characteristics. These studies, however, 
assume that the shift in the advisor relationship and the benefits that accrue are permanent, 
uncorrelated with other transactions, and driven primarily by deal characteristics rather than firm 
fundamentals.  Without examining subsequent transactions after the shift, it is unclear whether 
there are long-term benefits to moving between advisors.   
Studies that instead examine intermediate horizons (3- or 5-year rolling windows; Corwin 
and Stegemoller, 2014 and Burch et al., 2005, respectively) may obtain different classifications 
relative to studying the entire history.  The choice of horizon may be relatively ad hoc and the 
window selected may impact results.  For instance, using the loyalty measure of Burch et al. 
(2005), approximately 38% of the firms categorized as “long-term” loyal exhibit dynamic 
behavior when a longer history of transactions is used instead. This potential misclassification 
may misrepresent the true long-term benefits of maintaining advisor relations. As a result, we 
characterize all firms in time to capture whether the overall behavior is static or dynamic. 
Another aspect that differentiates this paper from prior work is our exploration of what 
drives some firms to maintain long-run advisor affiliations, while others do not. A firm’s 
                                                            
52 To alleviate concerns about when these first four transactions are measured, we include both the number 
and value of prior year deals as controls in our analyses. We also replicate the rolling-window methodology 
in Burch et al. (2005), where only deals in the prior 5 years are used for classification, and obtain results 
similar to our main analyses. 
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information environment (captured broadly by firm risk and informational opacity) could lead 
firms to optimally retain advisors, since the benefits of retention may outweigh the explicit costs 
associated with staying. We characterize firm risk by financial distress and idiosyncratic 
volatility.  Informational opacity contains measures that account for ease of valuation, product 
market competition, and firm complexity.  
We measure financial distress in two ways: Altman’s (1968) Z-score (working capital, 
retained earnings, earnings before interest and taxes, and sales scaled by total assets plus market 
value of equity scaled by book value of total debt) and the CHS measure (uses both accounting 
and market based data to predict distress scores; Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi, 2008). Firms 
are considered distressed if they have a Z-score below 1.8 (Altman, 1968) or lower than median 
CHS score (-7.789), which corresponds to a BBB rated firm (Mansi, Maxwell, and Zhang, 2012). 
Idiosyncratic volatility is measured as the monthly average sum of squared errors obtained by 
regressing rolling weekly returns on the Fama-French three-factor model (Brown and Kapadia, 
2007; Fu, 2009).  Firms with above median idiosyncratic volatility are categorized as high risk. 
Our first measure of opacity is an index comprised of R&D expenses, capital 
expenditures, and intangible assets all scaled by total assets (from Compustat) plus the standard 
deviation of analysts’ one-year earnings forecasts (obtained from IBES). We identify high and 
low information sensitive firms by comparing a firm’s value for each of the four components to 
the median value (above median = 1).  Firms with index values greater than 2 (out of 4) are 
informationally-sensitive. Second, we follow Asker and Ljungqvist (2010) and measure product 
market competition as the Herfindahl index based on the sum of squared market shares of sales in 
each firm’s industry by four-digit SIC (where sales data are from Compustat).  Firms are 
segmented into high (low) product market competition based on whether firms are below (above) 
the median. Lastly, we measure complexity from Compustat’s Non-Historical and Historical 
Segment database (1976-2011), which is available for 90% of our sample. Firms are required to 
report financial information for any business segment that represents more than 10% of total 
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reported sales. Complex firms are those with more than three segments (the median), although 
results are robust if we condition based on indicators for single- versus multi-segment firms. 
3.C. Summary Statistics 
Table 1 presents deal counts as well as financial and deal characteristics for static and 
dynamic firms based on the split classification.53 Dynamics take on significantly more debt 
issuances, total deals, and deals per year (Panel A) and are larger, more levered, and less 
profitable than static firms (Panel B). Consistent with prior research, firms that use many advisors 
also have more analyst coverage than static firms.  In terms of financial distress, dynamic firms 
have lower Z-scores but a slightly better CHS score (although both are well above levels 
indicating financial distress). Dynamic firms also have lower idiosyncratic risk and information 
sensitivity than static firms, but are more likely to be complex (operating segments).   
Panels C through E in Table I present the mean deal characteristics by transaction type.  
In debt transactions, dynamic firms take on larger issuances with lower maturities, gross spreads 
(fees), and yields than static firms (Panel C).  Further, dynamic firms are more likely to issue 
senior debt and shelf offerings.  In Panel D, dynamic firms undertake larger equity issuances, pay 
lower gross spreads, and are more likely to do shelf offerings than static firms. For mergers 
(Panel E), dynamics engage in larger deals and pay more in total fees (but less as a percentage of 
deal value).54 Table I suggests that dynamic firms differ significantly from statics and dynamics 
appear to reap benefits on at least some dimensions from retaining a variety of advisors.  
 
4. Modeling the Firm-Advisor Choice and Outcomes of the Decision 
In this section, we first investigate the likelihood that firms are static or dynamic based on 
firm characteristics and the information environment.  Next, we examine whether there are costs 
                                                            
53 Table I reports mean firm characteristics.  Median firm characteristics are qualitatively similar and 
differences between static and dynamic firms all remain significant at less than the 1% level.  
54 Some of these deal characteristics may be related to or driven by firm size, although we find no 
difference in size when only the first four deals are examined. We control for size in our regressions and 
also split regressions into small and large firms. Results qualitatively hold. 
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or benefits to long-term relations by testing whether static or dynamic firms have different 
advisory fees, deal costs, or analyst coverage.   
4.A. Likelihood of Dynamic Firm-Advisor Relations 
We begin by investigating how firm characteristics and the information environment are 
related to the decision to have static or dynamic advisor relations.  Burch et al. (2005) and Corwin 
and Stegemoller (2014) provide models of advisor choice using five- or three-year rolling 
windows on a Herfindahl index of advisor usage, and include log size, market to book, 
profitability, leverage, and firm age. To prevent look-ahead bias, we use our ex ante methodology 
(for this test only) to identify firms. Under this approach, only the first four transactions are used 
to categorize firms into either static or dynamic (hybrid firms are classified as static).   
Using logistic regressions, we model the per-deal probability of being dynamic on the log 
market value of equity, market to book, return on assets, firm leverage, firm age, and year and 
industry controls (Table 2).55  We include controls for the information environment (Z-score, 
CHS score, idiosyncratic volatility, information sensitivity index, product market competition, 
and operating segments).  Columns (1)-(3) contain the Z-score as a sole measure of firm risk plus 
one measure of information opacity. Column (4) contains Z-score and the three opacity measures, 
Column (5) includes Z-score, idiosyncratic volatility, and the three opacity measures, while 
Column (6) includes all measures.  Results are similar if we use idiosyncratic volatility or the 
CHS measure as our sole measure of firm risk.  
We find no evidence that the choice to be static or dynamic is related to whether firms are 
risky. Measures of information opacity, however, are significantly negatively related to a firm’s 
choice to be dynamic in their advisor selection.56  For example, based on the unconditional 
probability of being static of 32.8%, firms with high information sensitivity are 10.6% less likely 
                                                            
55 We note that our results are qualitatively consistent if OLS models are used instead of logit models. 
56 In unreported tests, we include several governance variables: board independence and size, busy board, 
classified board, CEO tenure, CEO age, and CEO duality and obtain qualitatively similar results to those 
shown in Table 2.   
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to be dynamic.  These results suggest that a firm’s propensity to be static or dynamic is at least 
partially related to its information environment.  Older and more profitable firms are less likely to 
be dynamic, while there is some evidence highly levered firms are more likely dynamic.  In the 
next section, we explore the consequences of the advisor choice.   
4.B. Advisory Fees, Deal Terms, and Analyst Coverage 
Approximately 60% of our firms choose to utilize a variety of advisors and this decision 
appears to be linked to firm fundamentals, including the information environment.  We now 
explore whether it is beneficial for firms to maintain relations with many advisors.  We begin 
with an examination of fees paid to advisors, as these are explicit costs borne by firms.  For debt 
and equity offerings, the fees paid are the gross spreads as a percentage of capital raised.  For 
mergers, we use the acquirer’s total dollar value of fees paid to the advisor divided by total deal 
value to make it comparable to underwriting gross spreads.  These fees are the dependent 
variables in the OLS regressions presented in columns (1) – (3) of Table 3. 
Our main independent variable is whether advisory relations are static or dynamic based 
on the split classification.  We construct an indicator variable equal to one if a firm has a dynamic 
relation with its advisors, and zero otherwise. The effect of a dynamic relation on fees could be 
positive or negative depending on whether long-term advisor relations are beneficial.  A negative 
(positive) coefficient would suggest that dynamic firms incur lower (higher) fees than statics.  For 
debt and equity offerings, we include the log of deal size (principal or proceeds raised) and a 
shelf-registration indicator.57  To capture advisor reputation, we rank advisors by their frequency 
in our data across all deals (Rau, 2000) and consider the top five advisors to be highly reputable.58 
                                                            
57 We do not include deal value in column (3) (merger fees) as the correlation between fees and value is 
highly significant (55%) leading to a multicollinearity problem in our analysis.  The correlations between 
proceeds and debt or equity gross spreads are only 6.8% and 24.7%, respectively, indicating that issues of 
collinearity are not as severe in these models.  If we exclude proceeds from columns (1) and (2), we obtain 
quantitatively consistent results. 
58 The top three advisors overall (Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley) are the same in 
debt, equity, and mergers, individually. We obtain qualitatively similar results if we expand the top 
advisors to ten and use Ritter rankings (http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm). We do not utilize 
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Based on Burch et al. (2005), we include firm characteristics such as age, and lagged market 
value of equity, return on assets, leverage, and market-to-book ratio.  We also include the total 
number and value of deals undertaken in the prior year to control for bargaining power.  In debt 
models, we include maturity and seniority and callability indicators, while for equity, we control 
for Nasdaq listing, relative offer size, prior month CARs, and return volatility. In merger models, 
we include acquirer run-up and indicators for horizontal deals, public targets, tender offers, and 
toeholds.59 Year and industry fixed effects are in all models, and robust standard errors are 
reported. 
Columns (1) - (3) of Table 3 present regressions for debt, equity, and merger fees, 
respectively. Across all transactions, dynamic firms pay significantly lower fees (6 to 9 basis 
points, on average) than static firms.  This translates to roughly a per-deal savings of $110,000 for 
debt, $90,000 for equity, and $850,000 for mergers, which is substantial considering firms in our 
sample undertake more than one deal per year on average.  Contrary to studies such as Fernando 
et al. (2012b), James (1992), and Sibilkov and McConnell (2014), we find significant benefits to 
firms that use many advisors.  We also obtain unambiguous results across all types of deals 
(unlike Burch et al., 2005), suggesting that one-time switches or intermediate-horizon rolling 
windows may not fully capture firm-advisor relations. 
Relative to Fang (2005) and Fernando et al. (2012a), we do not observe a long-term 
premium for reputation.   Debt and equity gross spreads decline in deal size and shelf offerings, 
but debt fees increase in debt maturity.  Larger and more profitable firms pay lower fees across all 
deal types, suggesting some firms may have better negotiating power.   
Overall, these results suggest that dynamic firms benefit from lower advisory fees 
relative to statics.  Our results are not sensitive to the classification methodology or model 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
League Tables since they are only available from 1998 onward. Our top advisors correspond almost 
directly to the League Tables. 
59 In unreported tests, we eliminate the deal characteristics (to replicate the model of Burch et al. (2005)) 
and obtain quantitatively similar results. 
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specification.  One concern, however, is that static firms may be willing to pay higher fees to 
long-term advisors at the outset of a relationship in order to obtain lower fees in the future.  In 
order to determine if loss leaders are driving results, we examine the total aggregate deal fees 
scaled by the aggregate value of transactions by deal type. In unreported tests, dynamic firms pay 
lower aggregate fees than static firms for debt and merger transactions. These results reinforce the 
notion that on average it is costly for firms to retain limited advisor relations. 
It is possible that firms substitute higher fees for preferential deal terms.  For example, 
static firms may pay higher fees, but obtain lower yields or premiums than dynamics.  Thus, we 
investigate if trade-offs exist among fees, deal terms, and analyst coverage (columns (4) – (7) in 
Table 3). We examine deal terms most likely under the purview of an advisor: yields (YTMs) on 
debt offerings (Column (4)), equity underpricing (Column (5)), and merger premiums (Column 
(6)). On average, even after controlling both for deal and firm characteristics, YTMs are 
significantly lower by 10 bps for dynamic versus static firms, representing a savings of 
approximately $230,000 per year. As expected, larger, older, and more profitable firms, as well as 
those with more prior deal experience, have lower yields.  YTMs are increasing in both deal size 
as well as firm leverage (likely measures of risk).  As dynamic firms have both lower fees and 
yields, the costs of maintaining long-term relations with advisors are particularly large when 
firms raise debt.  Unlike debt deal terms, a dynamic firm-advisor relation does not result in less 
underpricing or lower merger premiums.  As equity and merger fees are higher for static firms, it 
is not necessarily advantageous to maintain dedicated advisor relations in these deals either. 
Firms may also change advisors to obtain additional analyst coverage (Column (7)), 
which has been shown to improve both the information and the trading environment.  The number 
of analysts in a given year is regressed on the dynamic indicator, lagged values of firm size, 
profitability, leverage, growth (Yu, 2008), as well as total transactions and total aggregate value 
of deals in the prior year. Consistent with prior research, firms that employ many advisors have 
nearly two additional analysts, yielding a 25% increase above the unconditional average of eight 
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analysts providing coverage.  Further, analyst coverage increases in firms with more deals, 
growth opportunities, profitability, and firm size, but decreases in firm leverage.   
Our results suggest that there are significant benefits to firms that use a variety of 
advisors.  We find, however, that nearly 34% of our sample firms maintain consistent relations 
with their advisors, implying that there must be some benefit derived (or they bear no greater 
cost) from the long-term relation.  We next explore whether deal costs and benefits are related to 
the firm’s information environment, conditional on the firm-advisor relation.   
 
5. The Information Environment: Firm Risk and Information Opacity 
We propose that informationally complicated firms may voluntarily (or involuntarily) 
choose to retain advisors.  We select two dimensions, firm risk and information opacity, in order 
to identify correlations between advisor choice and fees, deal terms, and analyst coverage in high 
and low information environments. In this section, we evaluate whether for some firms, the costs 
associated with utilizing many advisors overshadows the apparent benefits noted in Section 4.   
  We begin by identifying the number of firms categorized as high risk or opaque. Our 
measures appear to capture a substantial portion of our sample (15%, 19%, 24%, and 37% of the 
sample is categorized as hard-to-value using Z-score, the CHS measure, the index of information 
sensitivity, and complexity, respectively).  We explore the impact of the firm’s information 
environment in a multiple-regression setting in Tables 4 (risk) and 5 (opacity).   
In order to capture the link between the information environment and the firm-advisor 
relation, we construct interaction terms between each of our information variables and our static 
and dynamic indicators. For all six of our measures we identify a base case, the low information 
environment dynamic firms and compare all other interactions to this base case.  Our main focus, 
however, is whether differences exists between static and dynamic firms, conditioning on the 
high information environment.  In the final row of each panel in Tables 4 and 5, we include a test 
for the difference in coefficients between high information statics and dynamics.   
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5.A. Firm Risk and Advisor Choice 
Panel A of Table 4 examines the interactions of financial distress (Z-score) and the 
advisor choice indicator. Regardless of a firm’s financial health, both distressed and non-
distressed statics pay higher fees, higher yields on debt, and have lower analyst coverage than 
non-distressed dynamics. While we observe some evidence distress increases a firm’s yields and 
underpricing, distressed dynamics do not pay higher fees to their advisors than non-distressed 
dynamics (row (3)).  As shown in the final row, distressed statics pay significantly higher fees 
and yields than distressed dynamics and have lower analyst coverage, indicating the firm-advisor 
relationship impacts the costs associated with deals even after conditioning on the financial 
stability of the firm (the p-value for debt fees falls just short of statistical significance at 0.13). 
In Panel B, we use our alternative measure of financial distress, the CHS measure.  As in 
Panel A, we find that high CHS-distressed statics and dynamics pay significantly higher fees, 
have higher yields to maturity, and less analyst coverage relative to non-distressed dynamics.  In 
the final row of Panel B, we test the difference in coefficients between CHS-distressed statics and 
dynamics.  Distressed statics pay higher fees in debt deals (p-value on mergers is 0.12), have 
higher yields, and less analyst coverage relative to distressed dynamics (final row of Panel B).   
The third measure of firm risk is idiosyncratic stock price volatility (Panel C, Table 4).  
Relative to low-risk dynamic firms, all other firms pay higher debt and equity fees and have 
significantly lower analyst coverage.  High-risk statics pay higher merger fees while high risk 
firms, in general, have higher yields to maturity.  Compared to high-risk dynamic firms, high-risk 
statics pay higher debt and equity fees, higher yields, and have less analyst coverage (final row of 
Panel C).  Overall, our results from Table 4 indicate that riskier firms can benefit from utilizing a 
variety of advisors, perhaps because it is relatively easy for an advisor to price risk in setting fees 
and deal terms for these firms.  Firm risk does not appear to provide an explanation for why a 
considerable portion of our sample firms maintain exclusive long-term relations.   
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5.B. Informational Opacity and Advisor Choice 
We next examine whether a firm’s information opacity can explain the choice of long-
term advisor retention.  We measure opacity as a firm’s informational sensitivity index (Table 5, 
Panel A), product market competition (Panel B), and complexity (Panel C).  Relative to the base 
case of low information sensitivity dynamics (Panel A), all other firms pay higher fees in debt 
and low information sensitivity statics pay higher fees in equity and mergers. For deal terms, all 
firms pay higher yields.  However, we do not find any significant differences between high 
information sensitivity statics and dynamics, except for analyst coverage (last row, Panel A).  
These results suggest that when a firm may be difficult to value (high R&D or analyst forecast 
dispersion), there appears to be little benefit to utilizing a variety of advisors.  For robustness, we 
utilize a continuous measure of a rank-based index of information opacity (untabulated) rather 
than segmenting by median values and obtain similar results.   
Some firms may also retain one advisor if there are high costs to revealing information 
(e.g., high product market competition, Panel B).  Both high competition statics and dynamics 
pay higher fees, particularly for equity and mergers, and have lower analyst coverage, but do not 
have significantly more costly deal terms than low competition dynamics.  Low competition 
statics pay higher fees and debt yields and have lower analyst coverage.  We find some evidence 
that debt fees are lower and analyst coverage is greater for high competition dynamics, although 
in general there is little difference across most measures. These results suggest that when product 
market competition is high, firms may not benefit from using many advisors. 
Lastly, complex firms (many business segments) may be harder to value (Cohen and Lou, 
2012) and thus advise in deals (Panel C).  Low complexity statics pay higher fees and yields and 
have less analyst coverage relative to the base case of low complexity dynamics;  easy to value 
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firms appear to be penalized for retaining a single advisor.60  We generally do not find significant 
differences in the final row of Panel C, suggesting that when complexity is high, the potential 
benefits of being dynamic are reduced. Together with higher information sensitivity and product 
market competition, these findings provide some justification for why a significant fraction of 
firms retain long-term advisors, even when the benefits of utilizing many advisors seem large. 
 
6. Further Exploration of the Firm-Advisor Relationship 
6.A. Ex Post Realizations 
One challenge to this study is that potentially endogenous relations among firm 
characteristics, advisor choice, and outcomes can exist.  For instance, if static firms face higher 
costs in terms of fees or deal terms, this may not be driven by their advisor choice.   Static firms 
may be instead inherently riskier than dynamics; thus, it is the riskiness of the firm that affects 
deal terms, not the advisor choice.  If firm risk drives this relation, then it should be pervasive 
across all deals, yet we find no difference in the financial, deal, or fee characteristics of statics 
and dynamics when only the first four deals are examined. 
In order to further address endogeneity, we examine ex post realizations of firm 
outcomes. Ideally, we would have a natural experiment (such as brokerage closures, Fernando, et 
al., 2012b) or a set of instruments to account for possible endogenous relations between firm 
characteristics, deal terms, and advisor choice.  As we are unable to identify these, we explore a 
variety of ex post outcomes, including deal announcement returns, changes in financial distress 
(measured by either Z-score or the CHS measure), migrations from investment-grade to non-
investment grade debt ratings, and whether the firm delisted in the year following the execution 
of the deal.  If static firms are fundamentally riskier, then we should expect lower announcement 
returns, higher incidence of financial distress, more non-investment grade firms, and a higher 
                                                            
60 Complex firms, regardless of whether they are static or dynamic, do not pay significantly higher fees 
than low-complexity dynamics.  Further, complex firms have both lower yields and merger premia, and 
more analyst coverage than low-complexity dynamics, but this could be an artifact of firm size.      
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likelihood of delisting.   
Results from difference of means and Wilcoxon signed-ranked tests are presented in 
Table 6.  In general, we observe no difference between static and dynamic firms across any of the 
five ex post realization measures.  Thus, on average, it does not appear that static firms are riskier 
than dynamics.  While this does not completely resolve potential endogeneity issues, it does 
provide some evidence that the advisor relation affects the overall costs and benefits to firms 
around deals, and it is not driven by efficient pricing of firm riskiness. 
6.B. Tests of Efficiency 
With respect to advisor retention, a substantial portion of our sample firms appear to 
make efficient decisions. Nearly 31% of statics (23% of their deals), however, are firms with low 
information opacity. These firms pay the highest average fees, have the least preferential deal 
terms, and lowest analyst coverage. These firms may be engaging in costly, suboptimal advisor 
retention. We caution, however, that there are unobservables, such as social and professional 
networks, “free” services provided by advisors to their clients, and “costs” of switching known 
only to decision makers that could lead to efficient, but unmeasurable, retention decisions.    
To explore possible issues that could affect the efficiency of the advisor retention 
decision, we examine three additional tests. First, some firms may face lock-up problems if their 
advisors (either through proprietary trading or the asset management arm of the bank) maintain 
large positions in certain types of firms.  For instance, a static firm may be compelled to retain an 
advisor that holds a significant amount of its outstanding equity.  In Panel A of Table 7, we 
collect data from Thomson Financial 13-F filings from 1995 to 2011 for our sample and examine 
the aggregate advisor ownership, segmented by firm type.  When examining the mean level of 
ownership, we find no difference in the level of advisor ownership across statics, hybrids, and 
dynamics.  Hybrids and dynamics have larger median advisor-related ownership than statics, 
indicating that statics are not held captive by large ownership positions by their advisors. 
In our second and third tests, we focus on hybrids with a gap of at least one year between 
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their last static and first dynamic deal (transition period).  In Panel B, we examine whether 
hybrids become less risky or more transparent as they transition from static to dynamic.  Across 
five of the six measures, we find no perceivable difference in a firm’s information environment 
(the exception is number of segments where hybrids become more complex).  This suggests that a 
reduction in costs to hybrids is not due to shifts in the information environment around the 
transition period. 
Last, we examine the effect of CEO turnover (Table 7, Panel C), which could alleviate 
potential managerial moral hazard.  Managers may be reluctant to move to new advisors; any 
poor outcomes (bad mergers or undersold deals) immediately following an advisor switch are 
likely to be seen as the fault of both the new advisor and the manager that made the choice to 
change.  This can lead to inefficiencies in advisor retention.  We attempt to exploit this 
inefficiency by examining CEO turnover in a sample of hybrid firms.  CEO turnover is the 
number of turnovers scaled by the number of firm-years. The incidence of CEO turnover for 
hybrids in this transition period is roughly double that for the static and dynamic portions of these 
firms (23% versus 12% and 15%).61  Thus, higher incidences of CEO turnover appear to be 
associated with firms that are willing to alter their advisor relations.  Further, nearly two-thirds of 
hybrids with CEO turnover are classified as low opacity static firms prior to the change in CEO 
(untabulated).  Low opacity static firms have relatively the highest fees and worst deal terms 
(Table 5). These results suggest that new CEOs may correct firm inefficiencies, at least as it 
pertains to the advisor retention decision. 
6.C. Alternative Specifications 
As we introduce a new methodology for firm-advisor relations, it is possible that our 
assumptions are biased.  We implement a variety of different methodologies to capture this 
relation as well as conduct multiple robustness checks. Appendix C provides a detailed list.  First, 
                                                            
61 In unreported tests, we find the incidence of CEO turnover is lowest for low-opacity statics relative to all 
others. 
121
  
 
   
as mergers may differ from capital market transactions, we test each deal type (debt, equity, and 
mergers) independently.  We also drop mergers and focus only on debt and equity deals.  In 
addition, in Table 8, we present results for the ex ante (Panel A) and ex post (Panel B) taxonomies 
of statics and dynamics.   
Next, we use alternative measures to capture firm risk and informational opacity.  For 
financial distress, we remove “grey” firms (Z-scores from 1.80 to 2.99) and use BB or B ratings 
as CHS measure cut-offs.  We create a deterioration index based on firm size, leverage, market-
to-book, and profitability, and examine each separately.  As analyst dispersion could represent 
risk (Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina, 2002), we reconstruct the information index excluding it, 
examine individual components, and also construct a complexity index based on sales, leverage, 
and number of segments (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2008).   
 To test the robustness of our hybrid classification, we re-characterize this relation using 
the first five, six, or seven deals (which marginally shifts the number of hybrid firms to dynamic), 
exclude hybrids entirely, use only hybrids split into their static and dynamic portions, and 
examine each deal type individually. Further, the ex post classification does not apply a cutoff, 
but categorizes firms across all observations.  We also shift the threshold for inclusion into our 
analyses by requiring firms to undertake a minimum of 10 or 15 deals.  Our 41-year sample 
period comprises significant changes to the advisory business, including the repeal of Glass-
Steagall in 1999 (potentially exogenous shock that could shift the number of advisors as 
commercial banks could offer investment banking services).  Even though all regressions include 
time fixed effects, we split around the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, as well as segment by decade.   
 A number of other checks are applied.  Given the increase in shelf offerings, we separate 
our debt and equity regressions based on shelf offerings.  In addition, some of dynamics may 
have started out static, but shifted behavior pre-1970 (first year of our sample).  To test this, we 
remove all dynamics with IPOs prior to 1970, and exclude dynamics entirely. We also split by 
advisor reputation, use alternative specifications of our independent variables, include additional 
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controls (e.g., investment grade indicators in debt and method of payment in mergers), and 
segment by deal size, type, number of deals, and firm age.  In all cases, we obtain quantitatively 
similar results when we implement alternate variable specifications or methodology.   
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the choice of firms to maintain long-term relations with their debt, 
equity, and merger advisors.  We find that over 60% of our firms engage a variety of advisors 
across transactions, while the remaining firms maintain steady advisor relations across their deal 
history.  Both are consistent with studies that suggest benefits to long-term advisor retention as 
well as those that propose firms benefit from switching to new advisors.   
To reconcile these findings, we examine the propensity of firms to stay with the same 
advisor or use a multitude of advisors by focusing on firm characteristics and information 
environment.  A firm’s likelihood of being dynamic is significantly negatively related to our 
information opacity measures, but not to firm risk, suggesting hard-to-value or firms that value 
informational discreteness are more likely to retain long-term advisors.  
We investigate potential consequences of a firm’s advisor choice and find that dynamic 
firms pay 6 to 9 bps lower advisory fees (debt, equity, or mergers) than statics, controlling for 
both deal and firm characteristics. Dynamic firms generally have lower yields and greater analyst 
coverage, and the magnitudes of these benefits are substantial.  For instance, firms that use many 
advisors save between $90,000 and $850,000 in per-deal fees, up to $2.3 million in interest costs 
per bond issuance, and gain nearly 25% more analyst following.  These results suggest that, 
overall, it is costly for firms to stay with one advisor; firms (and their shareholders) are better off 
maintaining relations with a variety of advisors for their transactions over time. 
When we condition on a firm’s information environment, high risk static firms pay higher 
fees, have worse deal terms, and lower analyst coverage than high risk dynamics.  Alternatively, 
high informationally opaque firms have no differences for statics and dynamics.  There appears to 
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be little benefit to moving among advisors for informationally opaque firms. Moreover, when we 
explore a variety of future outcomes of statics and dynamics, we observe little differences, 
suggesting that less preferential deal terms for statics do not speak to firm quality or riskiness. 
These findings suggest real benefits to firms when many advisors are engaged.  Further, we 
provide some evidence that low-opacity static firms may engage in suboptimal advisor retention. 
Overall, our results suggest that the choice of firm-advisor relation is not one size fits all.  
While many firms can obtain significant and measurable benefits from utilizing a variety of 
advisors, for some firms, the costs of switching can be large.  When informational set-up costs are 
high, firms place more value on long-term relations.  Our findings suggest that there are real and 
economically meaningful costs and benefits to the long-term firm-advisor retention decision. 
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Table 1: Firm and Deal Characteristics 
 
Panel A details mean statistics for the total number of deals per firm and composition of those 
deals segmented by firm type: static (698), hybrid (921), and dynamic (510). Panel B presents the 
mean firm characteristics.  All financial data are for the fiscal year prior to the deal. Panels C, D, 
and E present mean deal characteristics (debt, equity, and mergers, respectively).  The static 
(dynamic) column represents all firms classified as static (dynamic) as well as the static 
(dynamic) portion of hybrid firms. Variable definitions are detailed in Appendix A.  p-values 
report the significance of the difference between sample means using a difference of means test. 
 
 
  Static Dynamic p-val   Static Dynamic p-val 
Panel A:  Deal Statistics by Category 
Number Debt Deals 2.34 5.68 (0.00) Number Total Deals 7.80 10.80 (0.00) 
Number Equity Deals 2.62 2.58 (0.62) Firm Years in Dataset 16.17 19.21 (0.00) 
Number Mergers 2.84 2.55 (0.01) Deals per Year  1.54 1.76 (0.00) 
Panel B:  Firm Characteristics - All Deals 
MVE ($ billions) 3,791 9,495 (0.00) CHS measure -8.27 -8.39 (0.00) 
Leverage 0.33 0.34 (0.03) Info Sensitivity Index 0.27 0.21 (0.00) 
ROA (%) 12.36 11.71 (0.01) Number of Segments 2.70 3.08 (0.00) 
Market to Book  2.73 2.90 (0.02) Idiosyncratic Volatility 11.45 10.53 (0.00) 
Z-score 22.92 16.18 (0.01) Analyst Coverage/Year 13.50 14.16 (0.01) 
Panel C: Debt (N) (2816) (7011)      
Principal Amt ($ mil) 181.18 303.80 (0.00) Senior Debt (%) 91.09 95.29 (0.00) 
Gross Spread, %  0.95 0.79 (0.00) Shelf Offering (%) 59.66 75.00 (0.00) 
Offer YTM (%) 8.65 7.33 (0.00) Callable Bond (%) 60.51 63.79 (0.00) 
Maturity (years) 14.48 13.22 (0.00) 
Panel D: Equity  (N) (1440) (2296)      
Proceeds ($ mil) 112.31 162.50 (0.00) Volatility (-30,-1) (%) 1.33 1.19 (0.02) 
Gross Spread, %  4.07 3.85 (0.00) CAR (-30 to -1) (%) 2.70 1.84 (0.05) 
Underpricing (%) 1.97 2.02 (0.75) Shelf Offering (%) 29.72 45.47 (0.00) 
Relative Offer (%) 13.87 12.62 (0.00) NASDAQ (%) 28.89 26.35 (0.09) 
Panel E: Mergers (N) (482) (960)      
Merger Value ($ mil) 1,142 2,093 (0.00) Completion (%) 85.04 88.40 (0.19) 
Acquirer Fees ($ mil) 4.56 6.50 (0.00) Public Target (%) 99.79 100.00 (0.16) 
Acq. Fees, % of Deal 0.68 0.56 (0.01) Tender Offer (%) 24.27 24.90 (0.80) 
Premium (%) 49.05 46.82 (0.34) Same SIC Code (%) 30.50 30.21 (0.91) 
Run-up (%) 4.58 3.58 (0.31) Toehold (%) 0.75 0.64 (0.61) 
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Table 2: Probability of Being Dynamic 
 
This table details the marginal effects from a logistic regression on the likelihood of a firm being 
classified as dynamic using the ex ante classification. Columns (1) - (4) each include a single 
measure of risk (Z-score) and the information opacity (information sensitivity index, product 
market competition, and complexity separately in (1) – (3), and jointly in (4)). Column (5) 
includes two measures of risk (both Z-score and idiosyncratic volatility) and opacity. Column (6) 
includes all measures of risk (Z-score, idiosyncratic volatility, and CHS score) and opacity. 
Variable definitions are detailed in Appendix A. p-values are listed in parentheses.   
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log MVE -0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.002 
 (0.66) (0.44) (0.54) (0.57) (0.41) (0.70) 
MTB 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000 
(0.40) (0.71) (0.86) (0.67) (0.75) (0.83) 
ROA -0.237 -0.190 -0.190 -0.230 -0.220 -0.244 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Leverage 0.033 0.049 0.051 0.033 0.032 0.058 
(0.18) (0.04) (0.03) (0.17) (0.18) (0.02) 
Firm Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Z-Score 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.22) (0.23) (0.39) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 0.075 0.048 
    (0.25) (0.49) 
CHS Distress Measure      0.014 
      (0.20) 
Information Sensitivity Index -0.036 -0.035 -0.035 -0.032 
(0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Product Market Competition -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.01)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.98) 
Number of Segments -0.011 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
       
Year Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12,192 12,192 12,192 12,192 12,192 10,442 
Pseudo R-squared 0.090 0.087 0.089 0.093 0.093 0.090 
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Table 3: Advisor Fees, Deal Costs and Benefits 
 
This table details OLS regression results on deal costs and benefits using the split classification. 
Columns (1) - (3) detail fees for debt, equity and mergers, while Columns (4) - (6) examine yield 
to maturity (YTM), equity underpricing, and merger premiums. Analyst coverage is in Column 
(7). Variable definitions are detailed in Appendix A. p-values are listed in parentheses.   
 
Fee Regressions   Offer Under- Merger   Analyst 
Debt  Equity Mergers YTM pricing Premiums Coverage 
(1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) 
Dynamic -0.06 -0.09 -0.08 -0.10 0.14 -0.00 1.87 
(0.00) (0.02) (0.09)  (0.00) (0.42) (0.90)  (0.00) 
Top 5 Advisor  -0.07 -0.13 -0.04 -0.10 -0.09 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.36)  (0.00) (0.58) (0.83) 
Log MVE -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.09)  (0.00) (0.29) (0.02)  (0.00) 
MTB 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.08 -0.00 0.11 
(0.15) (0.57) (0.68)  (0.08) (0.05) (0.78)  (0.00) 
ROA -1.08 -1.20 -0.86 -4.82 -1.75 0.20 12.47 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)  (0.00) (0.10) (0.08)  (0.00) 
Leverage 0.76 0.02 -0.20 2.46 -0.44 -0.05 -6.66 
(0.00) (0.86) (0.26)  (0.00) (0.49) (0.41)  (0.00) 
Deal Size -0.03 -0.45 0.01 -0.60 -0.02 
(0.00) (0.00)   (0.34) (0.00) (0.00) 
Shelf Offering -0.41 -0.55 -0.08 
(0.00) (0.00)    (0.81) 
Maturity 0.01 0.02 
(0.00)    (0.00) 
Senior Debt -1.08 -1.39 
(0.00)    (0.00) 
Callable 0.35 
(0.00) 
NASDAQ 1.04 
 (0.00)  
Relative Offer Size 3.66 
 (0.01) 
Volatility (-30,-1) 0.02 
 (0.81)  
CAR (-30,-1) -1.94 
 (0.08) 
Public Target -0.19 0.12 
(0.05)    (0.05) 
Tender Offer 0.22 0.12 
(0.00)    (0.00) 
Run-up 0.00 
 (0.00) 
Same SIC 0.00 
 (0.86) 
Toehold -0.00 
 (0.11) 
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Table 3: Advisor Fees, Deal Costs and Benefits (continued) 
 
Fee Regressions   Offer Under- Merger   Analyst 
Debt  Equity Mergers YTM pricing Premiums Coverage 
(1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) 
Firm Age -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.63)  
# Deals past year -0.00 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.01 0.28 
(0.09) (0.00) (0.06)  (0.00) (0.48) (0.04)  (0.00) 
Prior Year Deal  -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
    Amount (0.43) (0.17) (0.71)  (0.85) (0.70) (0.00)  (0.24) 
Constant 1.93 6.13 0.76 7.77 2.35 0.60 6.96 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,920 3,517 770 9,827 3,736 2,175 12,777 
R-squared 0.404 0.415 0.154   0.768 0.126 0.105   0.331 
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Table 4: Firm Risk 
This table details OLS regression results on how firm risk, affects deal costs and benefits. Panel A 
uses Altman’s z-score as a measure of financial distress, Panel B uses the CHS measure of 
financial distress, and Panel C uses idiosyncratic volatility.  All firms with a Z-score lower than 
1.8 or firms with a CHS score below the median score for BBB rated firms in Mansi et al. (2012) 
are considered distressed and idiosyncratic volatility is measured by the sum of squared errors 
based on the three-factor Fama-French model.  Columns (1) - (3) detail fees for debt, equity and 
mergers, while Columns (4) - (6) examine the offer yield to maturity (YTM), equity underpricing, 
and merger premiums. Analyst coverage is presented in Column (7).  Variable definitions are 
detailed in Appendix A. p-values are listed in parentheses.   
 
 
 Fee Regressions  Offer Under- Merger  Analyst 
 Debt Equity Mergers  YTM pricing Premiums  Coverage
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
Panel A: Altman’s Z-Score        
Distressed  0.10 0.33 0.44  0.75 -0.36 0.08  -2.74 
   Statics (0.02) (0.00) (0.04)  (0.00) (0.28) (0.72)  (0.00) 
Non-distressed  0.05 0.04 0.06  0.06 0.09 -0.01  -1.95 
   Statics (0.00) (0.44) (0.25)  (0.07) (0.71) (0.57)  (0.00) 
Distressed  0.04 0.03 -0.02  0.42 0.49 0.07  2.04 
   Dynamics (0.14) (0.68) (0.89)  (0.00) (0.09) (0.47)  (0.00) 
Year/Industry FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Deal Characteristics Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  No 
Observations 7,809 2,866 699  8,653 3,052 1,274  11,433 
Adj. R-squared 0.424 0.397 0.162   0.737 0.119 0.142   0.337 
Intra-panel: Distressed Statics = Distressed Dynamics 
 (0.13) (0.00) (0.05)   (0.00) (0.00) (0.96)   (0.00) 
Panel B: CHS Measure        
Distressed 0.55 0.52 0.33  1.28 -0.25 0.03  -8.74 
   Statics (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.44) (0.60)  (0.00) 
Non-distressed 0.03 0.06 0.04  -0.01 0.14 -0.00  -1.28 
   Statics (0.05) (0.23) (0.46)  (0.81) (0.54) (0.88)  (0.00) 
Distressed 0.33 0.51 0.16  0.95 0.27 0.00  -6.46 
   Dynamics (0.00) (0.00) (0.02)  (0.00) (0.33) (0.96)  (0.00) 
Year/Industry FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Deal Characteristics Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  No 
Observations 7,094 2,671 596  7,936 2,860 1,862  10,962 
Adj. R-squared 0.390 0.414 0.091   0.777 0.112 0.117   0.338 
Intra-panel: Distressed Statics = Distressed Dynamics 
 (0.00) (0.91) (0.12)  (0.01) (0.16) (0.65)  (0.00) 
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Table 4: Firm Risk (continued) 
 
 Fee Regressions  Offer Under- Merger  Analyst 
 Debt Equity Mergers  YTM pricing Premiums  Coverage
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
Panel C: Idiosyncratic Volatility 
High Risk 0.17 0.40 0.17  0.57 0.40 -0.02  -3.93 
   Statics (0.00) (0.00) (0.02)  (0.00) (0.12) (0.57)  (0.00) 
Low Risk 0.04 0.11 0.07  0.04 -0.13 -0.02  -0.90 
   Statics (0.01) (0.08) (0.28)  (0.25) (0.50) (0.56)  (0.00) 
High Risk 0.09 0.31 0.07  0.43 0.52 -0.02  -1.56 
   Dynamics (0.00) (0.00) (0.15)  (0.00) (0.02) (0.52)  (0.00) 
Year/Industry FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Deal Characteristics Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  No 
Observations 8,834 34428 755  9,710 3,694 1,428  12,625 
Adj. R-squared 0.390 0.414 0.091   0.777 0.112 0.117   0.338 
Intra-panel: High Risk Statics = High Risk Dynamics 
 (0.00) (0.06) (0.16)  (0.01) (0.64) (0.98)  (0.00) 
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Table 5: Firm Opacity  
 
This table details OLS regressions on the effect of information opacity on deal costs and benefits 
using three different measures.  Panel A reports information sensitivity, measured by an index 
based on analyst forecast dispersion as well as asset-scaled R&D, intangibles, and capital 
expenditures. Panel B measures product market competition based on the Herfindahl Index on 
sales. Panel C uses firm complexity, measured by the number of operating segments from 
Compustat.  Columns (1) - (3) detail fees for debt, equity and mergers, while columns (4) - (6) 
examine the offer yield to maturity (YTM), equity underpricing, and merger premiums. Analyst 
coverage is presented in column (7). Variable definitions are detailed in Appendix A. p-values are 
listed in parentheses.   
 
 
 Fee Regressions  Offer Under- Merger  Analyst
 Debt Equity Mergers  YTM pricing Premiums  Coverage
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
Panel A: Information Sensitivity        
High Info Sensitive 0.09 0.09 0.08  0.28 0.45 -0.05  -0.08 
   Statics (0.00) (0.29) (0.40)  (0.00) (0.40) (0.24)  (0.82) 
Low Info Sensitive 0.11 0.15 0.16  0.18 -0.09 0.01  -1.86 
   Statics (0.00) (0.01) (0.02)  (0.00) (0.69) (0.84)  (0.00) 
High Info Sensitive 0.05 0.09 0.11  0.18 0.17 -0.01  1.18 
   Dynamics (0.00) (0.32) (0.10)  (0.00) (0.70) (0.83)  (0.00) 
Year/Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Deal Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  No 
Observations 6,224 2,270 487  7,029 2,415 1,098  12,261 
Adj. R-squared 0.426 0.358 0.078   0.732 0.069 0.115   0.333 
Intra-panel: High Info Sensitive Statics = High Info Sensitive Dynamics 
 (0.21) (0.99) (0.80)   (0.18) (0.62) (0.38)   (0.00)
Panel B: Product Market Competition        
High Competition 0.05 0.33 0.11  0.03 -0.28 -3.47  -3.68 
   Statics (0.02) (0.00) (0.10)  (0.54) (0.37) (0.32)  (0.00) 
Low Competition 0.07 0.16 0.22  0.21 -0.15 -0.98  -2.02 
   Statics (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.40) (0.81)  (0.00) 
High Competition 0.01 0.33 0.11  0.05 -0.17 -2.20  -1.81 
   Dynamics (0.55) (0.00) (0.07)  (0.29) (0.58) (0.43)  (0.00) 
Year/Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Deal Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  No 
Observations 8,894 3,492 759  9,787 3,712 1,423  12,735 
Adj. R-squared 0.402 0.419 0.149   0.770 0.125 0.143   0.335 
Intra-panel: High Competition Statics = High Competition Dynamics 
 (0.03) (0.99) (0.97)  (0.75) (0.72) (0.67)  (0.00) 
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Table 5: Firm Opacity (continued) 
 
 Fee Regressions  Offer Under- Merger  Analyst 
 Debt Equity Mergers  YTM pricing Premiums  Coverage
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
Panel C: Firm Complexity         
High Complexity -0.00 -0.07 -0.01  -0.13 0.12 -0.13  0.62 
   Statics (0.92) (0.35) (0.89)  (0.01) (0.73) (0.00)  (0.04) 
Low Complexity 0.08 0.14 0.12  0.12 -0.37 0.01  -2.76 
   Statics (0.00) (0.00) (0.06)  (0.00) (0.09) (0.65)  (0.00) 
High Complexity -0.01 0.02 -0.03  -0.09 -0.20 -0.06  0.48 
   Dynamics (0.41) (0.74) (0.62)  (0.02) (0.42) (0.06)  (0.01) 
Year/Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Deal Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  No 
Observations 7,814 3,068 733  8,631 3,273 1,377  11,737 
Adj. R-squared 0.423 0.402 0.085  0.770 0.116 0.119   0.342 
Intra-panel: High Complexity Statics = High Complexity Dynamics 
 (0.58) (0.27) (0.79)  (0.41) (0.40) (0.06)   (0.64)
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Table 6: Ex Post Realizations 
 
This table provides difference of means and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for the difference 
between static and dynamic firms in cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date 
of a firm’s debt, equity, or merger transactions, the change in a firm’s Z-score from the 
announcement date through one-year post-announcement, the change in a firm’s CHS score, the 
percentage of firm’s that change from investment grade to non-investment grade, and the 
percentage of firm’s that delist within the following year.  p-values report the significance of the 
difference between sample means or medians using a difference of means or Wilcoxon signed-
rank test. 
 
 
  Mean   Median 
  Static Dynamic p-value   Static  Dynamic p-value
CAR (-1 to +1) -0.70 % -0.71 % (0.90) -0.31 % -0.34 % (0.48)
Observations       3,610       7,118 
Z-score  -1.04 -1.01 (0.94) -0.02 0.01 (0.39)
Observations       2,267       4,325 
CHS score 0.02 0.01 (0.26) 0.04 0.03 (0.43)
Observations       2,174       4,028 
IG to Non IG 1.25% 1.05% (0.63) 0.00 0.00 (0.63)
Observations 883 2,296
Percent Delisted 1.23% 0.97% (0.25) 0.00% 0.00% (0.25)
Observations       3,080       5,661           
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Table 7: Efficiency Tests 
 
This table provides efficiency tests for firms.  Panel (A) reports the percentage of investment bank 
ownership at the time of the deal by the firm’s advisor, separated into static, hybrid, and dynamic firms. 
Panel (B) focuses on hybrid firms and examines the differences in the firm’s information environment 
(for both risk and opacity measures) for the last deal that a firm is static and the first deal it is dynamic.  
Panel (C) details the number of CEO turnovers scaled by number of years where the transition period 
(Column 3) represents the period between the last deal that hybrids are static and the first deal hybrids 
are dynamic.  p-values report the significance of the difference between sample means or medians using 
a difference of means or Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
 
 
Panel A:  Investment Banker Ownership 
Static Hybrid Dynamic p-value 
(1) (2) (3)  1 vs. 2 1 vs. 3 2 vs. 3
Mean 0.81 % 0.82 % 0.84 % (0.87) (0.70) (0.79)
Median 0.23 % 0.30 % 0.30 % (0.01) (0.00) (0.28)
(N) 831 3,256 1,494 
Panel B:  Hybrid Firms during Transition Period  - Opacity  
  Static Dynamic p-value    
Z Score 37.62 35.85 (0.83)
(N) 620 617
CHS measure -8.02 -8.06 (0.42)
(N) 570 599
Idiosyncratic Volatility 0.12 0.13 (0.25)
(N) 346 686
Information Index 2.04 2.03 (0.92)
(N) 266 515
Number of Segments 2.21 2.43 (0.01)
(N) 718 698
Product Market Competition 657.48 625.67 (0.34)
(N) 755 741
Panel C:  Hybrid Firms - CEO Turnover  
Static 
Portion 
Dynamic 
Portion 
Transition 
Period p-value  
  (1) (2) (3) 1 vs. 3  2 vs. 3  
Mean 12.04 % 14.58 % 23.14 % (0.00) (0.02)  
(N) 247 247 98    
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Table 8: Deal Costs and Benefits:  Ex Ante and Ex Post Classifications 
 
This table reports OLS regressions for deal costs and benefits using the ex ante classification (Panel A) 
and ex post classification (Panel B).  The ex ante classification uses the first four deals to classify all 
firms and maintains that classification for the entire time the firm is in the dataset.  The ex post 
classification bases the type of firm-advisor relationship using all firm deals.  Columns (1) - (3) detail 
fees for debt, equity and mergers, while columns (4) - (6) examine the offer yield to maturity (YTM), 
equity underpricing, and merger premiums.  Analyst coverage is detailed in column (7).  Variable 
definitions are detailed in Appendix A.  p-values are listed in parentheses. 
 
Fee Regressions Offer Under- Merger Analyst 
Debt Equity Mergers YTM pricing Premiums Coverage
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) 
Panel A: Ex Ante Classification               
Dynamic  -0.02 -0.06 -0.13 -0.07 -0.15 -0.02 -0.23 
(0.06) (0.17) (0.00)  (0.02) (0.37) (0.41)  (0.16) 
Year/Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Deal Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Observations 8,920 3,517 770 9,827 3,736 2,175 12,777 
Adj. R-squared 0.403 0.415 0.157   0.768 0.126 0.105   0.324 
Panel B: Ex Post Classification               
Dynamic  -0.06 -0.10 -0.12 -0.10 0.02 0.02 2.23 
(0.00) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.01) (0.94) (0.57)  (0.00) 
Year/Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Deal Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Observations 8,920 3,517 770 9,827 3,736 2,175 12,777 
Adj. R-squared 0.403 0.415 0.157   0.768 0.126 0.105   0.331 
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Appendix A: Dataset Construction (Chapter 1)  
 
The final dataset is composed of insider trading data from Thomson Reuters, Form 4, Table 1 and 
merger data from Securities and Data Corporation (SDC).  After April-1991, the SEC combined all 
private transactions with open market transactions. To remove these transactions, erroneously 
recorded trades, and all routine trades, I apply the following filters to the dataset (following Jeng et 
al., 2003 and Cohen et al., 2012): 
 Removal of trades where the number of shares traded exceeds trading volume for a given 
day 
 Removal of records where prices reported for the shares traded fell outside the daily 
trading range on CRSP 
 Removal of trades less than one hundred shares 
 Removal of trades with a stock price below $2.  
 Removal of all routine trades as defined by Cohen et al. (2012).  If an insider trades in the 
same month of the year for at least three years, all subsequent trades by that insider in that 
month are deemed routine trades.  All other trades are classified as opportunistic. 
 
Data Step Sales # Firms 
Purchase
s # Firms 
All open market sales or purchases from Form 4, 
Table 1 from 1992-2013 2,864,233 15,961 949,919 16,887 
All open market sales or purchases from Form 4 
that are clean  2,851,537 15,961 930,720 16,887 
Matching to CRSP 2,736,009 11,967 789,522 12,381 
Dropping all routine trades according to Cohen et. 
al. (2012) and applying filters by Jeng et. Al. 
(2003). 
2,251,598 10,746 512,898 11,149 
Collapsing transactions into one aggregate daily 
transaction per individual per firm 741,494 10,746 282,231 11,149 
Removing all trades not by directors/CEO of the 
firm 345,704 9,289 163,741 10,172 
Merging Sales and Purchases together # Obs. # Firms 
Creating one merged dataset of sales and purchases 
per firm per day per group 446,030 11,390 
Match dataset with Compustat  330,507 6,973 
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Appendix B: Variable Definitions (Chapter 1) 
 
Insider trading data obtained from Thomson Reuters, Form 4, Table 1 described in Appendix 
A. Financial data is from Compustat and stock price data is from CRSP.  Firm financial data 
is for fiscal year prior to the year of the merger, winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels, and 
GDP adjusted where appropriate (base year 2000). Governance data obtained from 
RiskMetrics and institutional ownership from Thomson Reuters 13-F Institutional.  
Variable Name  Definition 
Panel A:  Insider Trading Variables 
Outside Director Net 
Sales ($) (OD trades) 
Total dollar volume sold less the total dollar volume bought by 
outside directors scaled by the total dollar volume traded in the 
six month per-merger period  
# of Outside Director 
Selling (Buying) 
Total number of outside directors selling (buying) in the six 
month pre-merger period in a firm  
% of Outside Director 
Selling(Buying) on Board 
Percentage of the outside directors on the board selling (buying) 
in the six month pre-merger period in a firm  
Panel B:  Merger Variables 
CAR  
Acquirer cumulative abnormal returns calculated using Fama-
French three factor model for the three day window (-1,1) 
around the merger announcement 
1-year BHAR One year buy-and-hold abnormal return from the date of merger completion using Fama-French three factor model 
2-Year BHAR Two year buy-and-hold abnormal return from the date of merger completion using Fama-French three factor model 
Deal Value Deal value of the merger in millions of dollars; GDP adjusted 
Prior Stock Performance Prior six month return calculated using Fama-French 3-Factor model  
Relative Size 
Target value (proxied by deal value) divided by the acquirer 
market value, where the acquirer market value is calculated by 
multiplying shares outstanding times the monthly price as of the 
month before the merger announcement 
Tender Offer Indicator variable that equals one if offer is a tender offer 
100% Stock Indicator variable equaling one if acquirer used 100% stock 
Same Industry Indicator variable if the acquirer and target share the same 4-digit sic code 
Foreign Target Indicator variable equaling one if the target is a foreign target 
Public Target Indicator variable equaling one if the target is a public target 
Subsidiary Target Indicator variable equaling one if the target is a subsidiary target 
Merger Program  Indicator variable equaling one if the merger is part of a merger program as defined by Fuller et al. (2002) 
Run-up (-42,-6) Percentage change in price from day (-42) to day (-6) before the merger announcement date 
Multiple Bidders Indicator variable equaling one if there are multiple bidders 
Merger Wave 
Indicator variable equaling one if the acquirer is currently in an 
industry merger wave using methodology outlined by Harford 
(2005) and Netter, Stegemoller, and Wintoki (2011)  
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Appendix B (continued) 
 
Panel C: Governance and Ownership Characteristics 
Board Size The total number of board members  
CEO/COB Duality Indicator variable equaling 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman of the Board 
CEO Tenure Number of years served by the CEO  
CEO Ownership The percentage of shares outstanding owned by the CEO 
CEO Entrenchment Index 
Following Masulis and Mobbs (2011), an index is created using 
principal components analysis based on CEO tenure, CEO 
ownership, and if the CEO is also chair of the board  
High CEO Entrenchment 
Index 
Indicator variable equaling 1 the CEO for the firm has a greater 
Entrenchment Index than the median level for firms that year.  
Institutional Ownership The percentage of shares outstanding owned by institutional investors  
Top Five Institutional 
Ownership 
The percentage of shares outstanding owned by the top five 
institutional investors  
Blockholder Ownership Percentage of shares outstanding owned by any blockholders of the firm 
Multiple Blockholders Indicator variable equaling 1 if the firm has two or more blockholders as shareholders 
 
Panel D: Firm Characteristics 
Log Assets Log of firm assets  
Market Value of Equity Closing price per share times common shares outstanding 
Market to Book Closing price per share times common shares outstanding divided by common stockholder's equity 
ROA Operating income before depreciation divided by assets 
Cash  Amount of cash scaled by firm assets 
Leverage Debt divided by equity  
Firm Age Age of firm at time of deal (based on CRSP start date) 
R&D Research and development expense scaled by assets, as defined by Compustat  
Analyst Coverage Number of analysts that cover the firm in a given year (from I/B/E/S) 
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Appendix C: Dataset Construction (Chapter 2) 
 
This appendix details the construction of our sample of U.S. publicly traded commercial and 
investment banks public and private debt issues obtained from the Securities Data Corporation 
(SDC) Global New Issues database.  We collect all debt offerings from SDC between 1970 and 
2014, and following the process below we match the dataset to CRSP and Compustat.  We further 
eliminate observations due to lack of required data for our main analyses.  The objective is to 
identify banks that are both “able” (legally permitted) and “capable” (a history of at least one 
external debt offering) that could possibly underwrite their own debt.  Whether these capable 
banks do underwrite their own debt is not a requirement to classify banks.  Our final dataset 
consists of 9,760 debt issues by 60 firms. 
 
Step  Sample Construction Process # Deals # Firms 
1 Obtain all debt issuances for U.S. publicly traded investment and commercial banks from SDC between 1970-2014 17,311      1,117 
2 
Use SDC firm cusip, date, and name information to match the firms 
to the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) to obtain firm 
permnos 
15,983 782
3 
Follow Burch et al. (2005), collapse all debt deals within a 7-day 
period of the same type, coupon, maturity, and advisor into a single 
aggregate offering 
15,184 782
4 Remove deals with missing transaction values and with no listed advisors 15,149 776
5 Match firms to Compustat to obtain prior-year financial information  14,721 643
6 
Identify and remove those firms that are not capable of self-
underwriting their own debt issuances.  This reduces the sample years 
to 1979-2014. (See below) 
10,975 74
7 Eliminate deals with missing specific deal and firm characteristics (e.g., maturity, prior-year debt market share) 9,760 60
 
To classify whether a bank is capable of self-underwriting their own debt issuances, we 
perform the following with regards to Step #6 above: 
 Obtain a listing of all debt issuances from U.S. publicly traded firms from 1970 
through 2014 from SDC (58,936 deals for 7,939 firms) 
 For each debt issuance, identify whether a bank is the lead underwriter for a deal 
 For each banking firm in the universe, find the first deal where the bank acted as 
a lead underwriter for another firm 
 Using the sample constructed in Step #5 above, cross-match the 643 banks to 
identify the first possible date (if any) it started underwriting debt deals; classify 
a bank as “capable” beginning with the data of the first external debt 
underwriting 
 Remove any deals by the bank prior to the date it became “capable” of 
underwriting debt as well as any banks without external underwriting experience 
 The procedure yields a sample of 74 capable banks  
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Appendix D: Variable Definitions (Chapter 2) 
 
This table provides descriptions of the variables used in our analyses.  Variables related to debt 
issuances are obtained from Securities Data Corporation (SDC) unless otherwise specified.  
Financial data are collected from Compustat and stock price data are collected from CRSP.  All 
market ranking information is obtained from SDC League Tables for the year prior to the debt 
issuance.  All firm financial data is for the fiscal year prior to the year of the debt issuance and is 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
 
Variable Definition 
Debt Characteristics 
Use Rival  Indicator equal to 1 if a bank uses a rival bank as the lead advisor in a deal 
Gross Spread, % Principal 
Gross spread as a percent of the principal (gross spread represents 
total manager's fee: management fee, underwriting fee, and selling 
concession)    
Deal Size Principal amount (in millions) 
Relative Deal Size Deal size divided by market value of equity 
Maturity Length of time for the bond to mature (in years) 
Offer Yield to Maturity Offer yield to maturity (in percent) 
Coupon  Bond coupon (in percent)  
International Deal Indicator equal to 1 if the offering is done internationally (coded as AND, ASPD, ECD, ED, or IFD by SDC) 
Private Deal  Indicator equal to 1 if the offering is privately placed (coded as PD, R144CD, or R144D by SDC) 
Financial and Firm Characteristics 
Market Value of Equity Year-end closing price per share times common shares outstanding (in millions) 
Leverage Total long-term debt divided by total assets  
ROA Operating income before depreciation divided by total assets  
Market to Book Market value of equity divided by common stockholder's equity  
Number of Deals Per Year Total annual debt offerings by the issuing bank  
12-mo Prior Stock Return Cumulative abnormal returns from three-factor model (Fama and French, 1993) based on daily returns (-253, -1) prior to issue date 
% Issued by IBs Fraction of total deals issued by an investment bank 
% Issued by Top 10 Bank Fraction of total deals issued by a Top 10 ranked bank (SDC League Tables) 
Total Rival Leads Total number of unique lead underwriters  
Prior 6-mo Deals Advised, # Prior 6-month percentage of total deals underwritten (all firms), based on the number of deals 
Prior 6-mo Deals Advised, $ Prior 6-month percentage of total deals underwritten (all firms), based on deal value  
Average Deal Size Advised Prior 6-month average deal size underwritten 
% Self-Underwritten Prior year percentage of deals self-underwritten scaled by the total issuer  financial debt deals 
% Financial Mkt Share Prior year percentage of financial debt scaled by total debt underwritten by the issuer 
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Appendix D: Variable Definitions (continued) 
Reputation Measures  
Issuer Top 10 Rank Indicator equal to 1 if the issuer was ranked as a Top 10 debt advisor in prior-year SDC League Tables 
Advisor Top 10 Rank Indicator equal to 1 if the current advisor was ranked as a Top 10 debt advisor in prior-year SDC League Tables 
Advisor Ranked Higher Indicator equal 1 if current advisor ranked higher than issuer in SDC League Tables.  
Advisor Ranked Lower Indicator equal to1 if the current advisor is ranked lower than the issuer in SDC League Tables.  
PY Debt Market Share Prior-year issuer or advisor debt market share (SDC League Tables) 
PY Financial Proceeds 
Total financial firm debt proceeds underwritten in the prior year (League 
Tables) 
PY Financial Market Share  Prior-year issuer financial firm debt market share (SDC League Tables) 
PY # Financial Issues  Number of financial firm debt deals underwritten in the prior year (League Tables) 
PY Financial Debt Ranking Prior-year financial firm debt ranking (SDC League Tables) 
Expertise Measures 
Issuer: % International Issuer's market share of international debt offers over prior 5 years  
Issuer: % Private Issuer's market share of private debt offers over prior 5 years 
Issuer: % Long Maturity Issuer's market share of long-term (> 10 year maturity) debt offers over prior 5 years 
Advisor > % International Indicator equal 1 if advisor international debt market share larger than issuer 
Advisor > % Private Indicator equal 1 if the advisor private debt market share is larger than issuer 
Advisor > % Long Maturity Indicator equal 1 if advisor the long-term debt market share is larger than issuer 
Certification Measures 
High Debt Rating Indicator equal to 1 if the offering is rated AA or higher by Moody's 
Mid Debt Rating Indicator equal to 1 if the offering is rated A by Moody's 
Low Debt Rating Indicator equal to 1 if the offering is rated BAA or lower by Moody's  
12-mo Prior Stock Vol Standard deviation of daily stock returns 12 months prior to the debt offer 
Relationship Characteristics (based on deal value) 
Prior 12-mo Advisor Use Prior 12-month percentage of issuer deals underwritten by current advisor 
Prior 12-mo Rival Use Prior 12-month percentage of issuer's deals underwritten by other advisors 
Capacity Measures (based on deal value)
Percent Debt Market Prior 6-month percentage of financial debt offerings underwritten by issuer 
Financial Debt Capacity Prior 6-month financial to total debt offerings underwritten by issuer 
Other  
Post-1999 Indicator equal to 1 if the offering occurred after the repeal of Glass-Steagall in 1999  
Asset Management Indicator equal to 1 if the issuer has an asset management division (FINRA.org) 
Proprietary Trading  Indicator equal to 1 if the issuer engages in proprietary trading (FINRA.org) 
Derivative Trading Indicator equal to 1 if  issuer engages in derivatives trading (FINRA.org) 
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Appendix E: Variable Definitions (Chapter 3) 
 
This table provides descriptions of the variables used in our analyses.  Variables related to debt 
and equity issuances and mergers are obtained from SDC.  Financial data are collected from 
Compustat and stock price data are collected from CRSP.  Analyst data are from IBES.  All firm 
financial data is for the fiscal year prior to the year of the deal and is winsorized at the 1% and 
99% levels. 
 
Variable Definition 
Firm Definitions 
Static Indicator variable equal to one if a firm consistently uses one or 
two advisors in 80% of all deals (see Appendix B for further 
details) 
Dynamic  Indicator variable equal to one if a firm uses multiple advisors in 
all deals (see Appendix B for further details) 
Hybrid Indicator variable equal to one if a firm is classified initially as 
static but at some point uses multiple advisors (see Appendix B for 
further details)  
Debt Characteristics  
Gross Spread, % Principal Gross spread as a percent of the principal amount; where gross 
spread represents total manager's fee (management fee, 
underwriting fee, and selling concession)    
Principal Amount  Principal amount in millions of dollars; GDP adjusted 
Maturity Length of time for the bond to mature in years 
Offer Yield to Maturity Percentage of offer yield to maturity 
Shelf Offering Indicator equal to one if deal is a shelf offering under Rule 415 
Senior Debt Indicator equal to one if the debt offering is classified as senior 
debt and not subordinated debt 
Callable Bond  Indicator equal to one if the debt offering is callable 
Equity Characteristics   
Gross Spread, % Principal Gross spread as a percent of proceeds amount; where gross spread 
represents total manager's fee (management fee, underwriting fee, 
and selling concession)      
Proceeds Principal amount in millions of dollars; GDP adjusted 
Underpricing Closing price less offer price divided by offer price times 100 
Shelf Offering Indicator equal to one if deal is a shelf offering under Rule 415 
NASDAQ Indicator equal to one if the firm trades on NASDAQ 
Relative Offer Size Proceeds divided by market cap at t-1 days prior to offering 
Volatility Standard deviation of the closing prices calculated from -30 to -1 
days prior to offering 
CAR Market-adjusted cumulative abnormal return calculated from -30 
to -1 days prior to offering 
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Appendix E: Variable Definitions (continued) 
 
Variable Definition 
Merger Characteristics   
Acquirer Total Fees  Total fees paid by acquirer to its advisors upon completion of the 
deal in millions of dollars; GDP adjusted 
Merger Value  Deal value of the merger in millions of dollars; GDP adjusted 
Premium Offer price to target stock price four weeks prior to 
announcement 
Completion Indicator equal to one if the deal is completed 
Run-up Percentage change in price from day (-42) to day (-6) before the 
merger announcement date 
Tender Offer Indicator equal to one if a tender offer is made 
Same SIC Indicator equal to one if acquirer and target have the same four-
digit sic code  
Toehold Percentage of shares acquirer holds in target firm prior to merger 
Public Target Indicator equal to one if the target is public  
Financial and Firm Characteristics 
Market Value of Equity Closing price per share times common shares outstanding in billions 
Leverage Debt divided by assets  
ROA Operating income before depreciation divided by assets  
Market to Book Closing price per share times common shares outstanding divided by common stockholder's equity  
Firm Deal Age Age of firm in years at time of deal (based on CRSP start date) 
Information Sensitivity 
Index 
Comprised of R&D to total assets, intangible to total assets, 
capital expenditures to total assets, and average standard 
deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts  
Z-score Altman’s (1968) Z-score 
Idiosyncratic Volatility  Sum of squared errors from a three-factor Fama French model 
CHS Distress Measure Uses both accounting and market based data to predict distress scores according to reduced form model in Campbell et al. (2008) 
Analyst Coverage Per Year Number of analysts that cover the firm in a given year from IBES 
Top 5 Advisor Indicator equal to one if the firm’s advisor is a top 5 advisor  
Number of Segments Number of segments based on reported segment financials in the Compustat Non-Historical and Historical database 
Product Market 
Competition 
Based on Herfindahl concentration index; sum of squared market 
shares of sales for each firm using four-digit SIC industry and 
year 
Number of Deals in  
   Past Year 
Aggregate number of deals across debt, equity, and mergers that 
a firm engaged in during the past twelve months 
Value of Deals in Past Year Aggregate value of deals across debt, equity, and mergers a firm 
engaged in during the past twelve months; GDP adjusted 
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Appendix F: Examples of Firm Classifications (Chapter 3) 
 
This table displays examples of our three classifications of firm-advisor relations. Static firms consistently 
retain the same advisors for at least 80% of their total transaction history (two examples provided). A 
hybrid firm initially uses the same advisor for at least the first four transactions, but at some point begins to 
use multiple advisors.  Dynamic firms use at least three advisors in its first four transactions, and then 
continue using multiple advisors for the remainder of deals.  Transaction data are obtained from SDC 
Mergers and Acquisitions and Global New Issues databases. 
 
Static (#1)    Static (#2)    Hybrid   Dynamic  
# Type Advisor # Type Advisor # Type Advisor # Type Advisor 
1 Equity Bear  1 Equity MS  1 Equity FBC  1 Debt LEH 
2 Equity Bear  2 Equity MS  2 Equity FBC  2 Equity LEH 
3 Merger   3 Equity MS  3 Equity FBC  3 Debt MS 
4 Debt Bear  4 Equity MS  4 Equity FBC  4 Merger Eberstadt 
5 Equity Bear  5 Debt MS  5 Equity FBC  5 Merger  
6 Debt Bear  6 Debt MS  6 Equity WW  6 Debt Shearson 
7 Merger Bear  7 Equity MS  7 Equity BHSS  7 Debt FBC 
8 Debt Bear  8 Equity MS  8 Equity MS  8 Debt SAL 
9 Debt Bear  9 Debt ML  9 Equity PBCF  9 Debt Smith 
10 Merger Bear  10 Debt MS  10 Equity PBCF  10 Merger  
11 Debt Bear  11 Debt MS  11 Equity GS  11 Debt FBC 
12 Debt Bear  12 Debt BOA  12 Debt MS  12 Debt JPM 
13 Debt Bear  13 Debt BOA  13 Debt MS  13 Merger  
    14 Debt BOA  14 Equity MS  14 Debt JPM 
        15 Merger CSFB  15 Debt JPM 
        16 Debt MS  16 Merger Warburg 
        17 Debt Barclay  17 Equity BOA 
        18 Debt MS  18 Debt CSFB 
        19 Equity LEH     
        20 Debt JPM     
        21 Equity JPM     
Intermedia Communications Kohl's Corp  Northeast Utilities Hercules Inc.  
This firm is involved in 13 
deals consisting of 7 debt 
offerings, 3 equity offerings 
and 3 mergers.  In 1 case, 
the firm uses no advisors.  In 
the remaining 12 deals, it 
uses Bear Stearns. 
  
Firm is involved 
in 14 deals 
consisting of 8 
debt and 6 equity. 
It uses Morgan 
Stanley, except in 
1 case, and then 
switches to Bank 
of America for 
rest of deals.  
  
Firm is involved in 
21 deals, consisting 
of 6 debt, 14 equity 
and 1 merger. It uses 
First Boston for first 
5 deals, but then 
switches among 9 
different banks for 
the remaining 16 
deals.  
  
This firm is involved 
in 18 deals, 
consisting of 11 debt 
deals, 2 equity deals 
and 5 mergers. The 
firm uses 10 
advisors, routinely 
switching with no 
consistent pattern.  
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Appendix G: Robustness Specifications (Chapter 3) 
 
This table provides descriptions of various robustness specifications on our analyses.  Robustness tests are 
conducted on methodology, deal characteristics, alternative specifications, as well as additional or alternate 
variables for Tables II – VI. 
 
Robustness measure  Rationale 
Methodological   
Increase cutoff for statics to 90% or 100%  Current 80% may be too low 
Use first five, six, or seven deals  1st four deals may not be enough to observe relation 
Increase minimum observations per firm to 10 
or 15 
 Current minimum of 5 observations per firm may be 
too low to establish relations 
Remove all dynamics with IPOs pre-1970  Examine only firms can observe entire history 
Include IPOs in all analyses  Examine if current exclusion of IPOs impacts results 
Classify firms based on each deal type  Examining relation in aggregate may mix impact 
Exclude hybrid firms from analyses   Firms that alter behavior may complicate analysis 
Exclude hybrids that transition from dynamic 
to static 
 Firms that shift from dynamic to static may be 
fundamentally different 
Run analyses on hybrid firms only  Isolate impact of firms that alter behavior 
Define advisory relation based on 2 deals 
within past 5 years 
 Replicate prior studies 
Eliminate deals without advisors  Limit analysis to only deals with advisors 
Calculate short- and long-term measures of 
advisor loyalty 
 Examine variation in relation of differing time 
horizons (replicate prior studies) 
Deal Characteristics   
Bifurcate regressions into small/large firms  Impact may vary by firm size 
Matched sample (size) for statics and dynamics  Impact may vary by firm size 
Segment on deal size, # deals, firm age  Key firm characteristics may impact relation 
Exclude proceeds from debt/equity fees  Consistent with merger specification 
Separate on shelf offerings (debt & equity)  Dramatic increase in shelf registration in 1990s 
Eliminate deal characteristics  Replicate prior studies 
Alternative Specifications   
Examine CEO turnover by firm type  Decision to remain static may be related to CEO 
Split around the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act  Potential exogenous shock impact # of advisors 
Examine merger death/consolidation  Potential exogenous shock that could alter relation 
Examine CAR (-1,1) around mergers  Merger performance may vary by firm type 
Examine medians (Table 1)  Outliers may impact relation 
Examine completed deals only  Relations may vary if deals not completed 
Include governance variables (% independent, 
board size, G- or E-index, classified board, 
CEO Duality) 
 Governance characteristics may impact advisor 
relation, data available 1996 - 2010 only (1996 - 
2007 for G-index) 
Rerun all tables 1975 – 2001  Replicate prior studies 
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Appendix G: Robustness Specifications (continued) 
 
Robustness measure  Rationale 
Additional Variables   
Table II – Probability of Being Dynamic   
Use idiosyncratic volatility or CHS measures 
for all models 
 Alternate measures of information asymmetry 
Include governance variables (% independent, 
board size, busy board, classified board, 
CEO duality, CEO tenure, CEO age) 
 Governance characteristics may impact advisor 
relation, data available 1996 - 2010 only  
Estimate each regression using firm-year 
specifications 
 Prevent results from being biased towards firms 
engaging in multiple deals in one year 
Table III – Main Specifications   
Use top 10 advisors or Ritter Rankings  Alternate measure of advisor reputation 
Market value of  equity versus total assets   Alternate measure of firm size 
Measure past activity over 3 years or total 
sample windows 
 Examine impact of longer horizon of prior deals 
Investment grade indicator  Measure of firm quality 
Method of payment indicator (mergers)  Merger financing may be related to advisory relation 
Control for # of days since last deal and 
indicator if last deal < 3, 6, or 9 months 
 Time between deals may impact likelihood of firm 
type (e.g., static or dynamic) 
Control for same day deals  Deals on same days (across types) may be related 
Aggregate deal fees scaled by aggregate value 
of transaction by deal type 
 Examine whether firms pay higher fees initially to 
obtain lower pricing later in relation 
Table IV – Firm Risk   
Remove firms with Z-scores between 1.80   
and 2.99, inclusive 
 Z-scores in this range are “grey”, removes near-
distress firms 
Create financial deterioration index (size, 
leverage, MTB, and profitability) as well as 
include each of 4 measures individually 
 Alternate specifications of financial deterioration 
Use CHS cutoff for BB or B ratings  Alternate specifications for financial deterioration 
Include measures of financial constraint: 
dividend payout, long- or short-term debt 
rating, sales, investment grade 
 Distinguish between impact of financial constraint as 
opposed to financial distress 
Include negative returns in previous year  Alternate specification for firm risk 
Include total firm risk  Alternate specification for idiosyncratic volatility 
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Appendix G: Robustness Specifications (continued) 
 
Robustness measure  Rationale 
Additional Variables   
Table V – Informational Opacity   
Exclude analyst dispersion from index  May proxy for risk rather than information 
Examine each of the 4 information sensitivity 
index components individually  
 Alternate measure of information sensitivity  
Classify high product competition based on 
mean 
 Alternate specification of product market competition 
Condition on single vs multi-segment  Alternate specification of firm complexity 
Create index of complexity based on sales, 
leverage, and number of segments as well as 
include each measure individually 
 Alternate specification of firm complexity 
Table VI – Ex Post Realizations   
Calculate 5-day event CARs  Alternate specification of event returns 
Examine percentage change in Z-scores  Alternate specification of Z-score 
Examine percentage change in CHS  Alternate specification of CHS measure 
Use merger completion date to one year post-
completion 
 Alternate calculation window for Z-score instead of 
announcement date 
Segment each measure by debt/equity/mergers  Examining relation in aggregate may mix impact 
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